Re Meyerstein
Re Meyerstein [2009] VSC 564
An administrator finds twelve distant relatives of a man who died intestate, but searches across Europe cannot show that no others exist. How sure must the court be that the class is complete before the $2.3 million estate is distributed?
What happened?
Werner Meyerstein was born in Germany in 1912 and died in Melbourne on 21 February 2001, aged 88 ([2]). He died intestate, because his will of 3 July 2000 appointed his wife executrix and universal beneficiary, she predeceased him, and there was no gift over; letters of administration were granted to State Trustees Limited on 4 June 2001 ([3]). The estate was worth $2,334,798.53 ([1]). Since 2003 a genealogical researcher employed by State Trustees, Mr Corbett, had been engaged to establish the next of kin, with external researchers in Italy, Germany and Poland who searched archives in Hanover, Poland and Berlin; the task was difficult because the family was Jewish and a number of its members perished during the holocaust ([4]).
Where there is no surviving spouse, parent, child or more remote issue, s 52(1)(f) of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) directs distribution among the next of kin of the intestate who are in equal degree ([8], [9]). The researcher’s investigations established that there were no surviving issue, siblings, nephews and nieces, great-uncles and aunts, or cousins, and no next of kin closer than fifth degree ([12]). State Trustees applied for an order that they were justified in distributing the estate to first cousins once removed, in the absence of evidence of any nearer next of kin, or alternatively that all monies be paid into court and State Trustees be discharged from further responsibility ([1]). The application was headed ex parte, and the only appearance recorded was for the plaintiff.
What did the Court decide?
Ross J, sitting in the Practice Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 8 December 2009, was satisfied that it would be appropriate to distribute the estate to the first cousins once removed named in the schedule to the originating motion, and ordered that the costs of the application be paid or retained out of the estate ([25], [26]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Ross J, sitting in the Practice Court on an application by State Trustees Limited as administrator, said that the practical problem which commonly arises in estates of this kind is “how can the person representative be sure that all of those relatives have been identified and located” ([13]). He said that a next of kin inquiry with published advertisements was not appropriate in this case because it was “clearly impractical to publish advertisements throughout the world which would have any realistic chance of alerting any distant relatives” ([15]), and he agreed with counsel for the plaintiff that an inquiry and advertisements “would be nothing more than an empty charade in the circumstances of this case” ([21]).
He recorded that in West v Weston Young J thought that, although the authorities indicated he should follow the English rule, “I would be justified in slightly modifying its operation for Australian conditions of the present day”, and had expressed the rule so modified in these words: “The rule will be satisfied if, within a reasonable time after the gift comes into effect, the court can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the substantial majority of the beneficiaries have been ascertained and that no reasonable inquiries could be made which would improve the situation” ([19], [20]).
Ross J said “In my view the modified rule as formulated by Young J ought to be applied to the matter presently before me” ([21]), and he was satisfied that on the balance of probabilities (a) if not all, then at least the substantial majority of the beneficiaries had been ascertained, and (b) there were no further reasonable inquiries which should be made and which would be likely to identify any further beneficiaries ([22]).
Ross J described Re Benjamin, in which one of a testator’s 13 children was missing, the Master could not certify whether the son was living or dead, and Joyce J held that the son must be presumed dead and gave the trustees permission to distribute ([16]). He said that such orders are known as Benjamin Orders and are regularly made in such circumstances, including in relation to intestate estates ([17]), and he concluded “A Benjamin order is required” ([21]). He found that the next of kin entitled under s 52(1)(f) of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) were the next of kin in the fifth degree who were living on 21 February 2001, when the deceased died, and that there were twelve of them ([23]).
The administration was complete except for distributing the net funds, once provision was made for the costs of the proceeding and the estate’s current income tax was paid ([24]). The judgment does not set out the terms of a formal order.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Ross J
Read judgment: [13]–[15] (opens in a new tab), [21]–[22] (opens in a new tab)
Ross J’s decision to apply the modified rule, and his satisfaction on the two matters at [22], are the reasons for the conclusion at [25] that distribution to the identified cousins was appropriate. The wording of the rule at [20], and the account of West v Weston at [18] and [19], are Young J’s words and Ross J’s description of that case, not Ross J’s own formulation. This is a first-instance decision of one judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, ordinarily followed by lower Victorian courts and persuasive elsewhere.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Ross J
Read judgment: [16]–[17] (opens in a new tab), [21] (opens in a new tab), [23]–[24] (opens in a new tab)
The conclusion that a Benjamin order is required, and the findings about who was entitled and that only distribution of the net funds remained once provision was made for the costs of the proceeding and the estate’s current income tax was paid, are the grounds for the relief granted at [25]. Ross J’s account of Re Benjamin at [16] is a description of Joyce J’s decision, and his statement at [17] that such orders are regularly made, with the authorities in footnote 5, supports the availability of the relief.
Why does this case matter?
The worry about whether every beneficiary has been found arises in two places that students usually learn separately: the certainty of the objects of a trust, and the administration of an estate. This decision shows the difficulty from the administrator’s side, where the practical questions are when it is safe to distribute and what the court will accept as sufficient inquiry. An answer is rewarded for identifying which question the court was asked, what material it had, and whose formulation it used.
Exam and application relevance
In an intestacy problem, identify the statutory class entitled and its degree of relationship, what searches have been made, and whether any further reasonable inquiry could be made, and then say what protection the administrator is asking the court to give. If you use this decision, say whose formulation of the test is being applied and give the paragraph for it.
This is a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, ordinarily followed by lower Victorian courts and persuasive in other Australian jurisdictions. The intestacy provisions applied are those Ross J quoted and described for a death in 2001. The Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) has since been amended, including by Act No 41 of 2017, which inserted the present intestacy provisions: s 70ZK now provides for distribution to the intestate’s aunts and uncles, with a child of an aunt or uncle who predeceased taking that aunt’s or uncle’s share.
The scheme Ross J applied to a death in 2001 is therefore not the present one, and this judgment does not say how the later scheme applies to earlier or later deaths, so identify which provisions govern the date of death in a present problem. The modified inquiry rule applied here is not said to have been overruled.
Check your understanding
1. What did the researcher’s investigations establish about the relatives of the deceased who survived him, and what degree of relationship did that leave ([12], [23])?
2. Why did Ross J regard a next of kin inquiry with advertisements as unsuitable in this case ([15], [21])?
3. According to Ross J, what was West v Weston about, and what did Young J do to the English rule ([18], [19])?
4. Which two matters did Ross J say that he was satisfied of, and on what standard ([22])?
5. In Re Benjamin, what had happened to the missing son and what did Joyce J do ([16])?
6. How many relatives fell in the entitled class, and to whom did Ross J consider it appropriate to distribute ([23], [25])?