Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (In Administration)

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2007

Corporations And Commercial LawCapital And Insolvency Context

Whitton v Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (In Administration) [2007] FCAFC 125

A trustee says a bankrupt was insolvent in April 1999, when a company he later controlled contracted to buy apartments and a caretaking business. His accounts showed assets short of liabilities, yet every purchase settled. Is that enough?

What happened?

Mr Rose was a solicitor who, from about 1999, turned to real estate investment ([7]). He was ultimately the sole director and principal shareholder of Regis Towers Real Estate Pty Ltd (Regis Towers), which on 20 April 1999, then named Cesscut Pty Limited, contracted with Meriton companies to buy five lots in a Sydney tower complex and to acquire the benefit of a Head Agreement under which Meriton Apartments promised to procure caretaker and manager rights over the complex ([5], [11]-[13]).

On Mr Rose’s evidence, Mr Stewart and Ms McInnes took the initiative, and Mr Stewart told him that Ms McInnes would put all the money in at the outset and that he could put in his half share in September ([9]-[10]). She wrote cheques for $218,750 on 20 April 1999 and had stopped payment on them by the next day; she and Mr Stewart then withdrew after Mr Rose borrowed $327,000 on the security of property offered by his parents-in-law and reimbursed her on 6 May 1999; their shares were transferred to Mr Rose, leaving him with three of the four shares and his wife with her existing one ([11]-[12]).

An administrator was appointed to Regis Towers on 17 September 2004, and Mr Rose became bankrupt when his debtor’s petition was accepted on 21 June 2005 ([17]). His trustee, Mr Whitton, claimed under s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that the benefits under the Head Agreement and the beneficial interest in the five lots belonged to the bankrupt estate. The administrator of Regis Towers sought under s 104 a review of the trustee’s rejection of Regis Towers’s proof of a debt owed by Mr Rose ([18]). The primary judge rejected both claims ([18]). Each side appealed, and Regis Towers cross-appealed on costs at first instance ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court (Marshall, Tracey and Buchanan JJ), sitting in Sydney, dismissed both appeals and the cross-appeal on 10 August 2007 and directed the parties to file written submissions on the costs of the appeals within 14 days (Orders). Buchanan J gave the principal reasons ([5]-[71]). Marshall and Tracey JJ agreed with his Honour’s reasons and with the orders, subject to a reservation about one earlier decision ([1]-[2]).

Buchanan J concluded that the trustee’s claim under s 121 could not succeed and that the administrator failed to prove its case under s 104 ([49], [69]). The cross-appeal had been brought to safeguard Regis Towers’s position if it succeeded in both appeals, and it was dismissed because that did not happen ([70]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Buchanan J considered whether it could reasonably be inferred that Mr Rose was insolvent, or about to become insolvent, on 20 April 1999 ([21]). He began from Barwick CJ’s statement in Sandell v Porter that, as s 95 of the Bankruptcy Act then expressed it, insolvency is an inability to pay debts as they fall due out of the debtor’s own money, which extends to money that can be procured by realisation, sale, mortgage or pledge of assets within a relatively short time ([34]).

His Honour noted that s 95, as it then appeared, referred to paying debts out of the debtor’s own money, that many later cases proceed on an express or implied incorporation of that element, and that it no longer appears in the definitions of solvency and insolvency in s 5(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or in the corresponding definition in s 95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which is in identical terms ([35]). He set out Palmer J’s observation at first instance in Lewis v Doran ([36]) and the passage in which Giles JA, with whom Hodgson and McColl JJA agreed, said that once the limiting words are no longer part of the test there is no compelling reason to exclude funds gained from borrowings secured on assets of third parties, or even unsecured borrowings ([37], quoting Lewis v Doran at [109]-[112]).

Applying that approach, he saw no reason to treat Mr Rose’s decision, with his wife, to continue the venture as rendering him insolvent simply because another borrowing had occurred, there being no evidence that the loan was repayable at the relevant time and it having only just been made ([38]). He regarded the trustee’s balance sheets, which showed a deficiency of assets over liabilities, as far from conclusive, because the liabilities were very substantially interest-bearing and there was no suggestion that they were payable on 20 April 1999 or that interest was not being met ([27]).

Section 121(2) of the Bankruptcy Act takes the transferor’s main purpose to be the purpose in s 121(1)(b) if it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, the transferor was, or was about to become, insolvent ([19]). The Full Court in Re Jury; Ashton v Prentice had said at [55] that it is sufficient if the inference of insolvency is reasonably open, and likened the question to the leaving of a case to a civil jury ([22]).

Buchanan J said that, sitting at first instance, he would be bound to apply that statement, but that as a member of a Full Court he had reservations about whether its final three sentences correctly reflect the intention and language of s 121(2); in his view the question is whether the judge applying s 121(2) is satisfied, as a matter of reasonable inference and having regard to all the circumstances, that the transferor was, at the time of the transfer, insolvent or about to become so ([25]).

He held that, on the evidence, the suggested inference was much too tenuous to be regarded as reasonably open on any test, and was only guesswork and speculation ([26], [39]). Marshall and Tracey JJ preferred to express no view about the correctness of the analogy employed in Re Jury ([2]).

The second element of the trustee’s s 121 claim required a transfer of property, and the trustee relied on s 121(9)(b), under which a person who does something that results in another person becoming the owner of property that did not previously exist is taken to have transferred it ([41]-[43]). Buchanan J found no factual support for the claim: Ms McInnes had provided the financial foundation for the joint venture on 20 April 1999, her later withdrawal was unexpected, and the property claimed had never been in Mr Rose’s hands but, before that date, was in the hands of Meriton Apartments or Meriton Property Management ([44]).

On the law, he held that the claim was resolved against the trustee by the High Court’s reading in Peldan v Anderson, when s 121(9)(b) is relied upon, of the words the property in s 121(1)(a) as the property in the hands of the transferor prior to the act taken to be the transfer, so that attention falls on the property out of which the new property is created ([46]-[48]). There was no property in Mr Rose’s hands on which s 121(1)(a), so interpreted, could act, and reliance on implied intentions could not conjure up property or displace the legal interests created when Regis Towers, as an independent legal entity, assumed contractual obligations ([48]). He treated the failure of this element as a further reason, in any event, why the trustee’s s 121 claim failed ([40], [49]).

On the administrator’s application under s 104 for review of the trustee’s rejection of Regis Towers’s proof of debt, Buchanan J agreed with the primary judge that the books of Regis Towers were insufficiently reliable to establish the alleged debt of $483,970.21 owed by Mr Rose ([50], [54]). The accounts were compiled in 2002 for a date in 2000 and contained many journal entries, including balancing entries produced by an undisclosed process of judgment or inference ([55]); one such entry was for $1,198,969.72, and the accountant who supervised the accounts could not say what it related to ([56]-[58]).

His Honour held that s 1305 of the Corporations Act, under which a book kept by a body corporate under a requirement of the Act is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in it, does not elevate such an entry to prima facie evidence that any transaction exists; it can be no more than prima facie evidence that an unknown person formed an opinion on an undisclosed basis that a balancing figure should appear ([51], [59]). The administrator’s own reconstruction could not support a debt of $345,000 from Mr Rose, and the suggestion that the Court deduct that sum and accept the remainder involved guesswork the Court should not accept as raising a provable debt ([62]-[67], [69]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Buchanan J (Marshall and Tracey JJ agreeing subject to their reservation about Re Jury)

Read judgment: [34]–[38] (opens in a new tab)

Buchanan J’s account of the change in the definitions, and of the approach in Lewis v Doran which he applied, is part of his reason for rejecting the trustee’s reliance on the new borrowing as a sign of insolvency, within the first of the two grounds on which the s 121 claim failed. The same ground rests also on the evidence being too tenuous on any test ([26], [39]), so the conclusion did not depend on the statutory point alone.

Ratio · Buchanan J (Marshall and Tracey JJ agreeing)

Read judgment: [27] (opens in a new tab)

This paragraph is part of the evidential reasoning by which the balance-sheet deficiency was found insufficient to raise the inference of insolvency, which is the ground of decision on the insolvency element.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Buchanan J

Read judgment: [25] (opens in a new tab)

Buchanan J states his reservations as a member of a Full Court and then decides that the inference fails on any test ([26]), so the preferred standard was not necessary to the result.

Separate reasoning · Marshall and Tracey JJ

Read judgment: [2]–[3] (opens in a new tab)

Marshall and Tracey JJ concur in the orders and in Buchanan J’s reasons subject to one reservation: they prefer to express no view on the Re Jury analogy. The reservation leaves the standard undecided by the Full Court.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Buchanan J (Marshall and Tracey JJ agreeing)

Read judgment: [40]–[49] (opens in a new tab)

This is a separate ground on which the s 121 claim failed. Buchanan J applies the High Court’s construction in Peldan v Anderson; the construction is the High Court’s, not the Full Court’s, and the ground is an alternative to the insolvency ground.

Proposition 4

Ratio · Buchanan J (Marshall and Tracey JJ agreeing)

Read judgment: [50]–[69] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are the ground on which the administrator’s appeal against the rejection of its proof of debt failed.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to meet this case as a one-line footnote to Sandell v Porter. Its four strands, one on solvency, one on the inference of insolvency, one on the transfer of property and one on proof of a debt, are easy to run together, and an answer that cites it should say which strand it is drawing on.

Exam and application relevance

When a problem asks whether a person was insolvent at an earlier date, fix the date first, then ask what debts were due and payable on it and what resources could meet them, using the evidence the problem gives ([26]-[29], [38]-[39]). Ask also what accounts prepared later show about the debts and resources on the date in question ([27]).

When citing the case, give the judge and the paragraph, say which Justice a point comes from and say whether the orders depended on it.

The decision was made in 2007 and states ss 5(2) and (3) and 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, s 95A of the Corporations Act and s 1305 of that Act as they then stood. It does not decide how those sections would apply after any later amendment, so check the current text against the date of the facts.

Check your understanding

1. Which two claims did the primary judge reject, and who appealed ([6], [18])?

2. What does s 121(2) of the Bankruptcy Act take to be the transferor’s main purpose, and on what inference ([19])?

3. What evidence did the trustee rely on to show that Mr Rose was insolvent on 20 April 1999, and what did Buchanan J make of the balance sheets ([26]-[29])?

4. Which element of the older formulation did Buchanan J say no longer appears in the statutory definitions, and in which two Acts ([34]-[35])?

5. What reservation did Marshall and Tracey JJ express, and about which earlier decision ([2])?

6. Why did s 1305 of the Corporations Act not carry the administrator’s case on the balancing entries ([59], [61])?