Atwell v Roberts

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia · 2013

Corporations And Commercial LawEquity And TrustsCorporate PersonalityEquitable Remedies

Atwell v Roberts [2013] WASCA 37

For decades a Fremantle family’s arcade was run by a family firm whose deed divided it into ‘units’ carrying pre-emptive rights. Years after units changed hands, allegedly in breach of those rights, could the dealings be unwound?

What happened?

The Atwell Arcade, a group of shops in the Fremantle business district, was leased out by a family business known as the Atwell Family Agency ([6], [15]). Over the years partners died or retired and new partners were admitted, and the business kept trading under the same name. A deed dated 25 March 1976, with a schedule of Rules, set the terms ([18], [20]). The Rules deemed each partner to hold “units”, divided the partnership into 142,884 units, and created a pre-emptive rights provision ([28]-[31]): apart from permitted dealings, such as an acquisition by one partner from another and transfers to a partner’s legal personal representatives, new trustees or certain family members ([118], [139]), a partner proposing to dispose of units had to give a disposal notice so that the other partners could buy them first ([141]).

The appellants, Malcolm and Ian Atwell, sued as trustees of the estate of their father, Walter Charles Atwell, on behalf of the partners other than the respondents ([34]). They challenged six transfers of units, five in the 1980s and one in 2001, alleging that each was made without complying with the pre-emptive rights provision ([43], [46]). Pullin JA noted that the first of them occurred in 1983 and that it was about 20 years later before any protest was raised about it ([4]). At trial the appellants sought to have the transactions rescinded and disposal notices issued; on the appeal they no longer sought rescission and sought an account ([2]). The trial judge, EM Heenan J, answered separate questions formulated by the parties and dismissed the appellants’ action against the second and third respondents ([5], [100]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Pullin, Buss and Murphy JJA, each giving reasons) dismissed the appeal ([1], [217]) and ordered the appellants to pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the appeal. Grounds 1, 3 and 4 failed. On ground 2, which concerned the dealings that required a disposal notice, Buss JA, with whom Pullin JA agreed, held that the trial judge had mischaracterised those dealings but that this did not affect the outcome ([178]); Murphy JA held that the trial judge’s conclusion was correct ([290], [300]). On ground 3, all three upheld the trial judge’s finding that the appellants were not partners before Elsie Atwell’s death on 9 November 1998 ([187]-[188], [302]). The Court later made special costs orders in favour of the first and second respondents ([2013] WASCA 37 (S)).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

All three members of the Court of Appeal rejected the appellants’ first ground, which challenged the trial judge’s view that the 1976 partnership deed reflected an underlying fallacy that the Atwell Family Agency was a continuing entity ([11], [129], [134], [288]). Pullin JA said that “it is an axiom of partnership law that any change in the membership of a partnership occurring, whether by reason of the retirement, expulsion, death or otherwise of a partner has the consequence of dissolving the partnership” ([11(a)]), and that “a share in a partnership, even if designated by reference to ‘units’, does not enjoy a corporate or quasi-corporate existence apart from the members who comprise it” ([11(d)]).

Buss JA said that “It is a fundamental principle of the law of partnership that any change in the membership of the partnership, whether occurring as a result of the retirement, expulsion, death or otherwise of a partner, effects a dissolution of the partnership” ([122]), and that each Atwell partnership had been dissolved as a matter of law on every change in its membership: “The fact that any winding up may have been ‘technical’ or ‘notional’ does not derogate from the occurrence or diminish the significance, as a matter of law, of the dissolution.” ([128]).

Murphy JA agreed, for the reasons Pullin JA summarised, that the deed reflected the fallacy the trial judge identified ([288]), and said that “Any ‘continuing’ partnership would be a new partnership different from the partnership existing prior to the death of the partner.” ([246]). The partners’ agreement could still shape what followed a dissolution. Pullin and Buss JJA relied on McPherson JA’s statement in Rushton (Qld) Pty Ltd v Rushton (NSW) Pty Ltd that an actual winding up may be avoided by agreement, so that it is the winding up and not the dissolution that is notional ([11(c)], [125]); Pullin JA said that the partners of a new firm “may agree that the restriction should apply to the new partnership” ([11(h)]); and Buss JA accepted the trial judge’s finding that the 1976 deed governed each of the successive partnerships ([201]).

On the fourth ground, Buss JA, with whom Pullin JA agreed ([12]), held that the trial judge was correct in deciding that “any equitable interest of the other partners, arising from a partner having triggered the pre-emptive rights provision in the Rules by deciding to dispose of his or her interest in the Partnership, did not survive the formation of the next succeeding partnership” ([200]). Buss JA did not decide whether triggering the provision gives the other partners an equitable interest at all.

He assumed it in the appellants’ favour, noting that “There is a division in the case law on this issue” ([198]), and said that such an interest “exists only so long as the option to acquire is specifically enforceable by him or her” ([199]). His reasons were that each change in membership dissolved the partnership and was followed by a notional winding up and a new partnership in which each partner acquired a new and different share ([202]-[204]); that the partners of each new partnership, including the persons who may have been entitled to insist on the pre-emptive rights, accepted the incoming partners ([205]); that the appellants had disavowed at trial any suggestion that the partners were induced into the successive partnerships by fraud or misrepresentation ([206]); and that “The subject matter of the pre-emptive rights provision was extinguished.” ([207]).

Before the dissolution and notional winding up it was open to the appellants to claim relief in equity, and afterwards, “subject to any available limitation or other defences, the appellants had a cause of action for breach of contract and a remedy in damages for any loss they had suffered as a result of the breach” ([209]). Murphy JA rejected the ground by a different route. “Assuming (without deciding)” that an equitable interest arose ([308]), he held that the partnership in which the disposing partner had an interest did not continue after the successor partnership began, that partner’s interest having been discharged by accord and satisfaction ([313]), so that the order the appellants sought “would be impossible to perform. Specific performance will not be ordered if performance is impossible.” ([314]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Pullin JA; Buss JA; Murphy JA

Read judgment: [11] (opens in a new tab), [121]–[129] (opens in a new tab), [132]–[134] (opens in a new tab), [245]–[246] (opens in a new tab), [288] (opens in a new tab)

The change in the identity of the partnership, despite the language of units and a continuing business, was necessary to rejecting ground 1. Pullin JA expressly used the dissolution and non-corporate character of the units to dismiss that ground; Buss JA applied those principles to the deed; Murphy JA adopted Pullin JA’s reasons at [288]. This does not make every consequence of dissolution unavoidable by agreement: Buss JA at [127] and Murphy JA at [245]-[246] recognised the continuation provision while treating the surviving firm as a new partnership. The distinction between dissolution and an actual winding up is part of the reasoning applied to this deed.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Buss JA, with Pullin JA agreeing at [12]

Read judgment: [12] (opens in a new tab), [198]–[208] (opens in a new tab), [211] (opens in a new tab)

The majority rejected ground 4 because, even assuming that the triggered pre-emptive right created an equitable interest, that interest did not survive the agreed notional winding up and formation of the next partnership. The new shares, acceptance of the new partnership by those entitled to insist on pre-emption, and absence of any pleaded inducement by fraud or misrepresentation were steps in that conclusion. The subject matter could no longer be restored, so there was no subsisting proprietary interest for specific performance or an injunction to protect. This is the ground applied to these transactions, not a ruling that every breach of a partnership pre-emption clause has the same consequences.

Classification unresolved · Buss JA, with Pullin JA agreeing at [12]; Murphy JA

Read judgment: [12] (opens in a new tab), [198] (opens in a new tab), [308] (opens in a new tab)

Whether triggering the pre-emptive provision created an equitable proprietary interest was assumed in the appellants’ favour, not decided. Buss JA identified divided authority and Murphy JA expressly proceeded without deciding the point. Their rejection of the claimed relief therefore supplies no holding that such an interest necessarily arises.

Separate reasoning · Murphy JA (concurring in dismissal of ground 4)

Read judgment: [303] (opens in a new tab), [308] (opens in a new tab), [311]–[315] (opens in a new tab)

Murphy JA reached the same result through the discharge of the disposing partner’s interest by accord and satisfaction under binding successor partnership agreements. No fraud or misrepresentation was alleged to avoid those agreements. There was consequently no subsisting interest which the disposing partner could assign, making the requested specific performance impossible. This was his distinct concurring route, with particular relevance to the second and third transfers; it was not an adoption of every step in Buss JA’s reasoning.

Obiter · Buss JA, with Pullin JA agreeing at [12]

Read judgment: [12] (opens in a new tab), [209] (opens in a new tab)

The observation that a contractual damages claim remained available, subject to limitation and other defences, answered the contention that the appellants were left without a remedy. The dismissal of ground 4 rested on the failure of the claimed proprietary relief, not on adjudicating a damages claim. This passage neither awards damages nor determines which limitation period or defence would govern such a claim.

Why does this case matter?

Unit partnership deeds are often drafted in the vocabulary of companies, with units, transfers, registers and committees, and problem questions use them to test whether a student can see past the drafting to the legal structure underneath. A student who reads such a deed as if it created a company will ask the wrong questions about who holds what, and against whom a complaint lies. The case is a Western Australian appellate decision on a deed of exactly that kind, made under the Partnership Act 1895 (WA), so it is a natural authority to use when a problem involves a family or investment partnership run on units.

Exam and application relevance

The fourth ground was decided on the facts of this partnership and on what the appellants did and did not allege at trial. Where a problem’s facts differ, work through each step of the reasoning on those facts rather than assuming the same result.

Where a problem turns on whether a triggered pre-emptive right is itself proprietary, for example in a priority contest with a purchaser of the units, identify whether this case decided that question or proceeded on an assumption about it before you rely on it.

The decision concerns the Partnership Act 1895 (WA) and the terms of one deed. In another State, check that State’s Partnership Act and the terms of the agreement before relying on it.

Check your understanding

1. What did the appellants allege about the six transfers of units, and how did the relief they sought change between the trial and the appeal?

2. How did Pullin JA and Buss JA each describe the effect of a change in the membership of a partnership, and what did Buss JA say about a “technical” or “notional” winding up?

3. On what question did Buss JA say there is a division in the case law, and how did he deal with it?

4. According to Buss JA, what remedy remained open to the appellants after the next partnership was formed, and subject to what?

5. By what different route did Murphy JA reject the fourth ground?