Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements

House of Lords · 1970

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements [1970] AC 508 (HL); [1968] UKHL 5

A settlor let his trustees pay a son’s income to anyone in whose house, company or care the son lived or worked. The drafting was poor and the edges vague. Must a court strike down a clause whose class is hard to pin down?

What happened?

In 1929 and 1938 Calouste Gulbenkian made settlements for his son, Nubar Sarkis Gulbenkian (Lord Reid; Lord Upjohn). Clause 2(i) of the 1929 settlement provided that the trustees “shall during the life of the said Nubar Sarkis Gulbenkian at their absolute discretion pay all or any part of the income” of the fund “to or apply the same for the maintenance and personal support or benefit of all or any one or more to the exclusion of the other or others of the following persons” (Lord Upjohn).

The persons included the son, any wife and his children or remoter issue, “any person or persons in whose house or apartments or in whose company or under whose care or control or by or with whom the said Nubar Sarkis Gulbenkian may from time to time be employed or residing”, and the other persons, apart from the settlor, entitled or interested in the trust fund under the trusts to take effect after the son’s death (Lord Upjohn). Income not paid or applied under the discretion was to be held, under cl 2(ii), on the trusts on which it would be held if the son were then dead (Lord Upjohn).

The 1938 settlement was similar, but omitted the words “or in whose company or under whose care or control”, and counsel on neither side sought to distinguish the two (Lord Upjohn). The son had assigned away his rights to income and took no part in the argument (Lord Upjohn).

The House was asked whether the class described in cl 2(i) was so uncertain that the provisions could not be operated by the trustees (Lord Reid), or whether the clause was void for uncertainty (Lord Upjohn). It was agreed between the parties that the discretion was a mere or bare power, not a trust power: the trustees had no duty to exercise it, and the Court had no power to compel them to (Lord Upjohn). Lord Reid described the clause as not making sense as it stood, and as a “botched clause” that had found its way into a standard book of precedents. The appellants argued that the clause was too uncertain, and also that a power is bad for uncertainty unless it is possible to make a complete list of the possible beneficiaries (Lord Reid; Lord Upjohn). The same decision is also known as Whishaw v Stephens.

What did the Court decide?

The House of Lords gave its decision in 1968. Each of Lords Reid, Hodson, Guest, Upjohn and Donovan said that the appeal should be dismissed, and the clause was not void for uncertainty. Lord Reid, Lord Upjohn and Lord Donovan gave reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Lord Upjohn said that, on a body of recent authority, provided there is a valid gift over or trust in default of appointment, “a mere or bare power of appointment among a class is valid if you can with certainty say whether any given individual is or is not a member of the class; you do not have to be able to ascertain every member of the class”. Lords Hodson and Guest agreed with his opinion. Counsel for both sides accepted that test as the right one on their first lines of argument, and Lord Upjohn assumed it and asked whether the clause satisfied it.

Lord Reid, in his own speech, said that if the classes of beneficiaries are not defined with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to determine whether a particular person is or is not within one of them, the power must be bad for uncertainty; that “if one can reasonably envisage cases where the Court could not determine the question the power must be bad for uncertainty”; and that it is “not bad merely because such determination may be difficult in a particular case”.

He rejected the appellants’ argument that a power is bad for uncertainty unless it is possible to make a complete list of the possible beneficiaries, and Lord Donovan said that he was in complete sympathy with the rule that a power does not fail simply because a complete list of every member cannot be drawn up. Lord Upjohn said that he agreed with the proposition as enunciated in Re Gestetner and the later cases. He declined to accept the wider propositions of Lord Denning MR and Winn LJ in the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning’s being, as Lord Upjohn put it, that if you can say of one particular person that he is clearly within the category the whole power is good), because those entitled in default are entitled to restrain the trustees from exercising the power save among those within it, so that the trustees or the Court “must be able to say with certainty who is within and who is without the power”.

He introduced that discussion after saying that what he had already said was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, and Lord Donovan, while inclined to share Lord Upjohn’s view, reserved his opinion on it because in this case it would be purely obiter. Later, in McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (HL), Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne agreed on the test, said that this House had decided that a mere power was valid if it could be said with certainty whether any given individual was or was not a member of the class, and that it did not fail simply because it was impossible to ascertain every member; he held that the test for trust powers ought to be similar. Lords Hodson and Guest dissented from that extension.

Lord Upjohn said that “the first task is to try to ascertain the Settlor’s intention, so to speak, without regard to the consequences, and then, having construed the document, apply the test”, and that where the draftsman has used words badly it is the Court’s duty to give a reasonable meaning to the language if it can do so without doing complete violence to it. He adopted, with amendments, the construction of Harman J in Re Gresham, reading the clause as covering any person by whom the son may from time to time be employed and any person with whom the son from time to time is residing, whether in the house or apartments of that person or in the company or under the care or control of that person.

Lord Reid reached a similar reading in his own speech, concluding that the clause resulted from carelessly telescoping two separate clauses, because the literal reading was one that no rational person would insert. Lord Upjohn said that the difficulties the appellants raised, about residing, persons with whom the son resides, persons in whose company he resides and persons under whose care or control he resides, were difficulties in borderline cases, that “mere difficulty is nothing to the point”, and that if the trustees feel difficulty or even doubt the Court of Chancery is available to solve it for them.

Lord Reid said that it is often difficult in a particular case to decide whether a temporary sojourn amounts to residence, “but that is the kind of problem which Courts often have to solve”. Lord Donovan said that when a particular claimant presents himself it is going too far to assert that the question whether he is qualified would be unanswerable, and that trustees in doubt could seek the Court’s ruling. Lord Upjohn said that the Court of Appeal were right to overrule Harman J’s decision in Re Gresham, where a similar clause had been held void.

After saying that what he had already decided was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, Lord Upjohn went on to examine the wider reasons of two members of the Court of Appeal and made general observations about trust powers. He said that where a donor directs trustees to divide a fund among a class, the class must be as defined as an individual, and that where the donor gives the trustees a power of selection among a class they have a duty to select from the class: the donor “has not entrusted them with any power to select the donees merely from among known claimants who are within the class, for that is constituting a narrower class and the donor has given them no power to do this”, so that if the class is insufficiently defined the donor’s intention fails for uncertainty.

He contrasted a mere power, which the trustees have no duty to exercise, and said that, with respect to the contrary view, he could not see how consistently with principle the principles applicable to mere powers could be applied to a trust power. Lord Reid said of the requirement in IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust that a complete list of the beneficiaries be possible that “That seems to me to be a very odd kind of uncertainty”, that he gravely doubted some of the arguments used by the Court of Appeal there, and that the present position of the law is far from satisfactory, but that this was not an appropriate case for a review of the law.

Lord Donovan said that he did not at that moment share the view that it is irrational to require the whole range of objects eligible for selection to be capable of ascertainment for a trust power but not for a power collateral, said that he agreed with the reasoning developed by Lord Upjohn, and added that the point did not arise for decision. Later, in McPhail v Doulton, Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne agreed on the test, said that Lord Upjohn’s observations could not be regarded as an endorsement of the Broadway Cottages requirement in a case where that decision was directly attacked, doubted that anything Lord Upjohn said was directed to the test for trust powers, and held that the Broadway Cottages rule ought to be discarded.

Lord Hodson, who had agreed with Lord Upjohn in this case, said in McPhail that the observations were not strictly necessary to the decision here, and Lord Guest described that part of Lord Upjohn’s speech as obiter dictum while adhering to his concurrence with it. Both dissented on the new test.

Why does this case matter?

Students often quote a one-line certainty formula from this case without asking which kind of provision the House was dealing with, which Law Lord said it, and how much of the surrounding discussion the result needed. The answers to those questions change how much weight the formula can carry in a problem.

Exam and application relevance

Before applying the case, classify the provision in the problem: does the donee have a duty to distribute, or a discretion whether to exercise a power, and what in the instrument shows which? Then identify what is said to make the class uncertain: the meaning of the words, difficulty in deciding whether a person fits them, or the size of the class. Compare the words in your problem with the words before the House, and attribute each statement to the Law Lord who made it, because the House gave separate speeches and two of the five Lords only agreed with another.

This is an English decision of the House of Lords. It is persuasive authority in Australia and does not bind an Australian court. Cite the speeches by the name of the Law Lord.

Check your understanding

1. What was the question in the appeal, and what did the parties agree about the kind of power in cl 2(i) (Lord Reid; Lord Upjohn)?

2. Which words of cl 2(i) described the class said to be uncertain (Lord Upjohn)?

3. According to Lord Upjohn, what is the first task of the Court when a clause has been badly drafted, and what did he do with Harman J’s construction in Re Gresham?

4. What did Lord Reid say about a power and difficulty in deciding a particular case, and what example of a difficult question did he give?

5. Which Law Lords gave reasons, and which Lords said only that they agreed with Lord Upjohn?

6. What did Lord Donovan say about Lord Upjohn’s view that certainty about one person alone is not enough?