Certainty of objects: fixed trusts, discretionary trusts and powers
Which test of certainty of objects applies to a fixed trust, a discretionary trust and a mere power, and what is persuasive English authority as against what Australian courts have decided.
Learning outcomes
- Classify a disposition as a fixed trust, a discretionary trust or a mere power by construing it, and choose the certainty-of-objects test that goes with each.
- State the ‘is or is not’ test from Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements and McPhail v Doulton with its status in Australia (persuasive English authority, the McPhail test a majority view), and separate unclear words, difficulty of proof and a class too wide.
- State what Kinsela v Caldwell decided, and the limited authority of West v Weston and Re Blyth, without crediting the High Court with a test it did not state.
A trust, or a power to select among people, can fail for uncertainty if those it is for cannot be identified well enough for the trustee, or a court stepping in, to carry it out. The standard is not a single test: it depends on what the trustee is required to do, so the first question is how the disposition is classified. This article states general equitable principle for all Australian jurisdictions and relies on case law, with one Queensland provision (s 33R of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld)) mentioned because of its bearing on Re Blyth. It does not cover other State or Territory legislation that affects a particular trust or will. English decisions are persuasive only in Australia, and the Australian authority cited here on the discretionary-trust test is a single-judge decision of a State Supreme Court, not a High Court decision.
Classify the disposition first
This article distinguishes three kinds of disposition, because the cases treat them differently. That grouping is a way of organising the cases, not a classification the cited decisions lay down.
- A fixed trust: the trustee must distribute the property among the class in shares the instrument fixes, equally or in stated proportions.
- A discretionary trust (a trust power): the trustee must distribute among the class, but chooses who takes and how much.
- A mere power: the donee may appoint among the class but has no duty to do so, and unappointed property passes under any default disposition (in Gulbenkian, a gift over).
Which kind a clause is turns on its construction. Lord Upjohn, in a House of Lords decision that is persuasive only in Australia, said that it is “a matter of construction whether the power is a mere power or a trust power” and that inappropriate language is not decisive.1
The English tests (persuasive only)
In Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements the House of Lords dealt with a clause the parties agreed was a mere power, in favour of a class that included persons with whom the settlor’s son was residing or by whom he was employed. Lord Upjohn, reviewing recent authority, said that a mere power among a class “is valid if you can with certainty say whether any given individual is or is not a member of the class; you do not have to be able to ascertain every member of the class”. He framed that for a power with a valid gift over in default of appointment. Lord Reid said that a power is “not bad merely because such determination may be difficult in a particular case”. The House held the clause was not void for uncertainty.1
In McPhail v Doulton (also reported as Re Baden’s Deed Trusts) all five Lords agreed that a clause directing trustees to apply income “at their absolute discretion” for the benefit of a company’s officers and employees, and their relatives and dependants, created a trust and not a mere power. On the test of certainty for such a trust the House divided. Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne agreed, held that the earlier Court of Appeal rule requiring the whole range of objects to be ascertainable ought to be discarded, and that “the trust is valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class”. Lords Hodson and Guest dissented on that point. The House remitted the question whether the deed was valid on that test to the Chancery Division.2 The English Court of Appeal then upheld the deed in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2), with Sachs, Megaw and Stamp LJJ giving differing explanations of how the test works.9
Lord Wilberforce also separated three problems. These are his remarks, grouped here for study. If the words used are unclear and the court cannot resolve them, the gift is void. If the words are clear but it is hard to find out who or where the members are, the court can deal with that on an application for directions. And where the meaning is clear but the class is “so hopelessly wide” as not to form “anything like a class”, the trust is “administratively unworkable”. His example was “all the residents of Greater London”, and he did not think a discretionary trust for “relatives” fell in that category.2
What the High Court has decided
Kinsela v Caldwell concerned a settlor’s deed under which, if none of the named beneficiaries was living on a vesting day in 1984, the trustees were to pay the capital to a class of next-of-kin identified by the intestacy law in force on that day. The settlor argued that the clause was void for uncertainty. The Court (McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ, in one joint judgment) rejected the argument: “A trust is not uncertain merely because the actual persons to whom the distribution will be made cannot be known in advance of the date of distribution; it is sufficient that the provisions of the trust ensure that upon that date the beneficiaries can be ascertained with certainty.” It added that “it is no objection to a trust which describes a class that difficulty may arise at a future date in determining whether or not a particular person is within the description of the class.”3
That decision binds lower Australian courts as to what it decided; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Its limits matter. The joint reasons adopt the reasons of Mahoney J at first instance (reported here only as the joint reasons describe them), do not cite McPhail or Gulbenkian, and do not state a test for discretionary trusts or mere powers. Young J later said of it: “The High Court did not deal with the present problem”, which was a fixed trust whose class could not be listed.5
Australian decisions on the English tests
Discretionary trusts. In Re Blyth Thomas J (a single judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland) construed a will directing the Public Trustee to distribute residue, in the Public Trustee’s uncontrolled discretion, among organisations that in the Public Trustee’s opinion were working for the elimination of war, and among organisations formed for the purpose of raising the standard of life throughout the world. He said: “I shall proceed on the footing that the law as stated in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts contains tests that may appropriately be applied in the present matter.” He accepted that a world-wide search could never produce a satisfactory total list of organisations of the first kind, yet held criterion certainty attainable for it, because it could be said of any given organisation whether it was within the class. He held the second limb failed for uncertainty. His reasoning also depended in part on s 64 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), which he said removed a separate rule against delegating testamentary power that had troubled powers of appointment in wills elsewhere in Australia.4 That section is no longer in the Act; a provision to the same effect is s 33R, read in the compilation current as at 28 April 2026.10 This article does not cover the delegation rule, and a will governed by the law of another jurisdiction may meet it.
Fixed trusts. In West v Weston Young J (a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales) considered a will trust to divide residue equally among those of the issue of four named grandparents who were living at the testator’s death and reached 21. By the trial the executrix and a genealogist had identified 1,675 members of the class, and he thought it more likely than not that others remained unidentified. He recorded that the English cases tend to show that “unless one can, with reasonable certainty, identify each and every beneficiary and the quantum of that beneficiary’s share, then the trust fails”. He did not treat McPhail as a reason to depart from that rule for fixed trusts, but modified it for present Australian conditions: it “will be satisfied if, within a reasonable time after the gift comes into effect, the court can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the substantial majority of the beneficiaries have been ascertained and that no reasonable inquiries could be made which would improve the situation”.5
That reformulation is one first-instance judge’s view. In Prosper v Wojtowicz Wilson J (Supreme Court of Queensland), whom some parties asked to follow West v Weston and others to hold it wrongly decided, found the problem before her different, because there the difficulty was a later omission to keep a record of the class rather than a class that could not be listed at the relevant date, and held it unnecessary to decide whether West v Weston should be followed.6 In Re Meyerstein Ross J of the Supreme Court of Victoria applied Young J’s modified rule, but to the distribution of an intestate estate, which is a different question from the validity of a trust.8 McMillan J of the Supreme Court of Victoria, without discussing West v Weston, stated that in the context of fixed trusts list certainty is required, and applied it to an income trust to be applied equally, which she held failed in the alternative for uncertainty of objects.7
Applying this in a problem question
- Classify the clause as a fixed trust, a discretionary trust or a mere power by construing it, and do not rely on the label the settlor used.
- For a discretionary trust or mere power, state the “is or is not” test and say whose it is: the House of Lords in Gulbenkian and, by majority, McPhail, both English and persuasive only, the McPhail test being a majority view; and applied by a single judge in Re Blyth, whose decision does not bind other courts, as tests that may appropriately be applied. Say that the sources cited here do not establish any High Court decision adopting it.
- Then ask, in Lord Wilberforce’s terms as grouped above, whether the words are unclear and whether membership is merely hard to prove. On his reasoning, difficulty in finding out who or where the members are is a matter for the court on an application for directions. For a discretionary trust, also ask whether the class is so hopelessly wide as to be administratively unworkable; his remarks on that point concerned a trust, and this article does not say the point applies in the same way to a mere power.
- For a fixed trust, start with Kinsela v Caldwell, which binds lower Australian courts as to what it decided (the High Court can reconsider its own decisions): on the clause there, a class fixed by reference to a future distribution date was certain, and later difficulty in deciding whether a person is within it was no objection. On whether the beneficiaries must also be capable of complete listing, set out the English approach as recorded by Young J, his modification, Wilson J’s decision to leave it open, and Ross J’s application of it to an intestate estate; these are single-judge decisions. Treat the position as unsettled on the authority cited here.
- State each authority’s status when you use it, and say that the only statute cited here is s 33R of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) and that no decision after 2017 on this question is cited, so the legislation and law of the State in the problem should be checked.
Self-check
- Have I classified the disposition before choosing a test?
- Have I said that McPhail and Gulbenkian are English and persuasive only, and that the McPhail test was a majority view?
- Have I kept to what Kinsela v Caldwell decided, and not credited the High Court with a test it did not state?
- Have I treated West v Weston as one first-instance judge’s modification, and not as settled?