Sandell v Porter

High Court of Australia · 1966

Corporations And Commercial LawCapital And Insolvency Context

Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666

A business has plenty on the books and nothing in the bank this week. Is it insolvent?

Clarified by Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21

Barwick CJ accepted that experts “may speak as to the likelihood of any of the debtor’s assets or capacities yielding ready cash in sufficient time to meet the debts as they fall due” (at 671). In a uniform Evidence Act jurisdiction that opinion is admitted through s 79(1), and Dasreef v Hawchar says what that exception demands. Applying s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ hold that the evidence must satisfy two criteria: the witness “has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience”, and the opinion “is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge” ([32]). A failure to demonstrate that an opinion is based on the witness’s specialised knowledge “is a matter that goes to the admissibility of the evidence, not its weight” ([42]). So what Sandell disposes of survives in a narrow form -- a bare assertion of the conclusion, unsupported by exposed reasoning, is not made admissible by the witness’s expertise.

Qualified by Lewis v Doran (2005) 219 ALR 555

Sandell’s “own money” restriction has not survived into the corporate test. Section 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not reproduce it, and the primary judge’s conclusion recorded by Giles JA at [80] is that the omission of “from his own monies” “removed an artificial restriction”: s 95A asks whether the company can pay all its debts as they become payable “by reference to the commercial realities”, and “[i]f the Court is satisfied that as a matter of commercial reality the company has a resource available to pay all its debts as they become payable then it will not matter that the resource is an unsecured borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit by another party”. What actually happened afterwards can prove that such a resource was available. Giles JA at [93] adopts the same frame: insolvency is a question of fact ascertained from the financial position as a whole, having regard to commercial realities, including “what resources are available to the company”, “whether resources other than cash are realisable by sale or borrowing upon security, and when such realisations are achievable”. Giles JA, with whom Hodgson and McColl JJA agreed, put it in his own words at [109]: “Particularly when the limiting words are no longer part of the test, there is no compelling reason to exclude from consideration funds which can be gained from borrowings secured on assets of third parties, or even unsecured borrowings”. So support from a related company can count without being legally enforceable -- what matters is whether it was, as a matter of commercial reality, available.

Qualified by Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (In Administration) [2007] FCAFC 125

The “own money” limitation has gone from personal insolvency too, which is where Sandell arose. In Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate, Buchanan J, with whom Marshall and Tracey JJ agreed subject to a reservation on an unrelated point, noted that s 95 of the Bankruptcy Act “as it then appeared, referred to a person paying debts ‘out of the debtor’s own money’”, and said: “This element, however, does not any longer appear in the definitions of solvency and insolvency in s 5(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act which I earlier set out” ([35]). Nor does it appear in s 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which is in identical terms ([35]). His Honour applied Giles JA’s reasoning in Lewis v Doran that, once the limiting words are gone, “there is no compelling reason to exclude from consideration funds which can be gained from borrowings secured on assets of third parties, or even unsecured borrowings” ([37], quoting Lewis v Doran at [109]). On the facts, a further short-term borrowing, supported by a family arrangement that provided added security, did not make the debtor insolvent ([33], [38]). Sandell remains where the analysis “often begins” ([34]). What has gone is the requirement that the money be the debtor’s own.

Qualified by legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 80

Barwick CJ said that whether the debtor had reached that state “is a question for the Court and not one as to which expert evidence may be given in terms” (at 671). Do not carry that into a uniform Evidence Act jurisdiction unqualified. Section 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides that “[e]vidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about: (a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue”, and its State and Territory equivalents say the same. Section 79 admits opinion evidence wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge derived from training, study or experience, and s 81 exempts admissions from the opinion rule. A properly qualified insolvency practitioner may therefore give admissible opinion evidence bearing on solvency, provided it meets s 79(1).

What happened?

A building partnership went bankrupt. Its trustees in bankruptcy moved to have repayments the partnership had made to Mrs Sandell — the appellant, who had lent it money — declared void as preferences under s 95 of the Bankruptcy Act 1924-1960 (Cth), which required the partnership to have been insolvent when the payments were made. The evidence the trustees offered on that point was thin. It comprised an affidavit whose operative paragraph simply asserted the conclusion that the partnership was insolvent, together with Mrs Sandell’s admissions and her husband’s evidence about the partnership’s cash position, and an outstanding unpaid debt.

The case is remembered not for that evidence but for what the trustees needed to prove with it.

What did the Court decide?

The evidence did not establish insolvency, so the preference claim failed. The information offered was, “put the matter at its highest, of the most tenuous” kind; the paragraph asserting insolvency “was, in my opinion, clearly inadmissible”; and what remained did not carry the conclusion at the relevant dates. The appeal was allowed with costs, the orders about the repayments set aside, and the trustees’ application in respect of them dismissed.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Insolvency is “an inability to pay debts as they fall due out of the debtor’s own money”, and “the debtor’s own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realization by sale or by mortgage or pledge of his assets within a relatively short time — relative to the nature and amount of the debts and to the circumstances, including the nature of the business, of the debtor.” The conclusion “ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor’s financial position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity” (at 670–671).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Barwick CJ, with McTiernan J agreeing in his reasons

Read judgment: pp 671–672 (opens in a new tab)

The distinction between temporary illiquidity and inability to meet debts using cash or money obtainable through assets was necessary to Barwick CJ’s rejection of the proof of insolvency under s 95. He applied it to the expected progress payments and bridging loans: the evidence of a cash shortage did not establish insolvency when the challenged repayments were made. That failure of proof disposed of the appeal. McTiernan J expressly agreed with his reasons; Windeyer J agreed that the evidence did not sufficiently establish insolvency at the relevant times, without expressly adopting every part of the formulation. The reference to the debtor’s own money concerns the statutory wording then in force; the later qualifications are addressed in the subsequent treatment.

Why does this case matter?

Because of how much hangs off a single finding, and how far after the event it is usually made. Whether a company was insolvent, and from when, determines whether a liquidator can recover a payment as an unfair preference, and it is a necessary condition of a director’s liability under s 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) — necessary, not sufficient: s 588G(2) also requires that the director was aware of grounds for suspecting insolvency, or that a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company’s circumstances would have been.

In practice the contest is almost never about the law. It is about a date, reconstructed years later from bank statements, ageing creditor reports and what the directors were told at the time. Notice what the Court said about proving it. The conclusion belongs to the court: whether the debtor had reached that state “is a question for the Court and not one as to which expert evidence may be given in terms” — though experts “may speak as to the likelihood of any of the debtor’s assets or capacities yielding ready cash in sufficient time to meet the debts as they fall due” (115 CLR 666 at 671).

So the bare assertion offered in this case was inadmissible. That is narrower than it sounds today — a qualified expert may give admissible opinion evidence bearing on solvency — but the assertion still has to be supported by reasoning that is exposed rather than assumed.

Exam and application relevance

Fix the date the question asks about, then ask what the debtor’s position at that date allowed it to do about the debts as they fell due. Build the picture before drawing the conclusion: each debt with its amount and due date, and each asset, facility or source of support with how, and how quickly, it could have produced money. A property that would take a year to sell may still support a facility drawn down next week.

What is available is where these arguments are won or lost, particularly around support from a related company or a director. Under s 95A that support does not have to be legally enforceable: an unsecured borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit counts if, as a matter of commercial reality, the resource was there. What actually happened next is evidence of that — a company that went on paying its debts for three years with group funding was, on the facts of Lewis v Doran, shown to have had the resource all along.

Check your understanding

A company cannot pay this month’s creditors but owns land it could mortgage within a fortnight. What would you need to know before saying whether it is insolvent?