Prosper v Wojtowicz

Supreme Court of Queensland · 2005

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Prosper v Wojtowicz [2005] QSC 177

A will left part of an estate to whoever came to the testator’s funeral and was not related to him. A signature book held 109 names, but others had come who did not sign. Can a gift to a group that nobody fully listed stand?

What happened?

Owen George Harrow Robertson made his will on 19 August 1997 and died on 9 January 2001, leaving an estate then estimated at $750,000 (Wilson J at [1]). By clause 6 he gave his whole estate to his trustees on trust: one third to Patricia Henderson (nee Bowden), one third to Megan Ann Williams (also known as Megan Ann Robertson), and the remainder, in clause 6(c), “to such persons and in such proportions (or amounts) as I have specified by any written instructions signed by me and left with this my Will” ([11]).

Clause 6(c) provided that if there were no instructions, or they were uncertain of meaning, or the disposition was not a valid legal disposition for any other reason, the remainder was to be divided equally between “such persons who attend my funeral and who are not (and were not) at any time related to me”, which could include the persons named in the will as executors and trustees ([11]).

On 8 January 2001 the testator signed handwritten instructions that the balance of one third be distributed equally in four quarters among four named people, none of them related to him by blood or marriage ([8], [12]). They were not signed before two witnesses as s 9 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) required, so they could not take effect as a codicil ([12]). Police found them with the will in his den on the evening of 9 January ([14]). The executor, Geoffrey Prosper, a friend of the testator, obtained probate on 12 April 2001, and both the will and the handwritten document were attached to the grant ([10], [15]).

The funeral was held on 13 January 2001 at a funeral chapel in Newstead, Brisbane, where an attendance book carried 109 signatures ([21]). Mr Prosper, who attended, believed that many more people attended who did not sign; from the rear he saw the chapel, which he said was about the size of the courtroom, almost filled, but he could not say how many more people attended than signed ([22]). His solicitors sent copies of the attendance book to about 10 people known to have been there.

From their responses and his instructions all but 13 of the signatures were identified, with at least six more people in the congregation, as well as the civil celebrant and the funeral directors’ staff, and there may have been others ([23]). The solicitor with carriage of the matter deposed that the only way further attendees might be identified, without any means for the executor to verify them independently, was to send the book to each of the 95 people identified so far, at an estimated cost of $3,000 to $5,000 ([23]).

Mr Prosper applied to the Court for the true meaning of the will. Maxwell Francis Cooper, a friend of the testator, was appointed to represent all persons within the class described in clause 6(c) ([9]). The testator’s second wife, Colleen Robertson, and his son, Vernon Frahm, were respondents and each had a family provision application pending ([4], [6]). The Court was asked whether the letter of instruction took effect as the written instructions left with the will; if not, whether the funeral attendee words were not void for uncertainty and were therefore valid and capable of being given effect to; and, if the answer to that question was no, whether there was a partial intestacy ([13]).

What did the Court decide?

Wilson J, sitting alone in the Supreme Court of Queensland, heard the application on 14 June 2005 and delivered judgment on 24 June 2005. She answered the first question no: it was common ground among those who appeared that the handwritten letter, which was written after the will was made, did not meet the conditions for incorporation by reference, and she said that stance was plainly correct ([18]-[20]). She declined an oral application by counsel for Ms Robertson and for the Frahms for an order revoking probate of the letter ([19]). She answered the second question yes: the words of clause 6(c) were valid and capable of being given effect to ([47]). She said it was not necessary to answer the third question ([48]). The executor had sought directions on how to ascertain the persons within the class, and she said she would hear counsel on that ([49]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Wilson J described the trust created by clause 6(c) as a fixed trust, and said that equity will not uphold a trust unless it can enforce and control it: in a fixed trust, unless all the beneficiaries can be identified, the trustee cannot identify the size of an individual share and the Court cannot enforce and control the trust ([25]). She added that the requirement of certainty of beneficiaries may be satisfied even though the particular persons who will benefit cannot be ascertained at the commencement of the trust, which here meant the date of the testator’s death ([26]).

She relied on the statement of the High Court in Kinsela v Caldwell, that “A trust is not uncertain merely because the actual persons to whom the distribution will be made cannot be known in advance of the date of distribution; it is sufficient that the provisions of the trust ensure that upon that date the beneficiaries can be ascertained with certainty” ([26]), and said that the ascertainability of a class at the date of distribution is to be assessed from the vantage point of the date the trust instrument took effect ([29]).

When the testator died the class was sufficiently defined to be ascertainable at the date of distribution, because it would have been possible to compile a complete list of funeral attendees; that a complete list was not in fact compiled did not invalidate the trust, although it gave rise to administrative problems for the executor ([31]). Wilson J placed the case in the same category as In re Hain’s Settlement, where Upjohn LJ had said that a settlement whose beneficiaries were sufficiently defined to be capable of ascertainment at its date cannot later be invalidated because some of the class have disappeared, become impossible to find or been forgotten ([32], [35]). She concluded that the trust was not invalid for uncertainty of beneficiaries ([38]).

Counsel for the applicant executor and for Mr Cooper, who represented the class, urged Wilson J to uphold the trust in reliance on West v Weston; counsel for Ms Robertson and for the Frahms submitted that it was wrongly decided and ought not to be followed ([33]). Her Honour said that in her view that case dealt with a different problem from the one before her ([33]). She described West v Weston as a decision in which Young J, acknowledging that the English cases on fixed trusts would defeat the trust before him, modified the rule for what he regarded as different conditions in present day Australia, and she recorded that his reformulation had been “trenchantly criticised as contrary to principle and contrary to the High Court’s decision in Kinsela v Caldwell” in the two works she cited ([34]).

In West v Weston a complete list of beneficiaries could not have been compiled at the date of the testator’s death; here the problem arose, not from unascertainability at that date, but from the subsequent omission to keep a complete record of those who attended the funeral, so that the case was in the same category as In re Hain’s Settlement and not in the same category as West v Weston ([35]). She therefore held that it was not necessary to decide whether West v Weston ought to be followed ([35]).

Wilson J said that a trust in favour of persons related to the settlor would be prima facie void for uncertainty of beneficiaries, because it would be uncertain what degree of relationship was required, and that to save such trusts the courts have adopted a rule of construction or convenience which applies in the absence of an intention to the contrary, which may be gleaned by inference from the words used and their context ([40]). By that rule, “relations” are restricted to those blood relations who would have taken under the intestacy rules applicable in the circumstances of the particular case ([41]).

Because the testator excluded persons who were at any time related to him, and a person cannot cease to be a blood relation, she held that he must have intended to exclude persons related by marriage, whether or not the marriage was subsisting at his death, as well as persons related by blood ([42]). The excluded subcategory of funeral attendees therefore consisted of persons related by blood who would have taken under the intestacy rules, and persons then or formerly related by marriage in such a degree that they would have taken under the intestacy rules had the marriage been subsisting at his death ([42]).

Applying the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) Part 3 and Schedule 2 as in force at the date of the testator’s death, under which his spouse and issue would have taken on an intestacy ([43]), she held that Ms Colleen Robertson, as his spouse, and Mr Vernon Frahm, as his son, were excluded and were not beneficiaries ([44]). She did not resolve the paternity of Ms Zoe Frahm, who appeared not to have attended the funeral, and said that Ms Megan Frahm, the testator’s first wife, who also appeared not to have attended, would have been excluded had she done so ([45], [46]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Wilson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [25]–[26] (opens in a new tab), [29] (opens in a new tab), [31] (opens in a new tab), [35] (opens in a new tab), [38] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the rule for fixed trusts that Wilson J applied, her finding that the class could have been listed when the testator died and that the later failure to compile a list did not invalidate the trust, and her conclusion that the trust was not invalid; the answer to the second question depends on them.

Proposition 2

Classification unresolved · Wilson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [33]–[35] (opens in a new tab)

Her Honour’s step that this case is in the Hain’s Settlement category and not the West v Weston category is part of the route to her result, but the question put to her, whether West v Weston ought to be followed, is expressly not decided ([35]). Her description of the criticism of Young J’s reformulation ([34]) is a report of what the cited works say. A single ratio or obiter label would conceal that the Court distinguished the case without deciding the point the parties argued.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Wilson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [40]–[44] (opens in a new tab)

Wilson J identified who was within the excluded subcategory, and applied the exclusion to the two attendees who were related to the testator ([44]); that construction fixes the class on which the trust operates and is part of her answer that the words of clause 6(c) are valid and capable of being given effect to ([47]).

Obiter · Wilson J (sole judge)

Read judgment: [45]–[46] (opens in a new tab)

The paternity of Ms Zoe Frahm was left unresolved because she appeared not to have attended, and the statement about Ms Megan Frahm describes what would have followed had she attended; neither is needed for the answer to the question asked.

Why does this case matter?

A gift to an open-ended group, such as those who attend an event, raises the question of how a court can control a trust whose members nobody has fully listed. This decision is cited in discussion of that question and shows it being put to a judge on a will, with the parties arguing over authority from another State. What the judge did with each authority put to her is easy to misreport from a citation alone.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a gift to a group identified by a description, decide how the gift is to be characterised and say why. Then identify precisely what makes the group hard to list on the facts, when that difficulty arose, and the point in time at which you say certainty is to be assessed. Where an authority from another State is put to you, set its facts beside the facts in the problem before you say what it can support, and take what the judge decided from the reasons rather than from a later citation of it.

This is a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland and is persuasive authority outside Queensland. The judgment cites the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) Part 3 and Schedule 2 as in force at the date of the testator’s death in 2001 ([43]); check the current provisions before relying on the intestacy rules in a modern problem.

Check your understanding

1. What did clause 6(c) say would happen to the remainder of the estate if there were no instructions, or the instructions failed, and who did it say was to take ([11])?

2. How many signatures were in the attendance book, and what did the executor and his solicitors say about the number of people who attended and about identifying them ([21]-[23])?

3. Why could the handwritten instructions of 8 January 2001 not take effect as a codicil, and what was common ground about them at the hearing ([12], [18])?

4. Which authority did counsel for the applicant and for Mr Cooper rely on, and what did counsel for Ms Robertson and the Frahms say about it ([33])?

5. What did Wilson J say, at [35], about the kind of problem presented by this case compared with the problem in West v Weston?

6. Which Succession Act provisions did Wilson J apply to find who would have taken on an intestacy, and which two funeral attendees did she hold excluded ([43], [44])?

7. Which orders did the Court make on the first and second questions ([20], [47])?