Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic
Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1; (2007) 232 ALR 232
A man buys shares in a gold miner that is about to collapse, and says the company misled the market. When the company is insolvent, does his damages claim wait behind its other creditors?
Qualified by legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), from 18 December 2010
Section 563A was repealed and substituted by the Corporations Amendment (Sons of Gwalia) Act 2010 (Cth) (Act No 150 of 2010), Schedule 1 commencing 18 December 2010; the substituted section applies to a claim that arises after that commencement (Sch 1 item 4(1)). The Court construed the earlier wording, under which a share-purchase damages claim was not postponed. Under the substituted s 563A(2)(b) a claim that arises from buying, holding, selling or otherwise dealing in shares in the company is a subordinate claim and is postponed until all other debts and claims are satisfied. The Court’s reasoning on the capacity-as-a-member words describes the earlier text.
What happened?
Sons of Gwalia Ltd was a publicly listed gold mining company. Administrators were appointed on 29 August 2004 ([8]). On 18 August 2004 Mr Margaretic had bought 20,000 shares in the company for $26,200 ([8]). He alleged that the company had failed to tell the Australian Stock Exchange that its gold reserves were insufficient to meet its gold delivery contracts and that it could not continue as a going concern, and that this was misleading or deceptive conduct contravening s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ([8]). His claim was for the difference between the cost of the shares and their value, which was nil ([8]).
The company later entered a deed of company arrangement that incorporated s 563A of the Corporations Act by reference ([9], [139]). The section then read:
“Payment of a debt owed by a company to a person in the person’s capacity as a member of the company, whether by way of dividends, profits or otherwise, is to be postponed until all debts owed to, or claims made by, persons otherwise than as members of the company have been satisfied.” ([1])
There was no contract between Mr Margaretic and the company for the purchase of the shares ([10]). The case was argued on the assumption that he could prove the alleged contraventions and the loss ([9]). The appellants were Sons of Gwalia itself and ING Investment Management LLC, a general creditor of the company ([7], [34]). Both argued that any liability to Mr Margaretic was a liability to him in his capacity as a member ([7]). ING and Sons of Gwalia also relied on principles said to come from the nineteenth-century House of Lords decision in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank ([11]). Emmett J at first instance and then the Full Court of the Federal Court (Finkelstein, Gyles and Jacobson JJ) had decided the issue ([7]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court’s orders in each of the two appeals were that the appeal be dismissed with costs ([33], [207]). Seven Justices sat (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) and each wrote a judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gleeson CJ identified the issue as whether the assumed liability to Mr Margaretic was a liability to him in his capacity as a member of the company ([7]). He held that s 563A assumes that the person’s claim is a debt admissible to proof and subordinates it if, but only if, the debt is owed to the person in the person’s capacity as a member ([6]). To draw the line between a shareholder claiming as a member and one claiming otherwise, “it is necessary to analyse the nature of a claim; it is not sufficient to describe its effect on other creditors” ([28]).
What determined the case was that Mr Margaretic’s claim was “not founded upon any rights he obtained or any obligations he incurred by virtue of his membership” of the company; he did not seek to recover paid-up capital or avoid a liability to contribute to capital, and his claim would have been no different if he had ceased to be a member when he made it or had never been entered on the register ([31]). Gleeson CJ also said that s 563A does not embody a general policy that “members come last” ([19]).
Hayne J reached the same conclusion by way of the statutory concept of membership. The capacity-as-a-member words of s 563A define and confine the obligations it postpones ([201]), membership is a statutory concept, and the connection between the obligation and membership will find its ultimate foundation in the Act ([202]), often by way of the company’s constituent documents ([203]). Where a person pays money to the company to create the relationship of member, as on a subscription for shares, damages for misrepresentation or misleading or deceptive conduct inducing that subscription will not, absent specific legislative provision, be an obligation founded on the legislative prescription of the rights and duties of members, and that, absent specific legislation giving subscribing members particular remedies as members, no distinction is to be drawn between acquisition by subscription and by transfer ([205]).
The obligation Mr Margaretic sought to enforce was rooted in the company’s contravention of the prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct and its liability to a damages order at the suit of any person who suffered loss, so it was not owed to him in his capacity as a member and s 563A did not apply ([206]). Gummow J agreed generally with Hayne J’s reasons ([46]), Heydon J agreed with them ([262]) and Crennan J agreed with the conclusions and reasons of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J ([265]). Kirby J concluded that the preferable construction of s 563A was the one Gleeson CJ adopted ([134]).
Callinan J dissented. He preferred the construction advanced by Sons of Gwalia, relying on the history of the provision, the earlier case law and the desirability of coherence and fairness in the law, and would have declared the claim postponed ([259]).
The Court also rejected the argument that a common-law principle from Houldsworth, as applied in Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, prevented a shareholder from proving for damages without first rescinding ([13]) or otherwise supplied the answer. Gleeson CJ said that Houldsworth “was never authority for a principle as wide as that asserted” and that Webb Distributors “neither requires nor supports any different outcome” ([16], [32]). Gummow J held that the existence of any such common-law “principle” based on Houldsworth in Australia should be rejected, and that reliance on Webb Distributors did not assist the appellants ([49], [98]); he added that it must be doubted whether the result in Webb Distributors was correct, though there was no point in further consideration of that matter in these appeals ([97]).
Hayne J held that neither Webb Distributors nor Houldsworth established any common-law principle that no shareholder, however the shares were acquired, could have a claim of the kind in issue ([190]), and that because the statutory definition of admissible claims was changed in 1992, Webb Distributors does not dictate the outcome ([192]). Heydon J noted that counsel for ING had abandoned the contention and, if it had not been abandoned, agreed with Hayne J’s reasons for rejecting it ([264]). Crennan J agreed generally with Gummow J’s analysis ([265]). Callinan J, in dissent, treated Webb Distributors as supporting the construction advanced by Sons of Gwalia ([253]-[254]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [28] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [31]–[32] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ says that whether a claim is owed to a person as a member is decided by analysing the nature of the claim and not by describing its effect on other creditors ([28]), and states what determines the case: the claim is not founded on any rights obtained or obligations incurred by virtue of membership, and would be the same if Mr Margaretic had ceased to be a member or had never been registered ([31]). That is the ground on which the appeals were dismissed, so it is necessary to the result.
Ratio · Hayne J (Gummow J agreeing generally, Heydon J and Crennan J agreeing)
Read judgment: [201]–[206] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J explains what the words ‘in the person’s capacity as a member’ do in s 563A ([201]-[203]), why the claim is not an obligation the Act creates in favour of members ([205]-[206]) and concludes that s 563A does not apply to the claim ([206]). Gummow J agreed generally with these reasons ([46]), Heydon J agreed with them on s 563A ([262]) and Crennan J agreed with both Gleeson CJ and Hayne J ([265]). These paragraphs carry the same ground of decision as Gleeson CJ’s, expressed through the statutory concept of membership.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [113]–[114] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab), [134] (PDF p 52) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurs in the orders. He accepts that there are policy reasons favouring postponement of the claim ([109]-[112]) but treats the question as one of statutory interpretation ([114]) and concludes that the preferable construction of s 563A is the one Gleeson CJ adopted ([134]). His own route is through the text, history and comparative provisions, not through Hayne J’s reasons.
Separate reasoning · Callinan J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [255]–[259] (PDF p 99) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J dissents: on coherence in the law, the language and history of s 563A and the case law he prefers the construction advanced by Sons of Gwalia and would allow the appeals and declare the claim postponed ([259]). It is a dissent and is not the holding of the Court.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ
Read judgment: [16] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [32] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson CJ treats the second appellant’s Houldsworth argument as a preliminary point ([11]-[16]), says that the issue is decided on the true construction of the Act and of s 563A ([16]) and that Webb Distributors does not require a different result ([32]). Rejecting the preliminary point was necessary to reach the construction question that decided the appeals.
Ratio · Hayne J
Read judgment: [182]–[190] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab), [192]–[193] (PDF p 72) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J explains that Webb Distributors concerned whether claims were admissible to proof ([182]), that its reasoning rested on capital maintenance and concerned subscribers ([190]), that neither it nor Houldsworth established the asserted common-law principle ([190]) and that, because the statutory definition of admissible claims changed in 1992, Webb does not dictate the outcome ([192]). These paragraphs are the route by which the Court decided that the threshold argument failed.
Ratio · Gummow J (Crennan J agreeing generally)
Read judgment: [49] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [98] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab)
Gummow J, in additional reasons, rejects the existence in Australia of any common-law principle of company law based on Houldsworth and holds that reliance on Webb does not assist Sons of Gwalia and ING ([49], [98]). Crennan J agreed generally with his analysis ([265]).
Obiter · Gummow J
Read judgment: [97] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab)
Gummow J says it must be doubted whether the result in Webb Distributors was correct, then adds that there is no point in further consideration of that matter in these appeals ([97]). The observation is not needed to dispose of the appeals.
Separate reasoning · Callinan J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [253]–[254] (PDF p 98) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J takes the opposite view of the case law, treating Webb Distributors as supporting Sons of Gwalia’s position and the history as favouring it ([253]-[254]). It is a dissent.
Why does this case matter?
A common slip in insolvency answers is to run together two questions: whether a claim can be proved in the winding up at all, and where it ranks once proved. Another is to start from a view about how a failed company’s assets ought to be shared and write the section to fit. Examiners expect the statutory words to be applied to the particular claim. Because the section was later replaced, the case also tests whether you notice which version of the law governs the claim in the question.
Exam and application relevance
For a shareholder’s damages claim against an insolvent company, identify the version of s 563A that applies to the claim before applying the Court’s construction: the section was substituted from 18 December 2010 for claims arising after that date.
For a claim that falls under the earlier wording, state what the claimant says gives rise to the obligation (a statutory prohibition, a contract, the company’s constitution or the Act’s rules about members) and apply the reasons of Gleeson CJ ([31]) and Hayne J ([201]-[206]) to it. Name the Justice whose formulation you use, since the two judgments are worded differently.
Check your understanding
1. In the terms used by Gleeson CJ at [31], what did Mr Margaretic’s claim not depend on, and which two hypothetical changes in his position did Gleeson CJ say would not have altered the claim?
2. How did Hayne J explain the work done by the capacity-as-a-member words of s 563A ([201]-[203]), and which Justices agreed with his reasons on that point ([46], [262], [265])?
3. Why did Hayne J say that Webb Distributors did not dictate the outcome ([182], [190], [192]), and what view did Callinan J take of it ([253]-[254])?