Futter v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Holt

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom · 2013

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Futter v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 AC 108 (UKSC)

Trustees acted on professional tax advice, and a large tax bill followed that nobody had expected. When can a court undo a trustee’s decision on the ground that the trustees did not think properly about its consequences?

What happened?

Two appeals were heard together. In Futter, Mr Mark Futter had made two settlements in 1985. Both initially had non-resident trustees, but in 2004 Mr Futter and Mr Cutbill, both resident in the United Kingdom, were appointed as trustees of the two settlements, and Mr Cutbill was a partner in the London solicitors who gave the tax advice ([47]). On 31 March 2008 the trustees, on the solicitors’ advice, distributed the whole capital of the No 3 settlement to Mr Futter under a power of enlargement, and on 3 April 2008 they distributed 36,000 pounds from the No 5 settlement to Mr Futter’s three children in equal shares under a power of advancement ([48]).

Each distribution was squarely within the scope of the relevant power ([48]). The trustees correctly understood that gains stockpiled while the trusts were non-resident would be attributed to Mr Futter and his children as if the beneficiaries had realised them, but they wrongly believed that these gains would be absorbed by allowable losses, so that no tax would be payable; this overlooked the effect of section 2(4) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 as amended ([48]). The result was a large capital gains tax liability for Mr Futter and a modest one for his children ([48]). The trustees applied to have the deeds declared void and the Revenue resisted; Norris J held the deeds void rather than voidable ([49], [52]).

In Pitt, Mr Derek Pitt suffered very serious head injuries in a road traffic accident in 1990, resulting in his mental incapacity. His wife, Mrs Patricia Pitt, was appointed his receiver, and his claim for damages was compromised by a court-approved structured settlement of 1.2 million pounds ([53]). Her solicitors sought advice from Frenkel Topping, financial advisers said to have specialist experience of structured settlements, who advised that the damages should be settled on a discretionary settlement, the Derek Pitt Special Needs Trust, which was done in 1994 with the authority of the Court of Protection ([53]).

The advisers’ written report made no reference to inheritance tax. As drafted, the settlement brought an immediate inheritance tax liability of the order of 100,000 pounds, which could have been avoided had it taken one of two other forms ([54]). After Mr Pitt’s death in 2007 his personal representatives sought to have the settlement set aside, either under the rule in Hastings-Bass or for mistake ([55]). The deputy judge, Mr Robert Englehart QC, set the settlement aside under the rule ([57]). The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals ([58]), and the trustees in Futter and Mr Pitt’s personal representatives appealed to the Supreme Court.

What did the Court decide?

The Supreme Court gave a single judgment, delivered by Lord Walker, with which Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed. On the Hastings-Bass issues it concluded that the appeal in Futter, and the appeal in Pitt so far as it turned on that rule, should be dismissed ([98]). On the separate ground of mistake in Pitt it concluded that the orders below should be discharged and the settlement set aside ([142]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Lord Walker began with the label. He said that it is “now generally recognized” that “the rule in Hastings-Bass” is a misnomer ([1]). He adopted the Court of Appeal’s distinction between an error by trustees in going beyond the scope of a power, which he called “excessive execution”, and an error in failing to give proper consideration to relevant matters in making a decision within the scope of the power, which he called “inadequate deliberation” ([60]).

For the second kind of error he held that “when the vitiating error is inadequate deliberation on relevant matters (rather than mistake) the inadequacy must be sufficiently serious as to amount to a breach of duty” ([68]). He returned to the point at [73]: “for the rule to apply the inadequate deliberation on the part of the trustees must be sufficiently serious as to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.” He gave his reason and the limits of the requirement: “It is not enough to show that the trustees’ deliberations have fallen short of the highest possible standards, or that the court would, on a surrender of discretion by the trustees, have acted in a different way. Apart from exceptional circumstances (such as an impasse reached by honest and reasonable trustees) only breach of fiduciary duty justifies judicial intervention.”

On the consequence of a breach, he accepted as “plainly right” the Court of Appeal’s statement that where the exercise of a discretionary power is within its terms but the trustees have breached their duties in respect of it, then “(unless it is a case of a fraud on the power) the trustees’ act is not void but it may be voidable at the instance of a beneficiary who is adversely affected” ([93]). He noted that Lloyd LJ had not answered the debate whether the court should intervene where the trustees would, or merely might, have decided differently, and said that this was not an oversight: the rule “is centred on the failure of trustees to perform their decision-making function”, and “Whether the court will intervene is another matter” ([91]).

He declined to lay down a rigid rule of either kind, because “as a matter of principle there must be a high degree of flexibility in the range of the court’s possible responses” ([92]).

On the effect of professional advice, Lord Walker accepted that trustees may be liable for breach of trust even though they acted in accordance with skilled advice, where the decision is outside their powers or contrary to the general law ([78]-[80]). He then stated the position for a decision within their powers: “But it would be contrary to principle and authority to impose a form of strict liability on trustees who conscientiously obtain and follow, in making a decision which is within the scope of their powers, apparently competent professional advice which turns out to be wrong” ([80]).

He added that a failure to take professional advice “may amount to, or contribute to, a flawed decision-making process” ([80]). He rejected the argument that the fault of the advisers should be attributed to the trustees as their principals: solicitors “do not and may not act as agents in the exercise of fiduciary discretions” ([81]). And he rejected as a “last-ditch argument” the submission that the trustees’ duty was to act on advice only if it was correct ([88]). He said that the duty “does not extend to being right” on every occasion, and he relied on Lord Truro LC’s statement in Re Beloved Wilkes’s Charity that the court’s supervision “will not be extended to the accuracy of the conclusion arrived at, except in particular cases”.

Those particular cases, Lord Walker said, may have included cases about the maintenance of minor beneficiaries and cases such as Kerr v British Leyland (Staff) Trustees Ltd, where trustees have to make a particular factual judgment ([88]; see also [75]).

Applying these points in Futter, Lord Walker said that capital gains tax was a relevant consideration and “fairly plain that it was the paramount consideration, and the trustees thought about it a great deal”, but the advice was wrong because an amendment had been overlooked ([95]). Mr Cutbill was a member of both the team giving the advice and the trustees acting on it; Lord Walker agreed with the Court of Appeal that it would be artificial to distinguish between the two trustees, but said that the documents tend to confirm that he should not “be treated as having been personally in breach of fiduciary duty” ([96]). In Pitt, Mrs Pitt “had taken supposedly expert advice and followed it”, and there was “no reason to hold that she personally failed in the exercise of her fiduciary duty” ([97]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Lord Walker, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed

Read judgment: [68] (opens in a new tab), [73] (opens in a new tab)

The requirement of breach of fiduciary duty was the ground on which the Hastings-Bass issues in both appeals were decided against the appellants ([95]-[98]), so it was necessary to the result.

Obiter · Lord Walker, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed

Read judgment: [73] (opens in a new tab)

The statements that the court may also intervene in exceptional circumstances, such as an impasse reached by honest and reasonable trustees, and in the past special case of maintenance of minors, concern situations that did not arise: neither appeal involved them.

Obiter · Lord Walker, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed

Read judgment: [91]–[93] (opens in a new tab)

The consequence of a breach (voidable rather than void) and the refusal to fix a would-not or might-not test did not arise on the facts, because no breach of fiduciary duty was found in either appeal ([96]-[97]). Lord Walker records that counsel on both sides agreed with the Court of Appeal on the void or voidable point and says that in the absence of further argument it is unnecessary to add much to it ([93]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Lord Walker, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed

Read judgment: [80]–[81] (opens in a new tab), [88] (opens in a new tab), [95]–[97] (opens in a new tab)

The Hastings-Bass appeals failed because no breach of fiduciary duty could be found against trustees who had taken and followed apparently competent advice that was wrong ([95]-[97]); the statements at [80], [81] and [88] are the reasons given for treating that conduct as no breach, and the strict-liability and agency arguments were answered in them.

Obiter · Lord Walker, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed

Read judgment: [88] (opens in a new tab), [75] (opens in a new tab)

Lord Walker’s suggestion of what the particular cases in Lord Truro LC’s statement may have included (maintenance of minors, and Kerr-type factual judgments) is expressed as a possibility and was not needed for the result, since neither appeal involved such a case.

Why does this case matter?

A tax bill that falls on a family after a trustee decision invites a sympathetic answer: the result is bad, so the decision should be undone. Examiners look for a student who tests the sympathetic answer against what the Supreme Court said and who is clear about the weight an English decision carries in Australia.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem in which a trustee decision has produced an unwanted result, start by saying what the trustees decided, which power they used, what they did to inform themselves before deciding, and what the person asking the court for relief says went wrong and wants done. Then use Lord Walker’s judgment, with the paragraph, for the points your facts engage.

This is a decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court and is persuasive, not binding, in an Australian court. A Privy Council decision of 2025 on appeal from The Bahamas, Dawson-Damer v Grampian Trust Company Ltd [2025] UKPC 32, has since considered this judgment, and its account of Lord Walker’s reasoning should be read before the English position is stated. The mistake ground in Pitt is separate, and nothing here states the law of mistake.

Check your understanding

1. In Futter, what did the trustees believe about the effect of allowable losses on the stockpiled gains, and what had they overlooked ([48])?

2. Which kind of error did Lord Walker call inadequate deliberation, and how did he distinguish it from the other kind ([60])?

3. What did Lord Walker say about deliberations that fall short of the highest possible standards ([73])?

4. What did Lord Walker say about laying down a rigid rule of either “would not” or “might not” ([92])?

5. When did Lord Walker say trustees may be liable even though they obtained apparently competent professional advice ([78]-[80])?

6. Why did Lord Walker not treat Mr Cutbill as personally in breach of fiduciary duty, despite his dual role ([96])?