Superannuation trustees: the SIS Act covenants and their enforcement
How the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) governs the trustees of APRA-regulated superannuation funds: who must be licensed, the trustee and director covenants deemed into the governing rules by ss 52 and 52A, the sole purpose test in s 62, and enforcement by civil penalty, criminal prosecution and members’ actions for loss, with APRA and ASIC as regulators.
Learning outcomes
- Identify whether a superannuation fund is a regulated superannuation fund, a registrable superannuation entity or a self managed fund, and so which set of covenants and which regulator applies.
- State the trustee covenants in s 52(2) and the director covenants in s 52A(2) of the SIS Act, including the prudent superannuation trustee standard and the conflict priority rule.
- Apply the sole purpose test in s 62 and the arm’s length rule in s 109 to a trustee’s conduct.
- Choose the enforcement route for a breach (civil penalty application by APRA or ASIC, criminal prosecution, or a member’s action for loss under s 55) and state its conditions and limits.
- Explain how the statutory covenants relate to the general-law duties of trustees, using Kelaher and AustralianSuper with their limits as single-judge decisions.
The trustee of a superannuation fund regulated by APRA works under a Commonwealth statute laid over the general law of trusts: the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (the SIS Act). This article explains who the Act regulates, the covenants it deems into a fund’s governing rules (ss 52 and 52A), the sole purpose test (s 62), and how and by whom the covenants are enforced. It states Commonwealth law. The Act’s basis for supervision is the Commonwealth’s power with respect to corporations or pensions (s 3(2)), and no State or Territory provision is stated here.1
Who the trustee is and what the Act regulates
The Act’s main object is the prudent management and supervision of certain superannuation funds, approved deposit funds and pooled superannuation trusts (s 3(1)). A regulated superannuation fund is one that has a trustee, whose trustee is a constitutional corporation under its governing rules (or whose governing rules make old-age pensions its sole or primary purpose), and whose trustee has elected that the Act apply (s 19). A registrable superannuation entity (RSE) is a regulated superannuation fund, an approved deposit fund or a pooled superannuation trust, but not a self managed superannuation fund (s 10(1)).
A person must not be or act as trustee of an RSE unless it holds an RSE licence, or belongs to a group of individual trustees that holds one, and contravention is an offence (s 29J(1), (3)). A body corporate may be trustee of an RSE only if it is the only trustee (s 29J(4)). The licensed trustee is the RSE licensee, and licensing is administered by APRA (s 6(1)).9 The governing rules are the trust deed and any other written or unwritten rules that govern the fund (s 10(1)), and the Act applies despite any provision in them (s 7).
The trustee covenants in s 52
If the governing rules of an RSE do not contain covenants to the effect of those in s 52, the governing rules are taken to contain them (s 52(1)).2 So they bind the trustee whether or not the deed contains them. Each trustee covenants:
- to act honestly in all matters concerning the entity (s 52(2)(a));
- to exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the care, skill and diligence that a prudent superannuation trustee would exercise (s 52(2)(b));
- to perform its duties and exercise its powers in the best financial interests of the beneficiaries (s 52(2)(c));
- where the beneficiaries’ interests, or the duties owed to them, conflict with duties to others or with the interests of the trustee or an associate, to give priority to the beneficiaries, to ensure the duties to them are met and their interests are not adversely affected despite the conflict, and to comply with the prudential standards on conflicts (s 52(2)(d));
- to act fairly in dealing with classes of beneficiaries, and with beneficiaries within a class (s 52(2)(e), (f));
- to keep the entity’s assets separate from the trustee’s own and from those of a standard employer-sponsor, not to fetter the proper performance of its functions, to manage any reserves under a strategy, and to give beneficiaries access to prescribed information and documents (s 52(2)(g)-(j)).
Section 52(3) defines a superannuation trustee as a person whose profession, business or employment is or includes acting as trustee of a superannuation entity and investing money on behalf of its beneficiaries. The best financial interests covenant extends to payments to third parties by or on behalf of the entity (s 52(3A)). The conflict obligations override any conflicting obligations of the trustee’s executive officers and employees under Part 2D.1 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (s 52(4)).
Section 52 goes on to impose investment, insurance, risk management and retirement income covenants (s 52(6)-(8B)), and member-outcome and MySuper covenants for regulated funds (s 52(9)-(14)); those are beyond this article. Each covenant applies in addition to every other covenant in ss 52 to 53 (s 51A).
The directors’ covenants in s 52A
Where an RSE has a corporate trustee, its governing rules are taken to contain covenants by each director of the trustee (s 52A(1)).3 They parallel the trustee’s: honesty, the care of a prudent superannuation entity director, best financial interests, conflict priority and not hindering the director or the trustee (s 52A(2)(a)-(e)). The sixth is a director’s own: to exercise reasonable care and diligence to ensure that the corporate trustee carries out the s 52 covenants (s 52A(2)(f)). Each covenant operates as if the director were a party to the governing rules (s 52A(6)), and the director’s conflict obligations override conflicting duties under Part 2D.1 of the Corporations Act (s 52A(3)).
Self managed superannuation funds have their own covenants in ss 52B and 52C. Their care covenant is not the professional standard but the care, skill and diligence that “an ordinary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property of another for whom the person felt morally bound to provide” (s 52B(2)(b)).
The sole purpose test and arm’s length investment
Each trustee of a regulated superannuation fund must ensure that the fund is maintained solely for one or more core purposes, or for one or more core purposes together with one or more ancillary purposes (s 62(1)).4 The core purposes are benefits for each member on or after retirement or a prescribed age, or for the member’s legal personal representative or dependants if the member dies before then. The ancillary purposes are listed in s 62(1)(b) and include benefits on cessation of work for gain or reward because of ill-health, and other benefits the Regulator approves in writing. The test applies to every regulated superannuation fund, self managed funds included, and s 62(1) is a civil penalty provision (s 62(2)).
A related rule governs how investments are made. A trustee or investment manager must not invest unless the parties are dealing at arm’s length, or the terms are no more favourable to the other party than arm’s length terms would be, and that obligation is also a civil penalty provision (s 109(1), (2)).5
How the covenants are enforced, and by whom
A person must not contravene a covenant to the effect of s 52 or s 52A that is contained, or taken to be contained, in the governing rules (s 54B(1), (2)).6 Both prohibitions are civil penalty provisions (s 54B(3)), and a contravention does not invalidate a transaction (s 54B(4)). Other covenants in the governing rules must not be contravened either, but that contravention is not an offence (s 54C). The consequences can be grouped, as a way of organising the provisions, into three routes.
Civil penalty. Only the Regulator, or its delegate, may apply for a civil penalty order (s 197(1)), within six years after the contravention (s 198).7 If the Court is satisfied of a contravention it is to declare it, and it may order a pecuniary penalty only if it is satisfied that the contravention is serious (s 196(2)-(4)).
Criminal prosecution. Contravening a civil penalty provision is an offence only where the person acts dishonestly and intends to gain an advantage, or intends to deceive or defraud, and the maximum is five years’ imprisonment (s 202(1)). Otherwise it is not an offence (s 202(2)).
An action for loss. A person who suffers loss or damage from conduct in contravention of s 54B(1), s 54B(2) or s 54C(1) may recover it from the contravener or from any person involved in the contravention (s 55(3)). The action may ordinarily be begun within six years after the cause of action arose (s 55(4)).8 An action against a current or former director of a corporate trustee for breach of a covenant of the kind in s 52A(2) needs the court’s leave instead: leave must be sought within six years, the court must consider whether the applicant is acting in good faith and whether there is a serious question to be tried, and in granting leave it may specify the period within which the action may be brought (s 55(4A)-(4D)). For loss caused by a trustee’s investment or management of reserves, it is a defence that the defendant complied with every applicable covenant for each act or omission that caused the loss (s 55(5)-(7)).
The general administration table assigns ss 52, 52A and 54B to both APRA and ASIC (s 6(1)). Where a provision is administered by both, “Regulator” means either of them (s 10(1)), so either may bring civil penalty proceedings for a covenant contravention. For the sole purpose test, the Commissioner of Taxation is the regulator of self managed funds and APRA and ASIC both administer it for other funds (s 6(1)).
Two Federal Court decisions show the regulators in court. In Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Kelaher, APRA alleged that two IOOF trustees and two of their directors had contravened the s 52 and s 52A covenants, and Jagot J dismissed every claim.10 Her Honour said that by treating the facts as if they automatically showed liability, “APRA has effectively cast the trustees in the role of insurer to the beneficiaries, which is contrary to principle” ([6]). In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AustralianSuper Pty Ltd, the trustee admitted that by failing promptly to merge members’ multiple accounts and to remediate them it had contravened ss 52(2)(b), 52(2)(c) and 54B(1).12 Hespe J accepted that there was a separate contravention for each affected member, because the powers were exercisable member by member ([133]-[134]), and ordered the agreed $27 million penalty, which also covered a contravention of s 912A(5A) of the Corporations Act. Both are single-judge decisions, and AustralianSuper proceeded on agreed facts ([6]), so neither is a contested appellate ruling.
How the covenants sit on the general law
This article assumes Trustee duties and powers, Fiduciary obligations and Directors’ statutory duties. The covenants put several of those duties into every RSE’s governing rules and raise the standard of care.
In AustralianSuper, Hespe J recorded that the prudent superannuation trustee standard took effect from 1 July 2013 as a heightening of the earlier “ordinary prudent person” standard. Unlike State and Territory legislation applying to professional trustees, the s 52(2)(b) covenant applies to all the trustee’s acts and decisions, not only investment, and overrides an inconsistent express covenant because of s 7 ([119]). In Kelaher, Jagot J held that the higher standard applies only to conduct after 1 July 2013 ([37]), that whether it was met depends on the particular circumstances, judged prospectively and without hindsight ([38]), and that it does not make a trustee “a surety of no loss” or impose strict liability ([40]). Kelaher was decided on the covenants as they stood before 1 July 2021. From that date Schedule 3 to the Treasury Laws Amendment (Your Future, Your Super) Act 2021 (Cth) requires the trustee and each director to act in the “best financial interests” of beneficiaries (ss 52(2)(c), 52A(2)(c)) for duties performed and powers exercised on or after that date, subject to an exception for contracts made before it (Sch 3 item 21). New s 220A presumes, in civil proceedings for a contravention of s 54B(1) in relation to s 52(2)(c), that the trustee did not so act unless it adduces evidence to the contrary.11
General-law principles also continue to apply to superannuation trustees. In Finch v Telstra Super Pty Ltd, a member’s claim to a disability benefit, the High Court said that a superannuation trustee’s decision may be reviewable for want of properly informed consideration, and that the duty of trustees properly to inform themselves is more intense in superannuation trusts in the form of the deed before it than in trusts of the Karger v Paul type ([66]).13 That requirement is explained in Trustees’ discretions: genuine consideration and the review of trustee decisions.
Applying this in a problem question
- Classify the fund. Is it an RSE or a self managed fund? That decides whether ss 52 and 52A or ss 52B and 52C apply, and who administers the sole purpose test.
- Identify who acted and when. A trustee’s conduct is measured against s 52 and a director’s against s 52A. Conduct before 1 July 2013 is measured against the ordinary prudent person standard (Kelaher [37]), and the covenant read “best interests” until 30 June 2021.
- Match the conduct to a covenant. Judge it on the circumstances at the time, without hindsight; a loss to members does not by itself prove breach (Kelaher [6], [40]).
- Check the fund’s purpose and dealings. If the fund is maintained for anything other than the core and ancillary purposes, apply s 62; if an investment is not on arm’s length terms, apply s 109.
- Choose the route. A regulator seeks a declaration and, for a serious contravention, a penalty. A person who suffered loss sues under s 55(3), ordinarily within six years; against a director sued on a s 52A(2) covenant, leave must be sought within six years and the action brought within any period the court specifies. A prosecution needs a contravention committed dishonestly and with intent to gain an advantage, or with intent to deceive or defraud (s 202(1)).
Suppose a trustee leaves thousands of members with duplicate accounts, each paying two sets of fees. If breach of s 52(2)(b) or (c) is established on comparable facts, AustralianSuper supports treating each affected member as a separate contravention, which APRA or ASIC may pursue, and a member may recover loss caused by the contravening conduct under s 55(3).