Prosper v Wojtowicz
Prosper v Wojtowicz [2005] QSC 177
A will left part of an estate to whoever came to the testator’s funeral and was not related to him. A signature book held 109 names, but others had come who did not sign. Can a gift to a group that nobody fully listed stand?
What happened?
Owen George Harrow Robertson made his will on 19 August 1997. He died on 9 January 2001, leaving an estate worth about $750,000.
Clause 6 left his estate to trustees. One third went to Patricia Henderson, one third to Megan Ann Williams. The remaining third, under clause 6(c), was to go to people named in written instructions signed by him and left with the will. If there were no instructions, or they were unclear or invalid, that share was to be split equally among funeral attendees not related to him, blood or marriage, which could include his executors.
On 8 January 2001 he signed handwritten instructions naming four unrelated people to share that third equally. They were not witnessed as required by s 9 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), so they could not work as a codicil. Police found them with the will after his death.
The executor, Geoffrey Prosper, got probate on 12 April 2001, with both documents attached.
At the funeral, 109 people signed an attendance book, but Mr Prosper believed more attended unrecorded. Despite enquiries, 13 signatures stayed unidentified, and further checking would cost $3,000–$5,000.
Mr Prosper applied to the Court for directions.
What did the Court decide?
Wilson J sat alone in the Supreme Court of Queensland, deciding on 24 June 2005.
Question one: no; the later letter was not incorporated, as all parties accepted. She refused an oral application to revoke its probate.
Question two: clause 6(c) was valid. Why? Question three was unnecessary.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Wilson J held that clause 6(c) created a “fixed trust” — a trust where each beneficiary’s share is set in advance. Equity will only enforce a trust it can control, so a fixed trust needs all beneficiaries identifiable.
But certainty of beneficiaries does not require knowing, at the trust’s start, exactly who will benefit. It is enough that the trust’s terms let beneficiaries be ascertained by the date of distribution.
She relied on Kinsela v Caldwell for this point. She also said ascertainability should be judged as at the date the trust instrument took effect, not later.
Here, when the testator died, the class (funeral attendees) was defined clearly enough to be ascertainable at distribution. A complete list could have been compiled then, even though one was not actually made. That failure caused administrative problems for the executor, but did not invalidate the trust.
Wilson J compared this case to In re Hain’s Settlement. There, Upjohn LJ said a settlement valid at its creation does not become invalid later just because some beneficiaries later vanish, cannot be found, or are forgotten.
She concluded the trust was not invalid for uncertainty of beneficiaries.
Counsel for the executor and for Mr Cooper (representing the class) urged her to follow West v Weston. Counsel for Ms Robertson and the Frahms argued that case was wrongly decided and should not be followed.
Wilson J said West v Weston dealt with a different problem. She described it as a case where Young J, accepting that English fixed-trust rules would have defeated the trust, modified those rules for modern Australian conditions. She noted this reformulation had been strongly criticised as contrary to principle.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Wilson J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [25]–[26] (opens in a new tab), [29] (opens in a new tab), [31] (opens in a new tab), [35] (opens in a new tab), [38] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the rule for fixed trusts that Wilson J applied, her finding that the class could have been listed when the testator died and that the later failure to compile a list did not invalidate the trust, and her conclusion that the trust was not invalid; the answer to the second question depends on them.
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Wilson J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [33]–[35] (opens in a new tab)
Her Honour’s step that this case is in the Hain’s Settlement category and not the West v Weston category is part of the route to her result, but the question put to her, whether West v Weston ought to be followed, is expressly not decided ([35]). Her description of the criticism of Young J’s reformulation ([34]) is a report of what the cited works say. A single ratio or obiter label would conceal that the Court distinguished the case without deciding the point the parties argued.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Wilson J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [40]–[44] (opens in a new tab)
Wilson J identified who was within the excluded subcategory, and applied the exclusion to the two attendees who were related to the testator ([44]); that construction fixes the class on which the trust operates and is part of her answer that the words of clause 6(c) are valid and capable of being given effect to ([47]).
Obiter · Wilson J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [45]–[46] (opens in a new tab)
The paternity of Ms Zoe Frahm was left unresolved because she appeared not to have attended, and the statement about Ms Megan Frahm describes what would have followed had she attended; neither is needed for the answer to the question asked.
Why does this case matter?
A gift to an open-ended group, like event attendees, raises control problems for courts. This case shows a judge weighing conflicting interstate authority on that issue.
Check your understanding
What did clause 6(c) say happened to the remainder if the instructions failed ([11])?
How many signatures were in the attendance book, and what did the executor say ([21]-[23])?
Why could the handwritten instructions not take effect as a codicil ([12], [18])?
Which Succession Act provisions did Wilson J apply, and whom did she exclude ([43], [44])?
What orders did the Court make ([20], [47])?