The interest of a discretionary object
What a discretionary object holds before any appointment: a right to due consideration and due administration, and how Kennon v Spry treated that right as property under the Family Law Act.
Learning outcomes
- State what an object of a discretionary trust holds, and what the object does not hold.
- Explain how a majority of the High Court treated the right to due administration under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
- Identify the limits of Kennon v Spry, including the divided bench and the features of the trust on which the majority relied.
A person named as an object of a discretionary trust is often called a beneficiary, and that label invites the assumption that they own something in the trust fund. The High Court’s decision in Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 561 is the clearest Australian statement of what such a person does have, and it shows that the answer can matter in a setting outside trust law. This article states the equitable position as that Court described it and then follows the question into the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Commonwealth legislation on property settlement between the parties to a marriage. It reads no State or Territory trustee legislation.
What an object holds before any appointment
In Kennon v Spry the husband, Dr Spry, was settlor and trustee of a family trust. His wife was one of the class of objects of the trustee’s discretionary power to apply the fund, and she was also one of the class among whom the fund was to be divided at a distribution date. Gummow and Hayne JJ held that, as an object of those powers, she “had a right in equity to due administration of the Trust” (at [125]). Three points in that paragraph are worth separating.
- The right “did not depend upon entitlement to any fixed and transmissible beneficial interest in the trust fund”. An object holds a right even though no particular asset, and no share of the fund, is hers.
- The right was “accompanied at least by a fiduciary duty on the part of the trustee” to consider whether, and in what way, the power should be exercised.
- The word “beneficiaries” in the trust instrument was, in their Honours’ words, “inapt” insofar as it suggested a vested beneficial interest.
French CJ reached the same description by way of Lord Wilberforce in Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 553, whom he quoted as saying that an object has “a right to be considered as a potential recipient of benefit by the trustees and a right to have his interest protected by a court of equity” (at [74]). He added that “[t]he rights to consideration and to due administration are in the nature of equitable choses in action” (at [75]). That is the contrast with the fixed trust described in Beneficiary rights: the object holds enforceable rights against the trustee, not a share in the assets.
Why the nature of the right was in issue
Mrs Spry sought a property settlement in the Family Court. The primary judge set aside a 1998 variation excluding husband and wife as capital beneficiaries and a distribution of the whole fund to trusts for the children, and ordered Dr Spry to pay his former wife a lump sum. Section 79(1)(a) of the Family Law Act2 allows the court, in proceedings “with respect to the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them”, to make orders “altering the interests of the parties to the marriage in the property” (current consolidated text). So the question became whether a trust of which the husband was the trustee and the wife an object held anything that was “property of the parties”.
The Court’s answer turned on statutory construction, not on a general theory of trust property. Gummow and Hayne JJ said that “property” “is not a term of art with one specific and precise meaning” and that the dispute “is not resolved by considering only the ways in which the term ‘property’ may be used in relation to trusts of the kinds described as ‘discretionary trusts’” (at [89]-[90]). They concluded that “[t]he right of the wife with respect to the due administration of the Trust was included in her property for the purposes of the Act” (at [126]), and that the husband’s power to appoint the whole fund to his wife was also part of the property of the parties to the marriage. French CJ agreed that the wife’s equitable right to due administration and to due consideration could be taken into account as part of her property (at [78]), and listed factors supporting the same characterisation of the trust assets with the power of appointment (at [70]), among them the husband’s legal title, the origin of most of the assets in the marriage and the absence of any equitable interest in any other party.
What the case does not say
Four limits matter in an answer.
- It is a statutory holding about the Family Law Act. It does not decide that an object has a proprietary interest in trust assets for any other purpose, and the passage on the nature of the right is a description of a right to due consideration and administration, not of ownership.
- The bench divided. French CJ and Gummow and Hayne JJ decided the point as described. Kiefel J would have dismissed the appeals on a different ground, that s 85A of the Act enabled the court to deal with the trust property (at [238]), and Heydon J, dissenting, would have allowed them. He took the view that the Act’s language was “not apt” to give the court power over the assets of a discretionary trust “by reason merely of the right of objects of the power of appointment to enforce due administration and to be considered” (at [165]). A student should therefore say that a majority of three of five took the s 79 route.
- The result depended on features of that trust. French CJ said that if the husband had been trustee of a charitable trust or executor of a friend’s will, the mere legal title to those assets “because of their origins and character, could not be regarded as part of the husband’s property” (at [69]). The wife’s right was one factor among several.
- Valuing the right is hard. French CJ acknowledged that “it is difficult to value those rights when the beneficiary has no present entitlement and may never have any entitlement” (at [77]).
How it connects to the rest of the trusts material
The content of “due consideration” is developed in Trustee discretions: genuine consideration and review, and who counts as an object at all is a question of certainty, covered in Certainty of objects. How a court divides assets between spouses once the property question is answered is for Property settlement.
Applying this in a problem question
- Classify the trust. If the claimant is an object of a discretionary power and holds nothing more, say that the equitable position is a right to be considered and to due administration, not a fixed interest in any asset (Kennon v Spry at [125]).
- Identify the setting. If the question concerns a property settlement under the Family Law Act, state that Kennon v Spry is a decision on that Act’s concept of property, decided by a majority of three of five Justices on the s 79 route.
- Check the features the majority relied on: who held legal title, the source of the assets, whether any other person held an equitable interest, and whether the trustee could appoint to the spouse. If the trust is of the kind French CJ distinguished, the same reasoning may not apply.
- Do not treat the case as holding that every discretionary object has a proprietary interest for every purpose.
- Remember the practical difficulty: even if the right is property, its value is hard to fix (at [77]).
Where the authority sits
The authority is Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 56, as stated in the Court’s own reasons for judgment, together with the text of s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Gartside is cited here only as quoted by French CJ, so what Gartside itself decided is not established by the sources cited here. The article does not cover de facto relationships under the Family Law Act, bankruptcy, taxation or State trustee legislation.