Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2012

Equity And TrustsEquitable RemediesEquitable Jurisdiction

Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30

A bank charged customers fees for overdrafts, refused payments and credit card defaults. Customers called the fees penalties; the bank said the doctrine needs a breach of contract. Which stipulations can the doctrine reach?

What happened?

The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group charged its customers fees which the applicants called “exception fees”: honour, dishonour and non-payment fees on retail and business deposit accounts, and over limit and late payment fees on consumer and commercial credit card accounts ([19]). The applicants brought a representative action in the Federal Court on behalf of about 38,000 group members ([3]). Among other claims, they sought declarations that the fee provisions were void or unenforceable as penalties and repayment of the fees as money had and received ([6]).

Gordon J answered separate questions on 13 December 2011. She found that the late payment fee was payable on breach of contract and so was capable of characterisation as a penalty, and the bank did not appeal that finding ([21]). She found that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees were not charged on a breach of contract by the customer, and that the events on which they were charged were not events the customer had an obligation or responsibility to avoid.

She therefore held it unnecessary to answer whether those fees were capable of characterisation as penalties ([22]). She had found that, under the terms agreed between the parties, those fees were charged as a consequence of the bank’s decision to afford or decline further accommodation to the customer, by authorising or refusing payment on an instruction that would overdraw the account or exceed the credit limit ([23]). Her Honour followed the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Interstar ([29]).

Grounds 1-4 of the applicants’ proposed appeal, which concerned the nature and scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against penalties and whether relief is available only where a penalty is imposed on breach of contract, were removed into the High Court ([17]-[18]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court granted leave to appeal on grounds 1-4, treated the appeal as instituted and heard instanter, and allowed it with costs. It set aside the primary judge’s answers on the exception fees other than those the order excepted, and substituted a declaration about the characterisation of the fees. It reserved the costs of the separate questions for the Federal Court ([84]-[87]). There was a single set of joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Their Honours began with the doctrine as they regarded it as settled. “In general terms, a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty on a party (‘the first party’) if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour of a second party and this collateral stipulation, upon the failure of the primary stipulation, imposes upon the first party an additional detriment, the penalty, to the benefit of the second party” ([10]). “If compensation can be made to the second party for the prejudice suffered by failure of the primary stipulation, the collateral stipulation and the penalty are enforced only to the extent of that compensation” ([10]).

The primary stipulation “may be the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event which need not be the payment of money”, and the penalty “need not be a requirement to pay to the second party a sum of money” ([12]).

The doctrine “is not engaged if the prejudice or damage to the interests of the second party by the failure of the primary stipulation is insusceptible of evaluation and assessment in money terms. It is the availability of compensation which generates the ‘equity’ upon which the court intervenes; without it, the parties are left to their legal rights and obligations” ([11]). They illustrated that with Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v Stewart, where a bond for £500 was conditioned on payment of £50 each time members of the obligor went on strike and no relief was given against the £50, because the loss caused by a strike could not be measured ([11]).

On scope, the Court of Appeal in Interstar had said that the limits of the doctrine arise from the consequences of breach of contract ([31]). The joint reasons held that “this limitation should not be accepted” ([46]) and that “it does not follow, as the ANZ would have it, that in a simple contract the only stipulations which engage the penalty doctrine must be those which are contractual promises broken by the promisor” ([45]). They traced the doctrine to bonds, whose “condition” is not a contractual promise ([33]-[36], [45]), and said that “In Interstar the Court of Appeal misunderstood the scope of the penalty doctrine” ([50]).

The primary judge “erred in concluding, in effect, that in the absence of contractual breach”, or of an obligation or “responsibility on the customer to avoid the occurrence of an event upon which the relevant fees were charged, no question arose as to whether the fees were capable of characterisation as penalties” ([78]).

But the Court did not hold the fees to be penalties. It identified a further issue arising from the primary judge’s findings: whether the fees were enjoyed by the bank “as security for performance by the customer of its other obligations”, or were charged for further accommodation provided on the customer’s instruction, or on refusal of it ([79]). It distinguished a stipulation attracting the penalty doctrine from one giving rise consensually to an additional obligation, as Lord St Leonards did in French v Macale and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham ([80]-[82]), and said that “the determination, with respect to the relevant exception fees, of live issues of this nature is entirely a matter upon further trial” ([83]).

On the effect of the Judicature system, the joint reasons rejected the Court of Appeal’s proposition that the doctrine had disappeared from equity into the common law action of assumpsit ([51]). The statement of Mason and Wilson JJ in AMEV-UDC that the jurisdiction “withered on the vine” “overlooks the proposition that the only relevant effect of the Judicature system, as explained above, was upon the procedures in the unified court system not upon substantive doctrine” ([68]). Dunlop “illustrates the place of the penalty doctrine in a court where there is a unified administration of law and equity but equitable doctrines retain their identity” ([77]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [10] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab)

The collateral or accessory character of the stipulation supplies the doctrinal basis for rejecting breach of a contractual promise as the sole trigger. That aspect of the joint reasons explains why the absence of breach could not by itself exclude the fees from the doctrine; it does not establish that these fees satisfied the test.

Obiter · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [10] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [11] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab), [12] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)

The statements about limiting enforcement to compensation, excluding prejudice incapable of monetary assessment, and extending relief to non-money penalties explain the wider doctrine. Those aspects were unnecessary to resolve the breach-only restriction: the Court neither assessed compensation nor determined that any disputed fee was a penalty. The non-money penalty observation likewise went beyond the bank fees in issue.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [78] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab), [83] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

Rejecting the premise that absence of breach or a customer obligation prevented characterisation as a penalty was necessary to allow the appeal and replace the primary judge’s answers. The reservation of the live issues for further trial defines the limited decision: it removes that threshold exclusion without deciding whether the fees were penalties.

Proposition 3

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Read judgment: [51] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [68] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

The continued existence of the equitable penalty doctrine answers the absorption argument supporting the breach-only restriction. The joint reasons reject that argument because procedural unification did not extinguish substantive equitable doctrine. This classification concerns that ground of decision, rather than treating the accompanying list of available remedies as an award of relief in this case. The criticism following the quotation in paragraph 68 is the joint judges’ own reasoning, not Mason and Wilson JJ’s view.

Why does this case matter?

Penalty questions are usually answered by going straight to the comparison with the loss a party might suffer, and students who do that skip what has to be shown first. Andrews is the case that asks, in the Court’s own order of analysis, which stipulations the doctrine can reach at all and what is left to be decided once that is settled. It is also a case about a bank’s everyday fees, so a problem about charges in a consumer or commercial contract is a natural place for it to appear.

Exam and application relevance

Name the stipulation said to be a penalty, what it is collateral to and what the party relying on it stands to lose, and then take each step of the joint reasons in order, attributing each to their Honours with its paragraph. Check what the facts of the problem say about the matters the Court left for trial before drawing a conclusion about any fee.

The decision was given in 2012, in the setting of a Federal Court representative action and a common law and equitable doctrine; the consumer and credit legislation pleaded in the proceeding was not before the Court ([4]-[5]).

A later representative proceeding against the same bank about fees of the same kinds reached the High Court in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28, where the appeals were dismissed from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court that the late payment fees were not penalties, and the Justices gave separate reasons on what makes a stipulated sum a penalty. That decision is not taught here, so check it before applying the comparison between the sum payable and the interests protected.

Check your understanding

1. What did the joint reasons say a stipulation must be, as a matter of substance, to impose a penalty prima facie, and what happens to the collateral stipulation if compensation can be made?

2. Why did the Court say that the penalty doctrine is not engaged where the prejudice cannot be assessed in money terms?

3. What did the primary judge conclude about the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees, and why did the High Court hold that she erred?

4. What further issue did the Court identify about the character of the fees, and what did it say about who would determine it?