Re Lauer; Corby & Anor v Lyttleton
Re Lauer; Corby & Anor v Lyttleton [2017] VSC 728
A will leaves residue to the trustee of a named family trust. Five versions of the deed exist, none signed by its named settlor, and the only link to the money is a bank account. Did the trust ever exist?
What happened?
Elizabeth Lauer died on 10 May 2011, aged 88 and unmarried, having suffered from dementia from about 2006 (McMillan J at [1]). By her will of 21 November 2002 she gave six legacies, devised her interest in a property at Rosebud to a friend, George Nagy, and in clause 9 left the residue of her estate to “the Trustee for the time being of the Elizabeth Lauer Family Trust for the Trustees to apply as capital contribution to the Trust” ([3]).
Mr Nagy, who had met her in about 1990 and in her last three years helped with her medications and finances, asserted that he was the trustee ([4], [5]). On 1 April 2002 she appointed him her attorney under an enduring power of attorney, and the same day she signed an agreement describing him as “Trustee” under which she agreed to pay expenses he incurred in finding a nursing home and in her day-to-day care ([25]). In winter 2002 she asked him to organise a family trust for her; after obtaining quotes from law firms and being surprised at their cost, he copied and amended a friend’s family trust deed ([26]).
Five versions of a deed of trust were before the Court, the defendant’s said to have been signed on 24 September 2002 ([27], [42]). In the defendant’s version Ms Queenie Williams, a friend of the deceased who died three to four years before her, was named as settlor and Mr Nagy as trustee, and five people were listed as beneficiaries in the second schedule ([44], [50]). A different page 10 in another version named a different settlor and three beneficiaries ([52]), a further version lacked page 10 altogether ([56]), and the settlor did not appear to have executed any version ([57]).
On 16 October 2002 a cheque account was opened at the Commonwealth Bank in the name of “The Elizabeth Lauer Family Trust”; the deceased was the person initially authorised to operate it and was described as “Trustee” in the bank’s authority ([28]). The earliest statement showed a balance of $4694 on 17 December 2004 and a deposit of $104,104 on 14 January 2005 ([30]). Over 2005 to 2007 sums of $25,000, $25,000 and $60,000 were debited from the account, the first two being credited to a Nagy Family Trust account and the $60,000 being debited on the day a term deposit account was opened in the deceased’s name, and the account was closed on 21 May 2008 ([31], [33]).
The executors, Ross Corby and George Anderson, asked the Court under r 54.02 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 whether the trust failed to come into existence for lack of formalities, whether it was void for uncertainty as to its beneficiaries or any other terms, whether it had been terminated by distribution of capital, and whether the residue should go to the trustee for the time being or be distributed under the law of intestacy ([6]). Mr Nagy suffered a stroke in October 2013 and the Court later appointed Ms Suzanne Lyttleton as his litigation guardian ([5], [10]).
He died on 11 April 2017, before the final written submissions were received, and Ms Lyttleton was appointed to represent his estate ([20], [62]). The parties consented to the matter being determined on the papers, and the Court treated the defendant’s evidence after his affidavit of 21 August 2014 as unreliable ([21], [22]).
What did the Court decide?
McMillan J delivered judgment on 30 November 2017. She said her conclusions were reached “with a degree of difficulty” ([8]). The Court declared that a trust by the name of the Elizabeth Lauer Family Trust failed to come into existence ([7]), and she answered the first question yes ([113]). Because the trust failed, there was no trustee to take at the date of death, the gift of residue lapsed and there was a partial intestacy ([125]). She said that the residue ought to be distributed in accordance with s 52 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), on the footing, from earlier orders, that no aunt or uncle survived and that Klaus Alfred Lauer was the deceased’s sole surviving nephew ([7], [125], [129]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
McMillan J said that an express trust can be created by transfer or declaration and must satisfy the three certainties of intention, subject matter and object, that the test of certainty of intention is objective, and that the intention that matters is that of the settlor ([91], [96]). She found two obstacles to the conclusion that a trust was created in 2002 ([104]-[107]). The first was that the person named as settlor in the defendant’s version of the deed, Ms Queenie Williams, did not execute it, so there was no evidence manifesting her intention to create a trust, and it was not possible to find that she may have adopted the intentions of others ([104]).
She accepted that the terms of the defendant’s version and the signatures of the deceased and Mr Nagy supported a finding that in 2002 they manifested an intention to create a trust, noting that the deed used the explicit words “upon trust” and that the surrounding facts the plaintiffs relied on did not outweigh the existence and language of the deed, but said that without a settlor’s intention their intentions assumed limited relevance ([105], [106]). The second obstacle was the absence of evidence of subject matter: the deed spoke of $500 to be paid by the settlor, there was no evidence that it was ever transferred (a point the defendant conceded, [75]), and there was no evidence of any other property to which trust obligations could be affixed in 2002 ([107]). She accepted that in 2002 Mr Nagy and the deceased sought to establish a trust of that name but held that no trust was created ([107]).
McMillan J said that the only property identified in the evidence to which trustee obligations may have attached was the funds in the Trust Account ([108]). She accepted that the $104,104 deposited in January 2005 came from the sale of the deceased’s interest in the Eastbourne Road property, and that depositing funds into a trust account is a particularly significant manifestation of an intention to create a trust, but found that evidence of who transferred the funds and in what circumstances was lacking and that contemporaneous documents were almost entirely absent, so, given that her 2002 will showed she had intended to devise that asset to the defendant, she could not infer that it was the deceased who transferred the money ([110]).
The defendant’s case also needed inferences about the objects: that the funds were to be held on the terms of the defendant’s version of the deed. She said that the deceased and Mr Nagy might be bound by that deed, but that did not mean its obligations were automatically annexed to the property identified in 2005, that the only link between the deed and the later property was the Trust Account, and that this alone was not enough to support the inferences ([111]).
She distinguished La Housse v Counsel, where the initial trusts came into existence, the trustee of the earlier trusts transferred the funds and contemporaneous evidence showed that the beneficiaries of the later trusts were intended to be the same ([111]). To draw the inferences would verge on speculation, which is particularly inappropriate when potentially creating property rights enforceable against third parties ([112]). She concluded that at no time did a trust of that name come into existence and said that the need for contemporaneous objective evidence “cannot be overstated on the issue of the creation of a trust” ([128], [129]).
McMillan J went on, in case her conclusions about creation were wrong, to consider whether the trust would be void for uncertainty of beneficiaries ([114]). She said that, excluding trusts for a purpose, the beneficiaries of an express trust must be capable of being ascertained, and that in the context of fixed trusts list certainty is required, that is, a description of the objects “precise enough to enable the whole range of objects to be listed”, a formulation she attributed in her footnotes to Nettle J in Commissioner of State Revenue v Viewbank Properties Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 127 at [20] ([100], footnotes 51-53).
She read clause 4 of the defendant’s version of the deed as giving the trustee no discretion over the application of income, which had to be applied equally, so that, at least as to income, there must be list certainty ([119]). The deed defined the income beneficiaries as the persons named in its third schedule, which read “The Lauer Family Trust” ([118]). She found no evidence about whether a trust of that name existed, whether the words were a mistake for the Elizabeth Lauer Family Trust, or whether the schedule was meant to name both the income beneficiary and the trust, and no evidence on which the clause could be rectified, so the trustee could not compile the requisite list ([119]).
She held that, even if the terms of the defendant’s version could be said to apply to the funds in the Trust Account, the trust failed for uncertainty of objects ([119]). She found it unnecessary to consider the rule against remoteness of vesting in the light of that conclusion ([120]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · McMillan J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [104]–[107] (opens in a new tab), [113] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs give two of her reasons for answering the first question that a trust of that name failed to come into existence ([113]): no evidence of the named settlor’s intention and no evidence of trust property in 2002. The declaration that the trust failed depends on them together with her reasons about 2005 ([128]-[129]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · McMillan J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [108]–[113] (opens in a new tab), [128]–[129] (opens in a new tab)
Having found that no trust arose in 2002, she considered whether the funds identified in 2005 independently established a trust on the deed’s terms, and found the evidence insufficient ([108]-[113]). That finding is the second of her reasons for the conclusion that no trust came into existence ([128]).
Proposition 3
Classification unresolved · McMillan J (sole judge)
Read judgment: [100] (opens in a new tab), [114]–[120] (opens in a new tab)
She decided this question, but expressly as an alternative: she addressed it in the event that her earlier conclusions were incorrect ([114]) and held that the trust would fail even if, contrary to those findings, the deed’s terms applied ([119]). The declaration that the trust failed did not depend on it, so a plain ratio label would hide that it is an alternative ground, and a plain obiter label would hide that she determined it.
Why does this case matter?
A will that names a family trust, a bank account in the trust’s name and a deed bearing a date can look like enough on their face to show that a trust exists. A dispute about it may arise years later, when the people who could say what happened have died or lost capacity, and the court is asked to decide from the documents that survive. Here the judge recorded that the outcome was inconsistent with the deceased’s intentions as expressed in her will and was not entirely satisfactory ([129]). Examiners reward an answer that asks, of each document and each transfer in the facts, what it shows, from when, and whose conduct it shows.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where a document refers to an existing trust, identify who is said to have created it, what property that person is said to have settled and when, and what evidence from the time supports each step. Compare the dates: the signing of a document, the opening of an account and the movement of money may not coincide, and the evidence may show different people acting at different times.
This is a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, so outside Victoria it is persuasive and does not bind. The judgment does not mention West v Weston [1998] NSWSC 419 or Kinsela v Caldwell (1975) 132 CLR 458, so the judgment itself does not address whether the general rule for fixed trusts has been relaxed in Australia. The Victorian statutory provisions the judgment mentions, including the one on which the distribution of the partial intestacy turned, are cited as they stood in 2017; check the current provisions before relying on them in a problem.
Check your understanding
1. What did clause 9 of the will provide, and what did Mr Nagy assert about himself ([3], [5])?
2. Which four questions did the executors ask the Court to determine ([6])?
3. Who was named as settlor in the defendant’s version of the deed, and what did McMillan J say about whether she executed it ([44], [57], [104])?
4. What did McMillan J accept about the intentions of the deceased and Mr Nagy in 2002, and what did she say about the weight those intentions carried ([105], [106])?
5. What did the deed say about $500, and what did the Court find about any property in 2002 ([107])?
6. What inferences about the $104,104 did the defendant invite the Court to draw, and why did McMillan J decline to draw them ([109]-[112])?
7. Why did McMillan J turn to clause 4 of the defendant’s version, and what did she say about the third schedule ([114], [118], [119])?
8. What did she say would happen to the residue if the trust failed to exist, and who took it ([125], [129])?