Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2009

Equity And TrustsEquitable RemediesEstoppel

Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44

Two guarantors sold their properties to pay down the first of three loans, and the first lender then passed the surplus to the second lender. Could equity make the first lender answer for that?

What happened?

B & B Holdings Pty Ltd, a property developer, borrowed in turn from three lenders on registered mortgages over the same land: $7,062,000 from Kingsway Group Limited (the first mortgagee), $1,400,000 from Rekley Pty Limited (the second) and $350,000 from Mr Skehan (the third) ([19]). Mr and Mrs Bofinger guaranteed each loan. Each guarantee was supported by mortgages over two properties of their own, and the guarantees were in the same form ([22]).

In 2005, after apparent defaults by B & B Holdings, the Bofingers sold their two properties and paid $1,519,234.40 to the first mortgagee in reduction of the debt secured by the first mortgage ([27]). The first mortgagee knew of the sales and the payments ([29]). The properties’ mortgages to the second and third mortgagees were discharged, and the guarantees to them stayed in force unsecured ([28]).

By 8 February 2006 the debt to the first mortgagee had been satisfied, while B & B Holdings had not repaid the second and third mortgagees ([30]). A firm of solicitors acted for the first and second mortgagees and, at least in February 2006, the third, and one of its solicitors was a director of the first mortgagee ([20]). On 7 February the firm wrote on behalf of the second mortgagee asking for possession of the two unsold lots and for the sale proceeds to be paid to its trust account.

On 8 February the first mortgagee consented, sent the keys and the discharges of its mortgages over the two lots, and confirmed that the proceeds were to be paid to the firm’s trust account to be disbursed to the second mortgagee ([31]). The second mortgagee was provided with $268,307, and the whole of the proceeds of another lot, $432,712.53, was paid to the firm on its behalf ([32]).

The Bofingers sued in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The question stated for separate decision was whether those sums and the securities over the two lots were held in trust for them ([38]-[39]). The primary judge answered no, and the Court of Appeal (Giles JA, Handley AJA and Sackville AJA) dismissed their appeal ([14], [42]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the Court of Appeal’s orders and the primary judge’s orders and answered the separate question in the Bofingers’ favour in the terms set out at [99]. The remaining issues were left to be taken up again in the Equity Division ([100]). The five Justices gave one set of joint reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Account by the first mortgagee. The respondents did not challenge the statements of principle on a surety’s equity to the creditor’s securities ([13]), but said they did not reach this case, where the first mortgage had been paid in full and discharged and the surplus had passed to the second mortgagee. The joint reasons asked what equitable relief fitted these facts. The term “constructive trust” may be used “to identify the imposition of a personal liability to account upon a defaulting fiduciary” ([47]).

On 8 February 2006 the first mortgagee “was obliged in good conscience both to account to the appellants for surplus moneys and securities it held and not to undertake or perform any competing engagement in that respect without prior release by the appellants”, and “[t]hese obligations were fiduciary in character” ([49]). The correspondence showed it entering into and performing a conflicting engagement with the second mortgagee, to the Bofingers’ loss ([49]). So the first mortgagee “is to be treated as a constructive trustee to the extent that it must account to the appellants as a defaulting fiduciary”, and it was “unnecessary to seek to determine upon the agreed facts whether the first mortgagee was a trustee in a fuller sense” ([50]).

The joint reasons added that a breach of that fiduciary obligation would engage the second limb of Barnes v Addy if further facts were established against the other respondents ([51]).

The guarantees to the other mortgagees. The respondents argued that the Bofingers’ guarantee to the second mortgagee excluded the equity. The joint reasons applied the settled principle that “a doubt as to the construction of a provision in such a contract should be resolved in favour of the surety or indemnifier” ([53]). The waiver in clause 6.4 reached only rights as surety under that guarantee that were inconsistent with it, and not rights under the guarantee to the first mortgagee ([59]).

Paragraphs (1) and (3) of clause 7.1 did not constrain rights under the guarantee of the first mortgage, as the Solicitors accepted ([62]), and the argument that paragraph (2) meant the second mortgagee was to “go first” was rejected ([63]-[64]). The Bofingers were therefore not acting in breach of any restriction in the guarantee of the second mortgage, there was nothing inequitable in their seeking equity’s aid, and they were not bound to offer to protect the second mortgagee as the price of relief ([66]-[67]). Giles JA’s reasons for a different view did not hold, for the same reasons ([70]-[71]).

Unconscionability and unjust enrichment. Sackville AJA had asked whether subrogation was needed to avoid an unconscionable result. The joint reasons held that this question did not allow for the fact that the surplus was computed only after allowance for the Bofingers’ payments ([82]). They also said that unjust enrichment “was not a principle supplying a sufficient premise for direct application in a particular case”, and that “the doctrinal basis of equitable subrogation in Australian law is not unsettled” ([85], [98]).

Estoppel by convention. Handley AJA had treated the second mortgagee’s claim to priority as supported by an estoppel by convention. The joint reasons quoted the Court in Con-Stan: “Estoppel by convention is a form of estoppel founded not on a representation of fact made by a representor and acted on by a representee to his detriment, but on the conduct of relations between the parties on the basis of an agreed or assumed state of facts, which both will be estopped from denying” ([74]). They continued: “The reference to an agreed or assumed state of facts (not of law) is significant” ([75]). They then held, “[i]n any event”, that “the agreed facts fall far short of what would be necessary to establish that the priority of the second mortgagee which is now asserted was the conventional basis of the transaction between it and the appellants as guarantors” ([75]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [47]–[51] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons needed the conclusion that the first mortgagee owed the sureties a fiduciary obligation to account, and was to be treated as a constructive trustee in the sense of a defaulting fiduciary, to answer the separate question in the sureties’ favour. This was the ground of the order made at [99].

Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [53]–[68] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

The respondents’ notices of contention argued that the sureties’ equity was excluded by the guarantee given to the second mortgagee. The joint reasons rejected that on the construction of clauses 3, 5, 6.4 and 7.1, resolving doubt in the surety’s favour. That rejection was necessary to the conclusion that the equity remained available.

Classification unresolved · Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [85]–[86] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab), [98] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons held that unjust enrichment does not supply a premise for direct application in subrogation and that the doctrinal basis of equitable subrogation in Australian law is not unsettled. The passage answers the Court of Appeal’s remark that the basis was open to debate, but the respondents did not rely on the English reasoning ([98]), so it is not clear that the order depended on it. It is recorded as unresolved because a ratio or obiter label would conceal that qualification.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [72]–[73] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [75] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

Handley AJA’s estoppel by convention reasoning was one of the Court of Appeal’s supports for upholding the primary judge. The joint reasons found the agreed facts fell far short of establishing the alleged conventional basis, which was necessary to reject that support.

Classification unresolved · Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [74]–[75] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons quote Con-Stan’s formulation and call the reference to facts, not law, significant, but go straight on to decide the point ‘in any event’ on the agreed facts. Whether the remark about facts and law was needed for the result is not clear, and the reasons say no more about it, so a ratio or obiter label would conceal that qualification.

Why does this case matter?

Bofinger is cited in two settings that have little in common, and a student who knows it from only one will misdescribe it in the other. In an estoppel answer it is a short passage in a case about sureties, so the weight to put on it depends on reading it in that setting. In an answer on guarantors and securities, the label attached to the first mortgagee’s position is where marks are won or lost, so the Court’s own wording matters.

Exam and application relevance

For estoppel by convention, ask what state of facts the parties actually adopted as the basis of their dealings, and what evidence shows that both did so. Read [74]-[75] closely and attribute no wider rule to them than their words.

For a guarantor who has paid part of a secured debt, identify who held the securities when the debt was satisfied, what that holder did with the surplus and the discharges, and what the guarantee terms say about the guarantor’s rights against the securities. Be precise about the label for the first mortgagee’s position: describe it in the joint reasons’ own terms ([50], [99]), and note what they left open.

Check your understanding

1. What did the first mortgagee do once its own debt had been satisfied, and what did the question stated for separate decision ask?

2. On what basis did the joint reasons say the first mortgagee was a “constructive trustee”, and what did they find unnecessary to decide about that description?

3. How did the joint reasons deal with clauses 6.4 and 7.1 of the guarantee to the second mortgagee?

4. Whose reasons are stated at [74]-[75], and how many Justices joined them?

5. What did the joint reasons say about the Con-Stan formulation’s reference to facts rather than law, and on what ground did they reject the estoppel by convention argument?