The interest of a discretionary object

What the case does not say

This case only decides a point under the Family Law Act. It does not say an object has a proprietary interest in trust assets for any other purpose. The right described is a right to due consideration and administration, not ownership.

The judges disagreed. French CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ reached the main holding. Kiefel J would have dismissed the appeals on a different ground, using s 85A to deal with trust property. Heydon J dissented, saying the Act’s wording was not apt to give courts power over trust assets merely because objects can enforce due administration and be considered. So only three of five judges took the s 79 route described.

The outcome depended on the particular trust’s features. French CJ said that if the husband held assets as trustee of a charity or as an executor, mere legal title would not count as his property. The wife’s right was just one factor among several.

Valuing this right is also difficult. French CJ admitted it is hard to value a beneficiary’s interest when they have no present entitlement, and may never get one.

Applying this in a problem question

Start by classifying the trust. If the claimant only holds a discretionary power, their equitable position is a right to be considered and to due administration. This is not a fixed interest in any asset (Kennon v Spry at [125]).

Next, check the setting. Kennon v Spry was about property settlements under the Family Law Act. It was decided by a bare majority, three of five Justices, under the s 79 route.

Then look at the features the majority relied on. These include who held legal title, where the assets came from, whether anyone else held an equitable interest, and whether the trustee could appoint assets to the spouse. French CJ distinguished some trusts with different features, so the same reasoning may not apply to them.

Do not assume every discretionary object has a proprietary interest for every purpose. The case does not go that far.

Finally, remember a practical problem. Even if the right counts as property, valuing it can be difficult (at [77]).

Where the authority sits

This part relies on Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 56. It also relies on the actual wording of s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Gartside is mentioned too, but only as quoted by French CJ in that case. So the sources here do not establish what Gartside itself actually decided.

This article does not deal with de facto relationships under the Family Law Act. It also leaves out bankruptcy, taxation and State trustee legislation.

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