Corin v Patton
Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540
Five days before she died, a joint tenant signed a transfer of her share to her brother, to hold on trust for her. It was never registered, and the bank held the certificate of title. Did her husband take the whole house?
Clarified by Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48
In Kramer v Stone the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ described Corin v Patton as holding unanimously, for different reasons, that the gift was not complete in equity ([45]). They found it unnecessary to assess the merits of the different approaches in Corin, because the principle about when equity will treat an imperfect gift as complete is a separate and independent doctrine from equitable estoppel: none of the judgments in Corin gave any role to reliance or detriment, and equitable estoppel has never required a promisor to have done everything necessary to give effect to a promised gift ([46]). There was no application to reopen Corin ([47]). So, after Kramer, an estoppel claim about a promised gift is decided on estoppel’s own elements, without any requirement that the promisor have done everything necessary to make the gift.
Qualified by legislation: Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), from 11 October 2021
From 11 October 2021, the cessation day declared by the New South Wales Registrar-General, a certificate of title previously issued has no force or effect for the purposes of any requirement to lodge or produce a certificate of title in connection with the registration of a matter, and the Registrar-General is no longer required to issue them (Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) Sch 3 Pt 12 cl 31(3), inserted by the Real Property Amendment (Certificates of Title) Act 2021). A dealing lodged before that day and still unregistered on it is dealt with under the requirements that applied when it was lodged, unless it is withdrawn and relodged (cl 32). So the step on which the joint reasons and Deane J decided Corin, the donor’s failure to put the certificate of title within the donee’s reach, does not arise in the same form for a voluntary transfer of New South Wales Torrens land made now: ask instead what the donor must do under the current registration requirements. The provisions do not address when equity treats a gift as complete.
What happened?
Mr and Mrs Patton were joint registered proprietors of land at Belrose in New South Wales under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The land was mortgaged to the State Bank of New South Wales, which held the certificate of title. In July 1984 Mrs Patton was terminally ill. On 12 July a solicitor, Mr Smallwood, brought documents to the house, and Mrs Patton and her brother, Mr Corin, executed a memorandum of transfer of her interest as joint tenant to Mr Corin and a deed under which he declared that he held that interest, as tenant in common with Mr Patton, on trust for her.
Mr Smallwood took the documents away to complete the transaction. Mrs Patton took no step to have the bank produce the certificate of title so that the transfer could be registered. She died on 17 July 1984, and the transfer was never registered (joint reasons of Mason CJ and McHugh J; Toohey J).
The plan was to sever the joint tenancy so that her share would pass under her will, which left her estate to her children, rather than to her husband by survivorship (Toohey J). McLelland J held that the joint tenancy had not been severed and that Mr Patton was entitled to the whole. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed an appeal on a different ground: the transaction was not for value, so Mrs Patton could have recalled it at any time before her death (joint reasons).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. All five Justices agreed that the joint tenancy had not been severed before Mrs Patton died, so Mr Patton took the whole by survivorship. There were four sets of reasons: Mason CJ and McHugh J wrote jointly, and Brennan J, Deane J and Toohey J each wrote separately. They did not agree on why the transaction failed.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Mason CJ and McHugh J began with severance. A unilateral declaration of an intention to sever is not enough; there must be an actual alienation of the joint tenant’s interest, at law or in equity. Since the transfer was unregistered and so passed nothing at law, the question was whether Mrs Patton had alienated her interest in equity, and that turned on the general rules about voluntary transfers.
Their Honours traced those rules from Milroy v Lord, where Turner LJ said “there is no equity in this Court to perfect an imperfect gift”, through the three judgments in Anning v Anning. Griffith CJ there asked whether everything necessary to be done by the donor had been done; Isaacs J took a stricter view, under which a gift is imperfect while the transfer of the legal title remains incomplete. Mason CJ and McHugh J found “stronger support in the later cases for the view of Griffith C.J. than that of Isaacs J.” and concluded that “if an intending donor of property has done everything which it is necessary for him to have done to effect a transfer of legal title, then equity will recognize the gift.
So long as the donee has been equipped to achieve the transfer of legal ownership, the gift is complete in equity.” They said the maxim that equity will not assist a volunteer is “not a specific rule or principle of law” and is subject to established exceptions, including the rule in Strong v Bird and equitable estoppel.
Applied to Torrens land, “a gift of such land cannot be regarded as complete in equity while the donor retains possession or control of the certificate of title”. Mrs Patton “gave no authority for the mortgagee bank to hand the certificate of title to Mr Corin”, and s 96 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), which lets a mortgagor have the certificate lodged for registration of the mortgagor’s own dealing, did not help Mr Corin, who was not entitled to redeem the mortgage. So “the transactions failed to pass the equitable property in the land to Mr Corin”. Nor could the transfer take effect as a declaration of trust, because “Mrs Patton clearly did not intend to constitute herself trustee for Mr Corin”; and Mr Corin’s agreement to act as trustee was not valuable consideration.
Deane J agreed with that analysis, subject to his own reasons. His test was “whether the donor has done all that is necessary to place the vesting of the legal title within the control of the donee and beyond the recall or intervention of the donor”. Mrs Patton had not done so, and a bare trustee’s undertaking was not valuable consideration: “Such an ineffective assignment will not be construed as itself constituting a declaration of trust in order to make it operative in equity.”
The other two Justices took different routes. Brennan J doubted whether Mrs Patton had done all that was necessary, but rested his decision on a different point: “the orthodox view, being founded on the judgment of Dixon J. in Brunker, denies the existence of an equitable estate or interest in the interregnum between delivery and registration”, so severance could have occurred only on registration, and “None was registered.” Toohey J said the failure to procure the certificate of title was “not, in all the circumstances, crucial to the outcome of this appeal”; for him “The real point is that the transfer to Mr Corin had not been registered at the time of Mrs Patton’s death. There was no transaction that equity would enforce”.
Why does this case matter?
Problem questions about incomplete gifts and trusts tend to give a student a donor who signed something and then died or changed her mind, with one formal step missing. Without Corin, the answer either says flatly that equity will not perfect an imperfect gift and stops, or says the donor intended a gift and should be held to it. Neither tells the examiner which missing step mattered and why.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the property and what the law requires to transfer it, then list each step the donor took and each step left undone, and ask whose step it was. For Torrens land, ask what the donor did about the certificate of title, as Mason CJ and McHugh J and Deane J did. Give the test with the names of the Justices who stated it, and say where Brennan J and Toohey J differed. If the facts involve a transfer to a trustee for the transferor, deal separately with whether the failed transfer could operate as a declaration of trust and whether the trustee gave value.
Corin concerned New South Wales Torrens land and the Real Property Act 1900 and Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) as they stood in 1990. Certificates of title stopped having effect for registration in New South Wales on 11 October 2021, so for a transfer made after that date ask what the donor had to do under the registration requirements then in force, and in another jurisdiction check its own current requirements, before relying on the certificate-of-title reasoning. On severance, use the case for Burgess v Rawnsley as well. The joint reasons gave reasons for declining to adopt that English approach in Australia, and Brennan J agreed with them; Deane J said it should not be followed in this country; and Toohey J said Lord Denning MR’s statement in it should not be taken as representing the law in New South Wales.
Check your understanding
1. What did Mrs Patton do, and fail to do, before she died, and why did the documents she signed name her brother as trustee for her?
2. How did Griffith CJ’s and Isaacs J’s views in Anning v Anning differ, and which did Mason CJ and McHugh J prefer?
3. Why did Mason CJ and McHugh J say the certificate of title mattered, and why did s 96 of the Conveyancing Act not help Mr Corin?
4. On what grounds did Brennan J and Toohey J dismiss the appeal, and how do they differ from the joint reasons?