Superannuation investment duties: strategy, best financial interests and the general-law inheritance
The investment duties of superannuation trustees under the SIS Act: the investment strategy covenants in s 52(6) and APRA’s SPS 530, the ‘best financial interests’ covenant in s 52(2)(c) and what the 2021 change of wording did and did not settle, and the general-law prudent-person and properly-informed-consideration duties the covenants inherit.
Learning outcomes
- Test a superannuation trustee’s investment strategy against each matter in s 52(6) of the SIS Act and the investment governance framework SPS 530 requires.
- State what the 2021 change from ‘best interests’ to ‘best financial interests’ changed (the wording, its application dates and the s 220A presumption) and what the sources leave unresolved.
- Apply the objective, prospective best interests test from Kelaher, with its limits as a single-judge decision on the earlier wording.
- Explain how the general-law prudent person standard (Elder’s Trustee v Higgins) and the duty of properly informed consideration (Finch, Alcoa v Frost) carry into the statutory covenants, and where Kelaher limited that inheritance.
A superannuation trustee invests other people’s retirement savings, and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (the SIS Act) governs how. This article examines the investment covenants in s 52(6), APRA’s prudential standard on investment governance, and the covenant in s 52(2)(c) to act in the beneficiaries’ “best financial interests”, including what the sources show about whether the 2021 change of wording changed the law. It then traces the general-law duties the covenants inherit: the prudent person judged without hindsight, and the duty of properly informed consideration from Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd. It states Commonwealth law for registrable superannuation entities (RSEs); State and Territory trustee legislation is not stated here, and self managed funds are noted only in passing.
The investment covenants in s 52(6)
The governing rules of every RSE are taken to contain three investment covenants by each trustee (s 52(1), (6)).1 The first is to formulate, review regularly and give effect to an investment strategy for the whole of the entity, and for each investment option the trustee offers (s 52(6)(a)). The strategy must have regard to eight matters:
- the risk of making, holding and realising the investments, and their likely return, having regard to the trustee’s objectives and the entity’s expected cash flow requirements;
- the composition of the investments, including how diverse they are and the entity’s exposure to risks from inadequate diversification;
- liquidity, having regard to expected cash flow requirements;
- whether reliable valuation information is available;
- the entity’s ability to discharge its existing and prospective liabilities;
- the expected tax consequences;
- the costs that might be incurred; and
- any other relevant matters.
The second covenant is to exercise due diligence in developing, offering and reviewing regularly each investment option (s 52(6)(b)). The third is to ensure that the investment options offered to each beneficiary allow adequate diversification (s 52(6)(c)). For a MySuper product the strategy must also state, and update each year, a ten-year investment return target and the level of risk appropriate to the assets attributed to the product (s 52(13)(b)).
The investment covenants are tied to the general care covenant. Each trustee must exercise the care, skill and diligence of a prudent superannuation trustee, which s 52(3) defines as a person whose profession, business or employment includes acting as a superannuation trustee “and investing money on behalf of beneficiaries” (s 52(2)(b), (3)). A trustee sued for loss caused by an investment has a defence if it shows that it complied with every covenant that applied to each act or omission that caused the loss (s 55(5)). Self managed funds have a parallel strategy covenant with a shorter list of matters (s 52B(2)(f)).
APRA’s investment governance standard
APRA may determine prudential standards that RSE licensees must comply with (s 34C(1)). Prudential Standard SPS 530 Investment Governance, made under s 34C and in force from 1 January 2023, states its purpose as ensuring that an RSE licensee, “consistent with its obligation to act in the best financial interests of beneficiaries, prudently selects, manages and monitors investments”.4 An RSE licensee must at all times have an investment governance framework, and the Board is ultimately responsible for it (paras 10, 12). The framework must include, among other things, investment objectives for each option and the investment strategy for the whole of each RSE and for each option “as required by section 52(6) of the SIS Act” (para 13). The standard’s stated key requirements include measurable return and risk objectives, a due diligence process for selecting investments, stress testing, a liquidity management plan and a valuation governance framework. On its terms the standard builds on the statutory covenant, which para 13 incorporates, rather than replacing it.
Best financial interests: the 2021 change
Until 30 June 2021, s 52(2)(c) required each trustee to perform its duties and exercise its powers “in the best interests of the beneficiaries”. The Treasury Laws Amendment (Your Future, Your Super) Act 2021 (Cth) replaced “best interests” with “best financial interests” in the trustee covenant, in the director covenant in s 52A(2)(c) and in the self managed fund covenant in s 52B(2)(c), from 1 July 2021 (Sch 3 items 9, 13 and 16).3 The amendments apply to the performance of duties and exercise of powers on or after that date, but not under a contract made before it unless the contract is later renewed or varied (Sch 3 item 21). The same Schedule declared that the obligation applies to payments to third parties (s 52(3A)).
The Act also changed how the covenant is proved. In civil proceedings for a contravention of s 54B(1) in relation to s 52(2)(c), it is presumed that the trustee did not act in the beneficiaries’ best financial interests unless the trustee adduces evidence to the contrary; if it does, the Regulator must prove the contravention on the balance of probabilities (s 220A).2 The trustee bears an evidential burden only, and the legal burden stays with the Regulator. That presumption applies to contraventions on or after 1 July 2021 (Sch 3 item 22).
Did the new wording change the law? The sources cited here establish three things and leave a fourth open.
First, before 2021 a Federal Court judge had already accepted a financial reading of “best interests” where the trust’s purpose was financial. In Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Kelaher, Jagot J accepted the submission that in cases where the purpose of the trust is to provide financial benefits, “the best interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests”, a phrase the submission took from the English Chancery decision in Cowan v Scargill ([65]).5 Cowan v Scargill is English authority and is not binding in Australia, and it is described here only as Kelaher records it.
Second, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AustralianSuper Pty Ltd, Hespe J said that the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to clarify that the financial interests, and not the non-financial interests, of beneficiaries must be the determinative factor in trustee decision-making ([124]).6 That is a statement of the amendment’s purpose, not a decision applying it.
Third, the same case shows how little the words mattered on its facts. The parties accepted that nothing turned on the difference between “best interests” and “best financial interests”, because the trustee did not try to justify its failures by any non-financial interest of members ([125]). The declarations simply recorded the contraventions as breaches of the “best interests” covenant before 1 July 2021 and of the “best financial interests” covenant after it.
The open question is what the amended covenant requires where a trustee relies on a consideration that is not financial. None of the decisions cited here decides it. AustralianSuper is a single-judge decision on agreed facts, and Kelaher was decided on the earlier wording. A student should treat the effect of “financial” in that situation as unresolved, and should not state it as settled in either direction. What has plainly changed is procedural: since 1 July 2021 a trustee facing civil penalty proceedings for a breach of s 52(2)(c) must point to evidence that it acted in the members’ best financial interests (s 220A).
How the best interests test is applied
Kelaher remains the fullest statement in the sources cited here of how the covenant is tested, though on the earlier wording. Jagot J held that the test is objective and applied prospectively, from the trustee’s position at the time of the decision, without impermissible hindsight, and that there will often be more than one course of action in the beneficiaries’ best interests ([55]). A decision that is not reasonably justifiable as in the beneficiaries’ best interests, assessed objectively on the circumstances as they existed at the time, breaches the covenant; one that is reasonably justifiable does not ([64]). Her Honour kept one exception: a case in which it is proved that the trustee’s subjective purpose in acting was contrary to the beneficiaries’ best interests ([63]). The fact that more information could have been obtained does not, by itself, mean that a decision objectively in the beneficiaries’ best interests was a breach ([53], [58]).
The general-law inheritance
The prudent person, without hindsight. The care covenant grew out of the general-law standard explained in Trustee duties and powers. Before 1 July 2013, s 52(2)(b) set the standard of an ordinary prudent person, and the higher prudent superannuation trustee standard applies only to conduct after that date (Kelaher [37]; AustralianSuper [119]). The general law also supplies the timing rule. In Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v Higgins, Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Windeyer JJ said that the court must “take our stand” at the time of the trustee’s decision and “look at the position as it would then have appeared to a prudent man acting as trustee”, not judge it “by the light of later events that could not then have been surely foreseen” (at 448).7 Later events go to the loss caused by a breach, not to whether there was one. Kelaher applied that passage to the SIS Act covenants ([38]).
Properly informed consideration. In Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd, the High Court stressed that superannuation is not “a matter of mere bounty”: members have exchanged value for it, and their legitimate expectations that benefit decisions will be soundly taken are high ([33]).8 The Court said that consideration which is not properly informed is not genuine, and that the duty of trustees properly to inform themselves is more intense in superannuation trusts in the form of the deed before it than in trusts of the Karger v Paul type ([66]). The Court left open how far the Karger v Paul principles apply to superannuation trusts ([65]-[66]). Trustees’ discretions: genuine consideration and the review of trustee decisions explains Finch in full. In Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Frost, the Victorian Court of Appeal applied Finch to a disability claim: superannuation trustees must give properly informed consideration to applications for entitlements and make further inquiries where that requires them ([59]), but they are not required to go on endlessly seeking information ([60]).9
Where the inheritance stops. Finch and Alcoa concerned decisions on a member’s claim to a benefit. In Kelaher, APRA argued that the same duty to inform applied to decisions affecting the capital of the fund. Jagot J rejected the extension: trustees of large funds take a myriad of decisions every day, and the extension “appears onerous in the extreme and highly impractical” ([52]; see also [6]). Jagot J nevertheless accepted that the superannuation context Finch described informs how the best interests covenant is applied ([49]). That limit rests on a single first-instance decision. Finch binds lower Australian courts on what it decided, Alcoa is a Victorian intermediate appellate decision that is persuasive elsewhere, and Kelaher is persuasive only.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the covenant. A complaint about how assets were invested engages s 52(6) and the care covenant in s 52(2)(b); a complaint that the trustee preferred some other interest engages s 52(2)(c), and s 52(2)(d) if there is a conflict.
- Fix the date. Conduct before 1 July 2013 is measured against the ordinary prudent person standard; conduct before 1 July 2021 is tested against “best interests”; the s 220A presumption applies only to contraventions from 1 July 2021.
- Test the strategy. Was there a strategy for the whole entity and for each option, did it have regard to each s 52(6)(a) matter, and was it reviewed and given effect to? Use SPS 530 for what a sound framework contains.
- Judge the decision prospectively. Ask whether the course taken was reasonably justifiable as in the members’ best interests on what was known or knowable then, not whether it lost money (Kelaher [55], [64]; Elder’s Trustee at 448).
- Separate benefit decisions from investment decisions. A decision on a member’s claim attracts the Finch duty to inform; Kelaher declined to extend that duty to the day-to-day decisions of a large fund.
- Flag what is unresolved. If the trustee relied on a non-financial consideration, say that the effect of the 2021 wording has not been decided in the sources cited here, and argue it from the text, the stated purpose recorded in AustralianSuper, and the earlier “normally” formulation in Kelaher.