Trustees’ discretions: genuine consideration and the review of trustee decisions

How a court reviews a trustee’s decision for want of genuine, properly informed consideration: the High Court’s reasons in Finch v Telstra Super, the Karger v Paul formulation as Finch reports it, and English authority that is persuasive only.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
express-trusts

Learning outcomes

  • Decide whether a trustee’s decision is a wide discretion or an opinion that forms part of performing a duty, using the High Court’s reasons in Finch v Telstra Super, and say what Finch left open.
  • State the Karger v Paul formulation as the High Court quoted it in Finch, with its status, and the requirement of properly informed consideration that Finch stated for the superannuation deed before it.
  • State what followed from the flawed decision in Finch, and the English framing in Futter; Pitt v Holt as persuasive only in Australia.

A beneficiary can challenge a trustee’s decision because the trustee lacked power, breached the terms of the trust, or decided badly within a power the trustee did have. This article is about the last: what a court asks when a beneficiary says the trustee did not consider the decision properly. It states general equitable principle for all Australian jurisdictions only so far as its two main authorities do. Those are one High Court decision on a superannuation trust, which expressly left some questions open, and one English decision that is persuasive only. It cites no statute and does not cover investment, the statutory duty of care, exoneration clauses or disclosure of reasons. The first question is whether the decision is a “discretion” at all.

Classify the decision first

In Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria treated a superannuation trustee’s decision as a “discretionary decision” and reviewed it on the principles of Karger v Paul. The High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ, in a joint judgment) held that this was the wrong starting point.1 The trustee had to decide whether a member had ceased to be an employee and whether the member was unlikely ever to engage in “gainful Work”, and the Court said of the first that it was “scarcely a discretionary decision”. Forming the second opinion “was not a matter of discretionary power to think one thing or the other; it was an ingredient in the performance of a trust duty”, owed to a member who was “the beneficiary of a trust” and not the object of a power of appointment (at [29]-[30]). The Court concluded that decisions of that kind “are not discretionary decisions in the sense used in Karger v Paul” (at [36]).

That decision binds lower Australian courts as to what it decided; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. What it decided concerned a superannuation trust deed, and the Court relied on the nature of the decision and on the context of superannuation, including the public significance of superannuation and its statutory regulation (at [31]-[36]). A useful contrast is between a wide discretion to choose among objects and a decision to form an opinion that is itself part of performing a duty; that contrast is a way of organising the case, not a classification stated in the decision. The Court decided only the case before it, and which kind a decision is turns on the instrument and its context.

English authority contains a similar observation, and is persuasive only in Australia. In the Supreme Court in Futter v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Holt, Lord Walker (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lords Mance, Clarke, Sumption and Carnwath agreed) described an English pension case in which the trustee “did not have any real discretion” but had to exercise a judgment on an issue of fact, and said that on such an issue “the court would be much more ready to intervene if the trustee had failed to grasp the real facts”.2

The Karger v Paul formulation

Karger v Paul is a decision of McGarvie J in the Supreme Court of Victoria, so it is a single judge’s decision at first instance. It is described here only as the High Court described it: a testatrix gave her trustees power, “in their absolute and unfettered discretion” and on her husband’s request, to pay or transfer the capital of her estate to him, her cousin, who took the remainder, challenged the trustees’ decision to transfer all of it, and McGarvie J held that the case concerned a “discretionary decision” (Finch at [28]).

In Finch the High Court quoted, without adopting it as its own statement, how the Court of Appeal put the principle: the court can set aside a trustee’s discretionary decision “if the relevant discretion was not exercised by the trustee in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration, and in accordance with the purposes for which the discretion was conferred”, though an error of fact, or not making all the inquiries that were open, is not by itself a sufficient reason to set aside a determination made in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration and for a proper purpose (at [28]). The High Court did not decide how far those principles apply to superannuation trusts or whether other principles should be adopted (at [65]).

It did say that, under those principles as applied to superannuation funds, a trustee’s decision “may be reviewable for want of ‘properly informed consideration’”: “If the consideration is not properly informed, it is not genuine.” It added that the duty of trustees properly to inform themselves “is more intense in superannuation trusts in the form of the Deed than in trusts of the Karger v Paul type” (at [66]). That was said of this deed, which gave the trustee a power to take into account information it considered relevant and coupled it with a duty to do so.

What genuine consideration required in Finch

The trial judge, Byrne J, spoke of good faith, but he found no bad faith. The High Court read his reference as meaning only that the trustee “had failed to give the matter ‘genuine’ consideration in that it had failed to pursue sufficient inquiries” (at [43]).

Byrne J held that the trustee failed in its duty to make inquiries in three ways: it made no inquiry about the member’s last months with his employer; it did not inquire further into the member’s material suggesting that his later jobs were a failed rehabilitation effort; and it relied on a statement its chief executive reported the member had made, that a job was “a real job”, without inviting the member’s comment (at [44]-[49]). The High Court held that the Court of Appeal’s attacks on his reasoning failed and that his opinion that the trustee did not comply with a duty of inquiry stood (at [56]). It said it “would be bizarre if knowingly to exclude relevant information from consideration were not a breach of duty”, and that failing to seek relevant information to resolve conflicting bodies of material, as there, was also a breach of duty; it said this of a deed that coupled a power to take information into account with a duty to do so (at [66]).

What follows from a flawed decision

On the facts in Finch the High Court did not decide the claim itself. As Byrne J had said, the trustee had “done no more than fail to observe due process by giving genuine consideration”, there was no bad faith, and a decision for the member was not the only possible one, so “the matter must be remitted to the Trustee” (at [67]-[68]). A defect in the process of deciding led to reconsideration, not to the court’s own decision on the benefit.

English authority, persuasive only, adds a framing for the same problem. Lord Walker agreed with Lloyd LJ’s statement that where trustees breach their duties in exercising a discretionary power, but within its terms, the act is “not void but it may be voidable at the instance of a beneficiary who is adversely affected”, unless it is a fraud on the power. He distinguished that from an act outside the power, which he called “excessive execution”, and a failure to give proper consideration to a decision within the power, which he called “inadequate deliberation”.

English limits on inadequate deliberation (persuasive only)

Futter; Pitt v Holt concerned tax-planning trusts and the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, and Lord Walker stated limits on that rule. He held that the inadequate deliberation “must be sufficiently serious as to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty”, and that “it is not enough to show that the trustees’ deliberations have fallen short of the highest possible standards”. He also held that “it would be contrary to principle and authority” to impose strict liability on trustees who “conscientiously obtain and follow, in making a decision which is within the scope of their powers, apparently competent professional advice which turns out to be wrong”. He quoted Lord Truro LC in Re Beloved Wilkes’s Charity, who said the court’s supervision is “confined to the question of the honesty, integrity, and fairness with which the deliberation has been conducted” and “will not be extended to the accuracy of the conclusion arrived at, except in particular cases”, and said those cases might have included ones where trustees must make a particular factual judgment.

Do not read that as the Australian position. Finch left open whether a superannuation trustee’s duty is “to form a fair and reasonable opinion, or even a duty to form a correct opinion” (at [66]). Whether Australian courts have adopted the English restriction of the Hastings-Bass rule is not covered here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the decision and the instrument. Is the trustee choosing among objects under a wide discretion, or forming an opinion that decides whether a beneficiary meets a condition? Say which, and why, as Finch did at [29]-[36].
  2. For a wide discretion, state the Karger v Paul formulation as the Court of Appeal’s statement quoted in Finch at [28], a single-judge decision at its source, and note that the High Court left its reach open at [65].
  3. Find what the trustee actually did: what it asked, what it had before it, and whether it put adverse material to the beneficiary. Compare the failures in Finch at [44]-[49], and remember they were found on one superannuation deed.
  4. For an opinion-forming decision outside superannuation, argue by analogy from Finch at [66] and say that Finch did not decide how far that duty extends beyond that deed.
  5. Choose the consequence cautiously: Finch remitted to the trustee on its facts; the English “voidable” framing is persuasive only.
  6. If the trustee relied on professional advice, treat Futter; Pitt v Holt as persuasive only and state its qualification that the failure must amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.

Self-check

  • Have I said whether the decision was a wide discretion or an opinion that forms part of a duty, and relied on the High Court’s reasons only for what it decided?
  • Have I treated the Karger v Paul statement as quoted in Finch and not as a High Court holding?
  • Have I labelled every English statement as persuasive only?
  • Have I said what Finch left open at [65] and [66]?

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