Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2003

Corporations And Commercial LawDirectors Duties

Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131

A director was found to have contravened four directors’ duty provisions and was ordered to pay almost $8 million. His appeal largely failed. What kinds of error can still change a judgment of that size?

What happened?

HIH Insurance Ltd (HIH) was a listed public company carrying on an insurance business, and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (HIHC) was its wholly owned subsidiary ([22], [25]). Rodney Adler was a director of HIH from 16 April 1999 to 26 February 2001 and was found at trial to be an officer of HIHC within the extended definition in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); there was no appeal from that finding ([23], [25]). Raymond Williams, one of the founders of the insurance business and HIH’s chief executive officer until about 12 October 2000, was a director of both companies ([22], [25]). Adler Corporation Pty Ltd, which it was accepted Mr Adler controlled, appealed with him ([26]).

On 9 June 2000 Mr Adler faxed Mr Williams that a company called Drenmex would like to borrow $10 million unsecured for venture capital and share trading, with absolute discretion over how to invest it, and Mr Williams replied that day that the proposal appeared fair and reasonable and that he would arrange for the funds to be transmitted ([29], [30]). On 15 June 2000 a cheque for $10,000,000 drawn on an account of HIHC and payable to Pacific Eagle Equity Pty Ltd (PEE) was delivered to Mr Adler ([50]). PEE was incorporated that day; Mr Adler was its only director and Adler Corporation held its one issued share ([39]). On 7 July 2000 PEE, as trustee, executed the deed constituting the Australian Equities Unit Trust (AEUT), and on 12 July 2000 HIHC was issued one B class unit on subscription of $10,000,000 ([66], [71]).

On Mr Adler’s instructions PEE bought 3,924,545 HIH shares on market between 15 and 30 June 2000 for $3,991,856.21 in all ([55]). It later acquired Adler Corporation’s shares in three companies (dstore, Planet Soccer and Nomad) for prices close to what Adler Corporation had paid for them, and made loans to companies and a trust with which Mr Adler was associated ([85], [90], [92], [94]-[110]). The shares in the three companies eventually proved all but worthless to PEE ([93]).

ASIC brought civil penalty proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Mr Adler, Adler Corporation, Mr Williams and others ([3], [142]). Santow J’s reasons on liability were published on 14 March 2002 ([14]). Among other findings, he found that Mr Adler had contravened ss 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1), that Adler Corporation had contravened ss 181(2), 182(2) and 183(2) through involvement in Mr Adler’s corresponding contraventions, and that Mr Williams had contravened ss 180(1) and 182(1) ([8], [9]). ASIC had pleaded the s 183 contravention against Mr Adler as a director of HIH and an officer of HIHC ([583]-[585]), and the trial judge found that he had breached his obligation not to improperly use information obtained by him to gain an advantage for himself or for Adler Corporation ([590]).

Santow J ordered Mr Adler, Adler Corporation and Mr Williams each to pay HIHC $7,986,402 as compensation under s 1317H of the Act ([10]). ASIC’s expert had calculated the loss on HIHC’s investment in the AEUT and added an amount for the interest HIHC could reasonably have expected to earn if the $10,000,000 had been invested in thirty day bank bills ([697], [698]). The trial judge held that the loss resulted from the contraventions within the meaning of s 1317H and accepted that calculation as adjusted ([697], [698], [703]-[705], [727]).

Mr Adler and Adler Corporation (appeal 40538/02) and Mr Williams (appeal 40556/02) appealed. They challenged many of the findings, including on the ground that the trial judge had taken into account matters outside ASIC’s pleaded case, and contended that he had made legal errors in some of the tests for contravention, in relation to causation of loss, and in other ways ([16], [19]).

What did the Court decide?

Giles JA said that the appeals in substance failed, and that the limited success of the appellants did not warrant any relief as to costs ([774]).

On Mr Adler’s and Adler Corporation’s appeal the Court allowed the appeal in part. It varied declarations 3 and 4 made on 27 March 2002, directed the parties to calculate the compensation payable to HIHC in accordance with its reasons, varied the compensation order by substituting the sum calculated for $7,986,402, gave liberty to apply, dismissed the appeal otherwise and ordered the appellants to pay ASIC’s costs ([775]). On Mr Williams’ appeal it directed the same recalculation and variation of the compensation order and dismissed the appeal with costs ([775]).

Giles JA said that the contraventions found by the trial judge otherwise stood ([740]). He did not think that the trial judge would have come to different pecuniary penalty and disqualification orders had he not found the contraventions that the Court set aside ([742]). He then considered four submissions that the trial judge had erred in exercising his discretions on those orders ([743]-[770]) and considered Mr Williams’ submissions on his own orders no more persuasive ([771]-[773]); the orders otherwise stood ([774]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Giles JA, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed ([1], [2]), held that the matters on which the trial judge relied did not establish contravention by Mr Adler of s 183(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ([606]). Section 183(1), as the judgment sets it out, provides that a person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use the information to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or to cause detriment to the corporation ([582]).

The information fundamental to ASIC’s pleaded s 183 case was of three kinds: the Investment Committee procedures and Investment Guidelines, the HIH investment portfolio, and the susceptibility of Mr Williams to a proposal that HIH invest money in less conservative ways ([587]). On the first kind, Giles JA said that the issue was whether disregard of the guidelines and procedures could be an improper use of information, and that he did not think that, in the present case, it could: the trial judge’s explanation went no further than a failure to advise the Board or the Investment Committee of the investments made within the AEUT, and “straightforward disregard of guidelines and procedures is a different matter” ([601]).

On the second, the trial judge had not explained what information about the portfolio had been improperly used or how, and investment outside HIH’s normal portfolio, of a non-risk averse kind, was akin to disregard of whatever was known about the portfolio and was not misuse ([602]). On the third, he had difficulty in seeing any information obtained by Mr Adler within s 183(1), because the inference was of no more than assent by Mr Williams to an investment proposal outside HIH’s normal guidelines and prudential procedures, and he did not think it open to the trial judge to conclude, to the requisite degree of satisfaction, that Mr Adler improperly used his knowledge that Mr Williams was favourably inclined ([604], [605]).

Giles JA found the reach of the trial judge’s finding uncertain so far as the purchase of HIH shares was concerned and said that it did not matter, because the findings could not stand ([594], [599]), and he noted that ASIC had not filed a notice of contention to support the result on any other footing ([606]). He said that it may be that information about corporate procedures is improperly used if a person, from knowing the procedures, devises a way of using them to gain an advantage or cause detriment, or of evading protections against that ([601]), and suggested as a test whether it could have been said that Mr Adler took advantage of information about susceptibility if, knowing for example that Mr Cohen favoured the proposal, he had put the proposal to the Investment Committee or the Board ([605]). The contraventions of s 183 by Adler Corporation, which depended on Mr Adler’s, were likewise held not to be made out ([740]).

Giles JA, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed ([1], [2]), held that the analogy with equitable claims against defaulting fiduciaries did not influence the meaning and application of the words “resulted from” in s 1317H(1)(b), under which a court may order a person to compensate a corporation for damage suffered if the person has contravened a corporation/scheme civil penalty provision in relation to the corporation and the damage resulted from the contravention ([695], [707]). The trial judge had accepted ASIC’s submission that, by analogy with equitable claims against fiduciaries, the words should accommodate the more stringent equitable test of causation, and had held in the alternative that the loss resulted from the contraventions on the common law test ([703], [705]).

Giles JA relied on Spigelman CJ’s observation in O’Halloran v R T Thomas & Family Pty Ltd that equitable compensation differs from damages under a statutory regime where the court is confined by the construction of the statute, and on the point that some civil penalty provisions do not involve a contravention by a person standing in a fiduciary capacity ([707], [708]). In his opinion the words, in their natural meaning, make “only the damage which as a matter of fact was caused by the contravention” the subject of an order for compensation, requiring a causal connection between the damage and the contravening conduct “free from the strictures of analogy with equitable claims against fiduciaries” ([709]).

He accepted that general law principles may be useful guides but said that the ordinary meaning of the statutory words has primacy, and he noted that s 185 underlines that the duties in ss 180 to 183 are additional to and stand free of a director’s common law and equitable duties ([710]). He did not think it necessary to further the debate over causation for the purposes of determining equitable compensation ([706], [707]). Applying that approach, he held that it was open to the trial judge to find that HIHC’s loss resulted from the contraventions and that, if it mattered, the finding was correct on the evidence ([711]-[715]).

For like reasons he held that the analogy with the award of interest against a defaulting fiduciary should not be adopted for the interest component of the loss: the inquiry is into loss resulting from the contraventions, and the suffering of loss through loss of use of money is a matter of fact to be determined by evidence, so that presuming a use made of the money, whether by the recipient or by the company, is not a correct approach ([728]).

There was no direct evidence of what HIH or HIHC would have done with the $10,000,000 ([726]); it was unlikely that HIH would have done nothing with it, and the Court should do its best to estimate the loss, in the way the evidence was left taking HIH’s overall return on all its investments because the money was part of HIH’s assets and not a separate fund ([733]). The loss would be less than the trial judge had found, and the parties were to calculate it ([736]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [600]–[606] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA held that disregard of the Investment Committee guidelines and procedures was not, in the present case, an improper use of information ([601]), that the portfolio information was not shown to have been improperly used ([602]) and that the susceptibility information was not made out ([604]-[605]), and concluded that the matters relied on did not establish contravention of s 183(1) ([606]). Those conclusions are the reasons for varying declarations 3 and 4 by deleting the reference to s 183(1) ([775]).

Obiter · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [601] (opens in a new tab), [605] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA’s statement at [601] that it may be that information about corporate procedures is improperly used if a person devises a way of using or evading them, and his suggestion at [605] that a test may be whether Mr Adler took advantage of information about susceptibility had he put the proposal to the Investment Committee or the Board, are expressed tentatively and are not needed for the conclusion that the matters relied on did not establish the contravention.

Classification unresolved · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [594]–[599] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA said he had some difficulty in seeing the reach of the trial judge’s s 183 findings so far as the purchase of HIH shares was concerned, and that whether they went further than the purchases from Adler Corporation and the loans could be material to the orders, but did not matter because the findings could not stand ([594], [599]). The Court did not decide what the trial judge had found, and a binary label would conceal that.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [707]–[710] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA answered the first question on the compensation appeal, the correct approach to whether damage resulted from a contravention ([699], [700]), by declining to apply the fiduciary analogy and reading the words according to their natural meaning ([707]-[710]), and then applied that approach ([711]-[715]). The outcome on causation would have been the same on either approach, because the trial judge also found causation on the common law test ([705], [715]); the reasoning also governs the interest component, where it determined the result ([728]).

Ratio · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [725]–[736] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA held that the analogy with interest against a defaulting fiduciary should not be adopted and that loss of use of money is a matter of fact to be determined by evidence, then estimated HIH’s overall return as the measure on the evidence as it was left ([728], [733]-[735]). The conclusion that the loss would be less than the trial judge found ([736]) is the reason for varying order 7 and directing a recalculation ([775]).

Classification unresolved · Giles JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [706]–[707] (opens in a new tab)

Giles JA described the debate over whether causation is more readily found in equitable compensation and said he did not think it necessary to further it ([706], [707]). The Court therefore left the equitable question undecided and decided only that the analogy does not influence s 1317H.

Why does this case matter?

Cited on its own, the first-instance judgment gives an incomplete account of this litigation: the findings it records and the orders it makes were not all left as they were. An answer that relies on this litigation needs to say which decision it is drawing on and what became of each head of liability and each remedy on appeal, rather than treating the findings under the four duty provisions as equally secure. The appeal is also a worked example of an appellate court altering part of a long judgment, one head of liability and the measure of one remedy, while leaving the other findings and orders in place.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem on s 183(1), identify the information the director is said to have obtained because of the office and the use said to be improper, and test each against Giles JA’s treatment of the three kinds of information ([601], [602], [604]-[605]). In a problem on compensation under s 1317H, identify the damage claimed and the contravening conduct said to have caused it, and say which rules of causation and proof are being applied and why ([707]-[710], [728]). Where the facts of a question resemble the HIH litigation, state the trial findings by reference to Santow J and the position after appeal by reference to Giles JA’s reasons and orders ([8], [9], [740], [775]).

This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. It binds the courts below it in New South Wales and is persuasive in other jurisdictions. These provisions are stated as the judgment sets them out for these proceedings ([427], [531], [545], [582], [695]); the wording of each may have changed since 2003, so check the current text of each, especially s 1317H, before relying on it. The decision concerned the findings, declarations and orders made against Mr Adler, Adler Corporation and Mr Williams and does not decide how the provisions apply to facts of a different kind.

Check your understanding

1. Who wrote the reasons in the Court of Appeal, and what did the other two members say ([1], [2], [3])?

2. In declarations 3 and 4 as varied, which of ss 180(1), 181(1), 182(1) and 183(1) remain in the declarations about Mr Adler, and which words were deleted ([8], [775])?

3. What three kinds of information did ASIC plead that Mr Adler had improperly used, and how did Giles JA treat the first kind ([587], [601])?

4. What did Giles JA say about the reach of the trial judge’s finding on s 183 as it concerned the purchase of HIH shares, and why did he say it did not matter ([594], [599])?

5. What approach to causation under s 1317H(1)(b) had the trial judge taken, and what did Giles JA say about it ([703], [705], [707], [709])?

6. What did Giles JA say about the evidence on what HIH or HIHC would have done with the $10,000,000, and how did he estimate the loss of use of the money ([726], [728], [733])?

7. Why did Giles JA say the pecuniary penalty and disqualification orders were not affected by the removal of the s 183 findings ([742])?