Constitution of an express trust: the failed transfer and the imperfect gift

The routes to a constituted trust

In Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264, Turner LJ said a voluntary settlement works in three ways. The settlor can transfer the property to the beneficiary, transfer it to a trustee, or declare that they hold it on trust themselves.[^cite:milroy-v-lord-modes-and-imperfect-gift] He added that equity will not perfect an imperfect gift. This is not an absolute rule, as exceptions exist. The case is English, so it is only persuasive in Australia.

In Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049, the High Court gave three separate judgments. Griffith CJ treated Milroy v Lord as the key authority, saying it contained “the whole law on the subject”.[^cite:anning-v-anning-necessary-to-be-done-by-the-donor]

Only two of the three modes actually create a trust. Transferring property straight to the intended beneficiary is simply an outright gift. The real question there is whether the gift was completed, not whether a trust exists.

A trust is constituted either by declaration or by transfer to a trustee. By declaration, the owner states they now hold the property on trust for someone else. No transfer of the property is needed.

In Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, Mr Kendle kept legal title to a house but signed an Acknowledgment of Trust. This declared he held half the interest on trust for his wife. French CJ described this as a duty “assumed when he declared the trust and retained the legal title”.[^cite:byrnes-v-kendle-owner-declares-trust-without-transfer]

By transfer, the settlor must actually get the property to the trustee. The trust is only constituted once that transfer has happened.

The facts of Milroy v Lord show this. Thomas Medley executed a deed in 1852 conveying fifty bank shares to Samuel Lord, to hold on trust for his niece. But the transfer was never recorded in the bank’s own books.

Turner LJ reasoned that Lord only held powers of attorney as Medley’s agent, not as trustee of the shares themselves. Both judges held that no perfect trust of the shares had been created. As a result, legal title remained with Medley’s estate.

A failed transfer is not rescued as a declaration

Turner LJ’s second rule: if a gift was meant to work one way, courts won’t make it work another way instead. In Milroy v Lord, the settlor meant Lord to be trustee, not Medley. The court refused to treat Medley as trustee instead, calling that “creating a perfect trust out of an imperfect transaction”.

The same idea appears in Australian cases. In Anning v Anning, Isaacs J said a gift must succeed or fail as a gift. If it’s missing something a gift needs, it can’t be saved by calling it a trust instead. Griffith CJ agreed, rejecting the idea the donor meant to make himself trustee.

In Corin v Patton, Mason CJ and McHugh J held the transfer document couldn’t work as a declaration of trust. Mrs Patton never intended to become trustee for Mr Corin, and the document gave no support for reading it that way.

In all three cases, the courts found the donor never intended to hold the property as trustee personally. So these cases don’t settle what happens where a donor did intend that.

The trustee does not supply consideration

Agreeing to be a trustee is not “giving value” in the legal sense. This matters because equity will not help a volunteer, someone who gave no value, perfect an imperfect gift.

In Corin v Patton, the judges held that Mr Corin’s promise to act as trustee was not valuable consideration. This made him a volunteer, even though he had agreed to take on duties.

The judges noted some exceptions to the rule against helping volunteers. These include the rule in Strong v Bird and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Neither exception applied in this case, so they are not explained further here.

Applying this in a problem question

First work out what the settlor meant to do. She may have declared herself trustee, transferred the property to someone else as trustee, or simply made an outright gift to the person she wanted to benefit. That last option is about completed gifts, not trusts.

If she meant to declare herself trustee, ask whether her words actually show that intention. Byrnes v Kendle involved a written deed. For land, also check the jurisdiction’s own writing requirements, which this article doesn’t cover.

If a transfer was intended, identify the type of property and what the transferor still needed to do to complete it. Apply the test from Corin v Patton, but remember this came from only two of the five judges (Mason CJ and McHugh J). Kramer v Stone didn’t settle which approach is correct, and the certificate-of-title facts in NSW have since changed.

If the transfer was incomplete, ask whether the settlor really meant to hold the property on trust herself. Where she only intended a transfer, Milroy v Lord (persuasive authority), Anning v Anning, and Corin v Patton all show courts refusing to treat a failed transfer as a self-declaration of trust.

Next, check whether the beneficiary or trustee gave consideration. On the reasoning in Corin v Patton, a trustee’s agreement to act is not itself consideration.

Finally, if the trust was never properly constituted, work out the consequence. In Milroy v Lord, the legal title remained with the settlor’s estate. In Corin v Patton, the husband took the property by survivorship.

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