Anning v Anning
Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049
Three days before he died, a grazier signed a deed giving all his personal property to his wife and five children, and did nothing else. Which parts of the gift worked, and how?
Qualified by Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540
In Corin v Patton the joint reasons of Mason CJ and McHugh J reviewed the three judgments in Anning v Anning. They said that the view of Higgins J, to the extent that it differs from that of Isaacs J, has not found support in the later cases, and that there is stronger support in the later cases for the view of Griffith CJ than for that of Isaacs J. They concluded that the principle is that, if an intending donor of property has done everything which it is necessary for him to have done to effect a transfer of legal title, equity will recognise the gift, “necessary” meaning necessary to effect a transfer. Deane J agreed with their analysis of the principal cases subject to his own reasons, while Brennan J and Toohey J reasoned differently in dismissing the appeal. So the approach of Griffith CJ, not the stricter approach of Isaacs J, is the one preferred in Corin v Patton.
Qualified by legislation: Property Law Act 2023 (Qld)
In Queensland, s 192 of the Property Law Act 2023 (Qld) provides that a voluntary assignment of property is taken to have been assigned in equity, whether oral or in writing, if the assignment is complete (s 192(1)). The assignment is complete when the assignor has done everything that needs to be done by the assignor to transfer to the assignee the rights of the assignor in relation to the property (s 192(2)), and that applies even if a thing remains to be done, without the intervention or assistance of the assignor, to make that transfer (s 192(3)). The section applies despite any rule of equity to the contrary, subject to ss 7 and 8 (s 192(4)). So for a voluntary assignment of property in Queensland a court starts from the section, and the equitable rules stated in Anning give way to it to the extent that they are contrary.
What happened?
On 13 June 1899 William Anning, a grazier of Hughenden in Queensland, executed a deed poll by which he purported to “freely and voluntarily convey” to his wife and five infant children all his personal estate, including a pastoral lease called Chudleigh Park, his share in Mount Sturgeon Station, stock, and money in three banks, to be divided equally (Griffith CJ; Higgins J). He died on 16 June 1899, having by his will appointed his widow executrix (Higgins J). He handed over none of the property, and the deed was delivered to his station manager rather than to any of the donees (Higgins J).
His widow, as executrix, brought what she treated as an administration action against the children to have it determined how far the deed was effectual (Higgins J). In an earlier suit in New South Wales the Chief Judge in Equity had taken the view that the instrument was a donatio mortis causa and held the attempted gift ineffective for want of delivery of possession; Cooper CJ, hearing oral evidence, found that the deed was intended as an immediate irrevocable gift, and that finding was not challenged (Griffith CJ).
Each kind of property had to be considered separately: the lease and promissory notes needed registration or endorsement that the donor never supplied, the chattels were caught by the Bills of Sale Act 1891 (Qld), a mortgage over New South Wales land could be transferred only by a registered instrument, and the bank deposits were debts owed to Anning, which could not be assigned at common law, although the Judicature Act allowed an absolute assignment in writing of which express notice had been given to the debtor (Griffith CJ; Isaacs J; Higgins J).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court varied the order of the Supreme Court of Queensland, with the costs of both parties to be paid out of the estate. The three Justices each gave reasons. They were unanimous that the donor’s share in Mount Sturgeon, an equitable interest, passed to the donees, and that the chattels, the lease, the promissory notes and the New South Wales mortgage did not. They divided on the bank deposits, which Higgins J put at about £3,000 out of property worth more than £60,000.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Griffith CJ began from Turner LJ’s statement in Milroy v Lord that the settlor “must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him”, and that “there is no equity in this Court to perfect an imperfect gift”. His Honour said: “I think that the words ‘necessary to be done,’ as used by Turner L.J. in Milroy v. Lord, mean necessary to be done by the donor.”
So for shares transferable by an instrument lodged with the company, or for registered land, the donor has done all that is necessary on his part as soon as he has executed the transfer, and in the case of registered land delivered it to the donee. “If, however, anything remains to be done by the donor, in the absence of which the donee cannot establish his title to the property as against a third person, the gift is imperfect”, but “if all that remains to be done can be done by the donee himself, so that he does not need the assistance of the Court, the gift is, I think, complete.”
Isaacs J laid down two propositions as firmly established. The first is that the deed “must stand or fall as a gift simply, and if wanting in any of the elements of a gift it cannot be supported as a trust”. The second is that a gift must be complete, because equity will not lend its aid to complete a title for a volunteer. Where the legal title is not assignable at law, equity enforces a transfer that is complete as between donor and donee if there is no further act the donor could be required to do.
But “If the legal title is assignable at law it must be so assigned or equity will not enforce the gift. If for any reason, whether want of a deed by the assignor, or a specifically prescribed method of transfer, or registration, or statutory notice, the transfer of the legal title is incomplete when the law permits it to be complete, equity regards the gift as still imperfect and will not enforce it.” In that case, “the fact that the assignor has done all that he can be required to do is not applicable”.
On that approach the gift of the money in the bank was “imperfect as a gift”, because the statutory notice had not been given and could no longer be given to a bank that had ceased to be the debtor.
Higgins J agreed that the gift of the deposits failed as a gift, because “the claimants under the deed cannot now show that the donor has done all that lay in his power to make the gift complete”: the donor did not hand over the deposit receipts, give a power of attorney to collect, or give or cause notice to be given to the bank. He said that “necessary” in Milroy v Lord does not mean obligatory on the donor, but necessary for the purpose of passing the property, and that “What the Courts look at is what the donor might have done.”
The bank deposits were nonetheless the point on which the donees succeeded. Griffith CJ was disposed to think that the donor had done all that was necessary on his own part, since the assignee could give the statutory notice, but said he did not think it necessary to determine that question. He held the gift complete where the legal right to receive the debt was vested in one of several donees, as the executrix was, and held on another ground that, assuming the gift as a gift failed, the deed nevertheless operated at law as a covenant, an implied covenant not to prevent the donee obtaining the benefit of the gift, on which an action at law would lie against the donor or his executor.
Isaacs J, who held the gift imperfect, reached the same practical result on the covenant alone: “there was an implied covenant on the part of the grantor that he would do nothing to derogate from his deed or render impossible the completion of the legal title on the part of the donees by their giving the statutory notice to the debtor”, the executrix had broken it, and the donees “are now legally entitled to be considered as creditors upon the estate for the amount of their shares”.
Higgins J declined to decide the covenant point on the pleadings, said “I know of no such implication”, and observed that without it “the decision of the majority of the Court would be against the defendants”.
Why does this case matter?
Questions about an intended gift that was not finished usually give a donor who signed something and stopped. Students either say the gift failed and stop, or say the donor plainly meant it and the court will give effect to the intention. Neither shows the examiner which step was missing, who could have taken it, and what the donees might still have in place of the gift. Anning is an early Australian case on exactly that situation.
Exam and application relevance
For each item of property, say what the law required to transfer it, list the steps taken and not taken, and apply the Justices’ tests to each unfinished step, attributing each test by name and treating the case as a source of competing tests whose later fortunes are in the treatment above. Where a gift fails as a gift, consider whether the donees have any other basis for a claim.
The decision was given under the Queensland Judicature Act and Bills of Sale Act and the New South Wales Real Property Act as they stood in 1907, and the Justices’ conclusions on particular property turned on those statutes. In Queensland, s 192 of the Property Law Act 2023 (Qld) now deals with when a voluntary assignment of property is complete in equity, and applies despite any rule of equity to the contrary, subject to ss 7 and 8. Check its terms, and the equivalent law of the jurisdiction concerned, before applying the tests in this case.
Check your understanding
1. What did Griffith CJ say “necessary to be done” in Milroy v Lord meant, and what did he say about a gift where all that remains can be done by the donee?
2. What did Isaacs J say about a deed intended as a gift that fails as a gift, and about a gift where the legal title is assignable at law but the transfer is incomplete?
3. Why did Higgins J hold that the gift of the bank deposits failed?
4. On what basis did Isaacs J hold that the donees could nonetheless succeed as to the deposits, and what did Higgins J say about that basis?