Kennon v Spry

High Court of Australia · 2008

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 56

A husband, sole trustee of a family trust, cut his wife out of it and moved its assets into trusts for the children as the marriage failed. She had only ever been one of the people he might choose to benefit. Was there property to divide?

What happened?

Dr Spry, a retired Victorian barrister, created a trust by parol in 1968, with himself as settlor and trustee; its terms were later recorded in an instrument signed in October 1981 ([1], [9]-[10]). The beneficiaries were all the issue of his father and all persons married to them ([11]), and clause 6 gave the trustee power, in his absolute discretion, to apply all or any part of the income or capital to any of them ([13]). He married Helen Spry in 1978, and they had four children ([1]).

In 1983 he executed a deed releasing any beneficial interest he held under the trust and ceasing to be a beneficiary; Mrs Spry remained one ([16], [119]). In December 1998, when the marriage was in difficulty, he varied the trust to exclude himself and his wife as capital beneficiaries ([2]). The couple separated on 30 October 2001. In January 2002 he established trusts for the four children and applied one quarter each of the capital and income of the trust to them ([2]). The marriage was dissolved when the decree nisi became absolute on 17 February 2003 ([2]).

Mrs Spry applied to the Family Court in April 2002 for property settlement and maintenance, including orders under s 106B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) setting aside the 1998 instrument and the January 2002 dispositions ([3]). Strickland J set aside the 1998 instrument and the January 2002 dispositions and ordered Dr Spry to pay her $2,182,302 ([5]). The Full Court of the Family Court (Bryant CJ and Warnick J, Finn J dissenting) dismissed his appeal and the trustees’ cross-appeals ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed both appeals, with costs in favour of Mrs Spry, and dismissed her applications for special leave to cross-appeal with no order as to costs. French CJ ([83]) and Gummow and Hayne JJ jointly ([142]) wrote reasons for dismissing the appeals, as did Kiefel J ([238]); Heydon J would have allowed them ([188]). So four of the five Justices were for dismissal, on reasoning that was not the same.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Gummow and Hayne JJ began from the Act. Section 79(1) lets the court alter the interests of the parties to the marriage in “the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them”, and their Honours said the term “property” “is not a term of art with one specific and precise meaning”, so the statutory context matters ([89]). They accepted that Dr Spry could not lawfully have applied the trust fund to himself, but said that did not decide the appeals ([116], [137]).

On the trust, they said: “as an object of these powers the wife had a right in equity to due administration of the Trust”. “The existence of such a right did not depend upon entitlement to any fixed and transmissible beneficial interest in the trust fund”, and it was accompanied at least by the trustee’s fiduciary duty to consider whether and in what way to exercise the power ([125]). Then: “The right of the wife with respect to the due administration of the Trust was included in her property for the purposes of the Act.”

And since during the marriage the husband could have appointed the whole of the trust assets to his wife, part of the property of the parties to the marriage was “his power to appoint the whole of the property to his wife and her right to a due administration of the Trust” ([126]). Because that power extended to the whole fund, the value of that property was the value of the assets of the trust ([137]).

The divorce was no obstacle. Section 4(2) makes the reference to “the parties to the marriage or either of them” include parties to a marriage ended by divorce before the order, and the court may proceed in the property settlement “as if” the changes to property rights brought about by the divorce “had not yet occurred”, provided that is just and equitable ([128]-[129]). Once the s 106B orders set aside the 1998 and 2002 instruments, the asset pool was properly taken to include the trust assets ([130], [137]).

French CJ agreed that, before the 1998 instrument, the wife’s equitable right to due administration, and her entitlement to due consideration, could be taken into account as part of her property, though he acknowledged that it is difficult to put a value on either ([78]-[79]). His own reasoning was that “For so long as Dr Spry retained the legal title to the Trust fund coupled with the power to appoint the whole of the fund to his wife and her equitable right, it remained, in my opinion, property of the parties to the marriage” ([66]). He confined that to a trust where the husband’s powers and the wife’s equitable right fitted together: the mere legal title of a trustee of a charitable trust, or of an executor of a friend’s will, “could not be regarded as part of the husband’s property as a party to the marriage” ([69]).

The other two Justices did not take that route. Kiefel J would have dismissed the appeals on s 85A, which she said “was intended to give the Court power to deal with property which could not be the subject of an order under s 79” ([209], [238]). Heydon J, dissenting, said the definition of property in s 4(1) “does not contemplate entitlements as trustee” ([175]) and that the Act’s language “is not apt” to give the court power over the assets of a discretionary trust by reason merely of the objects’ right to due administration and to be considered ([165]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Separate reasoning · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [125]–[126] (PDF p 47) (opens in a new tab), [137] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab)

These passages supply the necessary ground of the joint reasons under s 79: the wife’s equitable rights, together with the power to appoint the fund to her, mattered to the property orders in these circumstances. Read this reasoning separately from French CJ’s formulation and Kiefel J’s different statutory ground; agreement on the result does not mean agreement with every reason.

Separate reasoning · French CJ

Read judgment: [62]–[66] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [78]–[81] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

French CJ agreed that the wife’s equitable rights could be taken into account, but framed the relevant property as the trust assets coupled with the trustee’s power and her equitable right. His formulation overlaps with, but is not simply identical to, the joint reasons. The statutory and factual limits remain important.

Separate reasoning · Kiefel J

Read judgment: [209] (PDF p 82) (opens in a new tab), [238] (PDF p 93) (opens in a new tab)

Kiefel J would dismiss the appeals on the different statutory ground of s 85A and vary the orders on the cross-appeals. Her agreement with dismissing the appeals does not make her a supporter of every step in the s 79 reasoning.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J, dissenting

Read judgment: [165] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab), [175] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab), [188] (PDF p 74) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J would allow the appeals. These passages reject treating the discretionary trust assets as property reached merely through the objects’ equitable rights. They explain the dissent and must not be attributed to the majority simply because they appear in the same decision.

Why does this case matter?

Problem questions often put a trust in the middle of a family dispute: one spouse is a trustee, the other is named among the people the trustee may benefit, and the money has been moved. Two shortcuts follow. One treats a person who may or may not ever receive anything as having nothing the law counts, and so leaves the trust out of the answer. The other takes the outcome as a statement about what discretionary objects own, and so overclaims. Kennon v Spry is the case that lets a student say what the High Court did hold about such a person, and under which statute, without going further than the Justices went.

Exam and application relevance

Say first which question was asked: whether the assets, or the wife’s rights over them, were “property of the parties to the marriage” under s 79(1) of the Family Law Act. Then take each feature that Gummow and Hayne JJ relied on at [125]-[126], and the further feature that French CJ stressed at [62] and [66], and test it against the facts of the problem rather than assuming it is present. Attribute the reasoning on property to those Justices by name, because the Court did not give one set of reasons on it.

The Court decided these appeals under the Family Law Act as it stood in 2008. Part VIIIAA of the Act, on orders binding third parties, was not relied on in the High Court ([93] n 52), and the statutory text may have changed since, so check the current provisions before applying the reasoning to a present dispute.

A later Full Court decision in the appellate division of the Federal Circuit and Family Court describes the cases before Kennon v Spry as having identified control of the trust and capacity to benefit a spouse party as prerequisites, treats Kennon’s unusual feature as control in the husband without a capacity to benefit himself, and says that matters such as the origin of the trust assets may be relevant but are not required before trust assets are found to be property (Caldwell & Caldwell [2026] FedCFamC1A 81 at [40]-[42], the majority). That decision is not taught here, so check it, and any later authority, before relying on Kennon v Spry for a trust that differs from the one in the case.

Check your understanding

1. What did the husband do to the trust in 1983, 1998 and 2002, and which of those steps did the s 106B orders set aside?

2. How did Gummow and Hayne JJ describe the wife’s right in equity as an object of the discretionary power, and why did it not matter that the husband could not lawfully have applied the trust fund to himself?

3. Why did the divorce not prevent the court from treating the wife’s right as part of the property of the parties to the marriage?

4. How do the reasons of French CJ, Kiefel J and Heydon J each differ from the joint reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ?