Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2010

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 254; [2010] HCA 36

A superannuation trustee refused a total and permanent invalidity claim after weighing strong medical opinion against short spells of later work. Was its refusal a free choice of the kind courts rarely disturb, or something stricter?

What happened?

Alan Finch was a member of the Telstra Superannuation Scheme, which was governed by a trust deed whose trustee was Telstra Super Pty Ltd (“the Trustee”). He left Telstra’s employment on 23 January 1998, having taken sick leave from 30 September 1996, and claimed the total and permanent invalidity benefit ([2]-[3]). The deed required, among other things, that the Trustee form the opinion that the member was “unlikely ever to engage in any gainful Work” ([7]).

The Trustee rejected his claim on 21 March 2002 and again, after a reassessment he requested, on 20 March 2003 ([4]). He had medical opinion in his favour, but he had also worked for one month at Foxtel and for some months at Qantas after leaving Telstra, and the Trustee relied on that work ([5]). Byrne J of the Supreme Court of Victoria set both determinations aside and remitted the matter to the Trustee; the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria allowed the Trustee’s appeal ([5]-[6]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court granted special leave to appeal and allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the Court of Appeal’s orders of 23 December 2009 and 23 February 2010 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to that court from Byrne J’s order of 28 November 2008 be dismissed with costs ([69]). The reasons were a single joint judgment of French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In a single joint judgment (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ), the High Court held that a superannuation trustee’s decision whether to form the opinion that a member was unlikely ever to engage in gainful work was not a discretionary decision in the sense used in Karger v Paul but an ingredient in the performance of a trust duty owed to the member ([29]-[30], [36]). The Court suggested, the contrary not having been put to it, that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to apply the Karger v Paul principles, developed in other fields, without any qualification ([37]).

Byrne J’s conclusion that the trustee had failed to give genuine consideration because it did not pursue sufficient inquiries on three matters stood ([43]-[56]). Consideration that is not properly informed is not genuine, and the duty of trustees properly to inform themselves was said to be more intense in superannuation trusts in the form of the deed in question than in trusts of the Karger v Paul type ([66]). The Court did not decide how far the Karger v Paul principles apply to superannuation trusts, or whether the duty in forming such an opinion is to form a fair and reasonable, or a correct, opinion ([65]-[66]).

Because the trustee had failed only to observe due process, and a decision in the member’s favour was not the only possible one, the matter was remitted to the trustee ([68]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [29]–[30] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons hold that the trustee was not exercising a discretionary power but forming an opinion as part of performing a trust duty owed to the member. This is necessary to the Court’s rejection of the Court of Appeal’s starting point.

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [43]–[56] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons uphold Byrne J’s conclusion that the trustee failed to give genuine consideration by not pursuing sufficient inquiries, and hold that the Court of Appeal’s attacks on his reasoning fail. This is the ground on which the appeal was allowed.

Classification unresolved · French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [65]–[66] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

The statement that the duty to inform is more intense in superannuation trusts in the form of the deed is put as reinforcing Byrne J’s decision and is tied to that deed, while the Court declines to decide how far the Karger v Paul principles apply or whether the duty is to form a fair and reasonable, or a correct, opinion. A binary ratio or obiter label would hide that qualification.

Why does this case matter?

A student who meets a trustee’s refusal of a claim often reaches for the language of wide discretions and asks only whether the trustee acted in good faith. That skips the prior question an examiner is looking for: what kind of decision the trustee was actually making, and what the trust instrument and its setting made of it.

Exam and application relevance

Use Finch where a beneficiary challenges a trustee’s decision about whether a condition for a benefit is met. First classify the decision, as the joint reasons did at [29]-[36]: is the trustee choosing among objects, or forming an opinion that decides whether the beneficiary qualifies? Then identify what the trustee had before it, what it did not inquire into, and whether adverse material was put to the beneficiary, comparing the three failures upheld at [44]-[49].

State the limits in the Court’s terms. Ask of each statement about the duty to inform, and about the Karger v Paul principles, whether the Court made it of the deed before it or of superannuation trusts generally, and whether it decided the point or left it open ([65]-[66]).

The Court’s references to the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) are to the law in 2010. Section 52(2)(b) of the first Act now refers to the care, skill and diligence of a prudent superannuation trustee, and the second Act is no longer in force, so check the current provisions before relying on those paragraphs.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices gave reasons in Finch, and was there any separate judgment?

2. Why did the joint reasons say the Trustee’s decision under limb (b) of the definition was not a discretionary decision in the sense used in Karger v Paul (see [29]-[30])?

3. What were the three matters on which Byrne J held that the Trustee should have made further inquiry ([44]-[49])?

4. What two questions did the Court say it did not need to decide at [65]-[66]?