Constitution of an express trust: the failed transfer and the imperfect gift

How an express trust is constituted by declaration or by transfer, why a failed transfer is not treated as a declaration, and what a transferor must have done before equity treats a voluntary gift as complete (Milroy v Lord, Anning v Anning, Corin v Patton).

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
express-trusts

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish constitution of a trust by declaration from constitution by transfer, and say when each is complete.
  • Explain why a failed transfer is not treated as a declaration of trust, and state the limit of that rule.
  • Apply the High Court’s ‘everything necessary’ approach to a transferor, stating accurately how far the reasons in Corin v Patton agree.
  • Explain why a trustee’s agreement to act does not supply consideration.

A trust can be clearly intended and carefully worded and still not exist, because a settlor who has not yet put the property in the trust has an intention, not a trust. The prior question is therefore not whether the settlor meant to benefit the beneficiary but by which route the trust was to be constituted and whether that route was completed. It matters because a beneficiary who gave no consideration, a volunteer, ordinarily cannot ask equity to finish what the settlor left unfinished. This article states what the High Court has said on the point, with English authority treated as persuasive only. The certainties are in Three certainties; the beneficiary principle and writing formalities are covered only in outline in Express trusts.

The routes to a constituted trust

In Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264, an English Court of Appeal in Chancery decision, Turner LJ said that a voluntary settlement is effectual if the settlor transfers the property to the beneficiaries, transfers it to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, “or declares that he himself holds it in trust for those purposes”. He added that one of those modes must be used, “for there is no equity in this Court to perfect an imperfect gift”.1 That statement is not absolute, as the exceptions noted below show, and because the case is an English decision it is persuasive only in Australia. In Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049, where the High Court delivered three separate judgments, Griffith CJ treated Milroy v Lord as the starting point, writing that “the whole law on the subject is contained in the judgment of Turner L.J. in Milroy v. Lord”.2

Only two of those three modes constitute a trust. Transferring the property to the persons for whom the settlor intends to provide gives it to them outright, so the question there is whether the gift was completed, not whether a trust exists. A trust is constituted by the owner’s declaration, or by transferring the property to the intended trustee. By declaration, the owner of property holds it on trust for another and no transfer is needed. In Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, Mr Kendle held the legal title to a house and signed an Acknowledgment of Trust declaring that he held a half interest on trust for his wife; French CJ described the duty he took on as one “which he assumed when he declared the trust and retained the legal title to the land”.4 By transfer, the settlor must get the property to the trustee, and the trust is constituted only when that has been done.

In Milroy v Lord itself, Thomas Medley executed a deed-poll in 1852 conveying fifty shares in the Bank of Louisiana to Samuel Lord on trust for his niece. No transfer was made in the bank’s books, and Turner LJ reasoned that Lord held his powers of attorney only as Medley’s agent. Both Lords Justices held that no perfect trust of the bank shares had been created, so the legal title stayed in Medley’s estate.

A failed transfer is not rescued as a declaration

Turner LJ’s second proposition is that where a settlement “is intended to be effectuated” by one mode, the court “will not give effect to it by applying another of those modes”. In Milroy v Lord the intention was that Lord, not Medley, would be the trustee, so the Court declined to hold Medley himself a trustee: that would be “creating a perfect trust out of an imperfect transaction”.1

The same idea appears in the High Court decisions. In Anning v Anning Isaacs J said that a deed intended as a gift “must stand or fall as a gift simply, and if wanting in any of the elements of a gift it cannot be supported as a trust”, and Griffith CJ rejected the first-instance view that the donor there had intended to make himself a trustee.2 In Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540, Mason CJ and McHugh J held that the instrument of transfer could not take effect in equity as a declaration of trust: Mrs Patton had not intended to constitute herself trustee for Mr Corin and the instrument gave no support for reading it that way.3 In Milroy v Lord, Anning v Anning and Corin v Patton the reasoning rested on a finding that the donor had not intended to hold the property on trust personally, so they do not decide what follows where a donor did.

When has the transferor done enough?

The test in Milroy v Lord is that the settlor must have done “everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property”. Anning v Anning shows the High Court dividing on what is “necessary”. Griffith CJ read the words to “mean necessary to be done by the donor”, so that, on his view, a gift is complete if all that remains to be done can be done by the donee himself. Isaacs J took a stricter view: where the legal title is assignable at law but the transfer is incomplete when the law permits it to be complete, equity regards the gift as still imperfect, even if the donor has done all he can be required to do.2

In Corin v Patton, Mr and Mrs Patton were joint registered proprietors of Torrens land in New South Wales. Mrs Patton, who was terminally ill, executed a memorandum of transfer of her interest to her brother, Mr Corin, together with a deed of trust under which he was to hold it for her, in order to sever the joint tenancy. The certificate of title was held by a mortgagee bank, and she died five days later with the transfer unregistered. The High Court dismissed the appeal, so Mr Patton took the land by survivorship.3

The Justices did not give a single set of reasons. Mason CJ and McHugh J preferred Griffith CJ’s approach and stated the principle that “if an intending donor of property has done everything which it is necessary for him to have done to effect a transfer of legal title, then equity will recognize the gift”. They held that Mrs Patton had not met it: the certificate of title remained with the mortgagee, she took no step to procure its production for registration, and she gave no authority for the bank to hand it to Mr Corin. Deane J, who agreed with their analysis of the cases subject to his own reasons, asked “whether the donor has done all that is necessary to place the vesting of the legal title within the control of the donee and beyond the recall or intervention of the donor”, and reached the same answer on the certificate. Brennan J reasoned differently, treating the donee’s position before registration as a statutory right to registration rather than an equitable interest, and Toohey J decided the case on the footing that the transaction had not been consummated.3 All five Justices agreed that the appeal be dismissed, but only two stated that formulation. A High Court decision binds lower Australian courts, and the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Mason CJ and McHugh J gave the reason for refusing to complete an incomplete gift as being that a donor should not be compelled to make a gift, and said that once the transaction is complete so far as the donor is concerned, “he has no locus poenitentiae”.

Two later developments qualify how far this can be pressed. First, Corin v Patton was decided under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) as it stood in 1990. Section 41(1) of the version current from 15 August 2025 still provides that “No dealing, until registered in the manner provided by this Act, shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any land under the provisions of this Act”, but Schedule 3, Part 12, clause 31 now allows the Registrar-General to end the issue of certificates of title, after which a certificate previously issued has no force for a requirement to lodge or produce one in connection with registration. Clause 32 preserves the former requirements for a dealing lodged before the cessation day, not registered by it and requiring a certificate when it was lodged, unless the dealing is withdrawn and relodged.6 The Registrar-General’s notice records 11 October 2021 as the cessation day.7 The certificate-of-title facts that decided Corin v Patton are therefore historical for New South Wales land, and this article does not say what a New South Wales donor must now do. The current registration provisions of the other jurisdictions are not stated here. Secondly, in Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48, the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ said that in Corin v Patton the Court unanimously held that the gift was not “complete in equity” but for different reasons, and that it was unnecessary to assess the merits of the different approaches taken there, because the principle on perfecting imperfect gifts, to the extent that it operates in Australian law, is a separate and independent doctrine from equitable estoppel. They added that no submissions had been made on whether or when an imperfect gift can be completed in equity. Those are the reasons of four of the five Justices: the appeal was dismissed with costs, and Gleeson J would have allowed it. She also approached the connection between the two doctrines differently, taking from Dillwyn v Llewelyn, adopted by the High Court in Olsson v Dyson, that an imperfect gift gives rise to a proprietary estoppel only where acts of the donor after the gift encourage the donee to act in reliance on it — a link the joint reasons treated as separate and independent doctrines.5 That is why the Corin v Patton formulation above is stated as the reasoning of two Justices rather than as settled High Court doctrine.

The trustee does not supply consideration

A person who agrees to act as trustee has not thereby given value. In Corin v Patton, Mason CJ and McHugh J, and separately Deane J, held that Mr Corin’s agreement to take the transfer as trustee was not valuable consideration, so he was a volunteer. Mason CJ and McHugh J also described the maxim that equity will not assist a volunteer as subject to “certain clearly established exceptions such as the rule in Strong v. Bird (1874) LR 18 Eq 315 and the doctrine of equitable estoppel”; neither was in issue in that case and neither is examined here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the route the settlor intended: a declaration by the owner, a transfer to a trustee, or an outright transfer to the intended object, which is a question of a completed gift rather than of a trust.
  2. If the owner declared herself trustee, ask whether the words manifest that intention (Byrnes v Kendle concerned a written deed), and check separately the writing requirement of the jurisdiction for land, which this article does not state.
  3. If a transfer was intended, identify the kind of property and ask what the transferor still had to do. Use the Corin v Patton formulation of Mason CJ and McHugh J, remembering that it is the reasons of two of the five Justices, that Kramer v Stone left the competing approaches unassessed, and that the certificate-of-title facts have changed in New South Wales.
  4. If the transfer was incomplete, ask whether the settlor really intended to hold the property on trust herself. If the intention was only to transfer, Milroy v Lord (persuasive), Anning v Anning and Corin v Patton show a court declining to treat a failed transfer as a declaration where the donor did not intend to be trustee personally.
  5. Ask whether the beneficiary or trustee gave consideration. The trustee’s agreement to act is not consideration on the Corin v Patton reasoning.
  6. If the trust is not constituted, say what follows: in Milroy v Lord the legal title stayed in the settlor’s estate, and in Corin v Patton the husband took by survivorship.

Self-check

  • Have I said which route the settlor intended, and whether it was completed?
  • Have I stated the Corin v Patton principle as the joint reasons of Mason CJ and McHugh J, not as the holding of all five Justices?
  • Have I avoided stating the current registration or writing provisions of any jurisdiction?

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