Lewis v Doran
Lewis v Doran (2005) 219 ALR 555
A building company relied on money that related companies, run by the same directors, supplied whenever it needed it. In deciding whether the company could pay its debts as they fell due, can that voluntary support count?
What happened?
Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (“Constructions”) was a construction company and a wholly owned subsidiary of Doran Constructions (Australia) Pty Ltd (“DCA”). DCA and Doran Holdings Pty Ltd (“Holdings”) were related companies in the Doran group, with common effective shareholdings, and the same four directors (Paul, Peter, Michael and John Doran) directed every company in the group ([1]).
By resolutions passed on 1 November 1994, DCA agreed to pay $4.1 million to Holdings in part repayment of its indebtedness, Holdings agreed to pay $4.1 million to Constructions in part repayment of its indebtedness, and Constructions agreed to lend $4.1 million to DCA. In the result, in place of a debt of $4.1 million payable by Holdings on demand, Constructions held a debt of $4.1 million payable by DCA in six years ([2]). Holdings’ minutes recorded that payment would be made by journal entry ([17]), and the entries were posted on 4 September 1995 ([21]).
Constructions went into liquidation on 24 December 1997. DCA had repaid $1.449 million, but the balance of the DCA debt was worthless ([3]). In the three years after the restructuring, substantial sums were paid to Constructions by Holdings, and by DCA with funds that Holdings had provided ([66]). On 16 December 1997 Holdings gave Constructions written notice that it would cease providing funds ([63]). Constructions was in dispute with Beresfield Aluminium Pty Ltd and the University of Newcastle, which became its largest unsecured creditors, although their debts were not established until after the liquidation ([37], [65]).
The liquidator, Mr Lewis, claimed $4.1 million from the directors and from Holdings. He alleged that the restructuring was entered into in breach of the directors’ statutory and fiduciary duties and that it was voidable under the Corporations Law as an insolvent transaction ([3]). Palmer J held that the claims failed ([4]). The Liquidator appealed. The appeal raised questions of intra-group support in determining solvency as at and after the restructuring, and of causation of Constructions’ insolvency at the time it went into liquidation ([4]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Giles JA, Hodgson JA and McColl JA) dismissed the appeal with costs ([161]). The issues before the Court included the directors’ purpose in the restructuring, whether Constructions was insolvent on 1 November 1994 and on 4 September 1995, causation of its insolvency in December 1997, whether the restructuring was in breach of the directors’ duties, and whether it was an uncommercial transaction.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Giles JA, with whom Hodgson JA and McColl JA agreed, treated solvency under s 95A of the Corporations Law, which asks whether a person is able to pay all the person’s debts as and when they become due and payable, as a question of fact. The older formulation of the test had referred to payment out of the debtor’s “own monies” ([79]). His Honour said that, “Particularly when the limiting words are no longer part of the test, there is no compelling reason to exclude from consideration funds which can be gained from borrowings secured on assets of third parties, or even unsecured borrowings” ([109]).
If a company can borrow without security it will have funds to pay its debts as they fall due and will be solvent, provided the borrowing is on deferred payment terms or otherwise such that the lender is not itself a creditor whose debt cannot be repaid as and when it becomes due and payable ([109]).
Giles JA added that voluntariness of the lender’s funding is material to whether the company is able to acquire funds, but “if the evidence establishes that the company is able to obtain funds, albeit they are voluntarily provided, that can suffice” ([111]). Ability is determined in the circumstances as they were known or ought to have been known at the relevant time, without hindsight, with consideration given to the immediate future ([103]). Giles JA also held that the Liquidator had not established insolvency on 1 November 1994 quite apart from the availability of other companies’ funds ([105]), because Constructions could call in debts owed by Holdings and Dyspane and was entitled to expect a payment from the Department that proved to exceed $1 million, and the test is not whether a company can immediately pay all its debts ([101]).
Palmer J had concluded that, if as a matter of commercial reality the company has a resource available to pay all its debts as they become payable, it does not matter that the resource is an unsecured borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit by another party ([80], [106]). Giles JA found ample support for Palmer J’s regard to funds available from other companies in the group, with Holdings acting as banker to the group ([113]-[114]). His Honour found that the ability on 1 November 1994 was real although it was lost when support was withdrawn in December 1997 ([119]), and found no error in Palmer J’s finding that Constructions was solvent ([120]).
In that context he noted that the Liquidator accepted that Holdings was capable of supporting Constructions for as long as its directors were minded to do so, and that it provided support until 16 December 1997 ([116]); and that it was not suggested that the funds, although apparently repayable on demand, were to be regarded as immediately repayable so that Holdings was itself a creditor whose debt could not be repaid when due, or that regard could not be had to the funds because their provision breached the directors’ duties owed to Holdings ([113]).
On the Liquidator’s duty case, Giles JA held that Constructions retained the ability to pay its debts as and when they fell due, so the directors were justified in not seeing Beresfield and the University as creditors whose interests would be put at risk, and the primary judge was not shown to have erred in concluding that there was no occasion to consider the interests of Constructions’ creditors ([147]). The directors still had to consider the interests of Constructions as a separate legal entity, and a transaction benefiting one company in a group may have derivative benefits for another, even if the companies are not parent and subsidiary ([148]).
His Honour concluded that the restructuring was for the benefit of Constructions, because increased financial capacity in Holdings, as banker to the group, could have brought and to some extent may have brought funds to Constructions, although Holdings’ exercise of enhanced access to finance was not extensive ([151]). There was also detriment, because DCA did not have the same financial substance as Holdings and the debt was deferred ([152]). The question was a balance of commercial benefit and detriment in the conduct of the group’s businesses as “one family business”, where courts are cautious about pronouncing on the commercial justification of executive decisions ([154]).
He was not satisfied that the primary judge erred in holding that the Liquidator had not established a breach of the directors’ statutory or fiduciary duties ([155]). The uncommercial transaction question under s 588FB(1) is objective and is judged on the circumstances at the time, without hindsight ([156], [159]); Giles JA held that Palmer J was not shown to have erred in not being satisfied that the restructuring was an uncommercial transaction ([160]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Giles JA (Hodgson JA and McColl JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [109]–[113] (opens in a new tab)
Giles JA stated and applied the reasoning on borrowed and voluntarily provided funds as part of finding no error in the conclusion that Constructions was solvent on 1 November 1994 ([113], [120]), but he also held at [101]-[105] that insolvency on that date was not established quite apart from the funds of other group companies. The group-funding reasoning is therefore an alternative route to the same conclusion, and the text does not say whether he regarded it as necessary to the result, so a binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that qualification. Hodgson JA and McColl JA agreed with the reasons as a whole ([162]-[163]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Giles JA (Hodgson JA and McColl JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [147]–[155] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state why the primary judge’s rejection of the breach-of-duty claim was not shown to be in error, which is a ground on which the appeal was dismissed ([155], [161]).
Why does this case matter?
Problem questions about a company in a corporate group tend to turn on the facts: who was lending to whom, on what terms, and what the company’s position was on the date the question asks about. A student who has learned the statutory words of the solvency definition has no way to say which of those facts matter. Examiners can set a scenario in which related companies lend, defer a debt or withdraw their support, and they reward an answer that fixes the date being tested and works from the facts at that date.
Exam and application relevance
Begin by identifying the statute and the date. The Court of Appeal applied the Corporations Law to events between 1994 and 1997; the provisions it quoted (ss 95A, 588FB, 588FC and 588FE) are now in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The current s 95A(1) and (2) are in the terms the judgment quotes at [32] and add a note about restructuring plans, the current s 588FB(1) is in the terms quoted at [31], and the current s 588FC covers an unfair preference as well as an uncommercial transaction. Check the current voidability periods in s 588FE before applying the case to a present-day problem.
Then work from the facts at the date being tested. Set out what resources the company could call on at that date, on what terms they were available and who was supplying them; and, for directors’ duties, ask what the company’s circumstances at that time made relevant to the directors’ decision. Say which features of the Doran group your own facts share and which they lack.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justice gave the reasons in the Court of Appeal, and what did Hodgson JA and McColl JA say about them?
2. What had earlier formulations of the solvency test said about the source of the money, and what was Giles JA’s reaction to those words no longer being part of s 95A at [109]?
3. What qualification did Giles JA attach to the use of borrowed funds when deciding solvency, and what did he say about funds that the lender provides voluntarily?
4. Why did Giles JA find that the ability to pay debts on 1 November 1994 was real even though Holdings withdrew its support in December 1997?
5. On the directors’ duties ground, why did Giles JA say there was no occasion to consider the interests of Constructions’ creditors, and how did he treat the benefit to a related company in the same group?