Certainty of objects: fixed trusts, discretionary trusts and powers
Classify the disposition first
First, work out what kind of disposition you have. The cases treat each kind differently, though this grouping just organises the cases rather than stating a rule from them.
A fixed trust: the trustee must give the property to the class in shares the instrument sets out.
A discretionary trust (also called a trust power): the trustee must distribute to the class, but chooses who gets what and how much.
A mere power: the holder may give the property to the class, but doesn’t have to. If unused, the property passes under a default clause, such as a gift over (as in Gulbenkian).
Which category a clause falls into depends on how it’s worded. In Gulbenkian, Lord Upjohn said this is “a matter of construction”, and that using the wrong kind of words isn’t decisive. This is a House of Lords decision, so it’s only persuasive in Australia, not binding.
The English tests (persuasive only)
In Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements, the House of Lords considered a mere power (a mere power lets trustees choose whether to give property to class members, but does not require it). The class included people living with or employed by the settlor’s son. Lord Upjohn said a power is valid if you can say with certainty whether any given person is or is not in the class; you need not list every member. Lord Reid added that a power is not invalid just because this test is hard to apply in a specific case. The House held the clause valid.
In McPhail v Doulton, all five judges agreed the clause created a discretionary trust (a trust where trustees must choose who among a class benefits), not a mere power. The judges split on the test for certainty of a discretionary trust. Lord Wilberforce, with Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne agreeing, rejected the old rule needing every object to be listable, and adopted the same “is or is not a member” test used for powers. Lords Hodson and Guest disagreed. The House sent the question of whether the deed met this test back to the Chancery Division.
The Court of Appeal later upheld the deed in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2). Sachs, Megaw and Stamp LJJ each explained the test differently, though they reached the same result.
Lord Wilberforce also identified three separate problems, as part of his reasoning. First, if the wording is too unclear for the court to resolve, the trust is void. Second, if the wording is clear but it’s hard to find where members are, the court can give directions to fix this. Third, if the class is clear but “hopelessly wide,” so it isn’t really a class at all, the trust fails as “administratively unworkable” (too broad for trustees to sensibly administer). His example was “all residents of Greater London.” He did not think “relatives” was this wide.
What the High Court has decided
In Kinsela v Caldwell, a settlor’s deed set a vesting day in 1984. If no named beneficiaries were then alive, trustees had to pay the capital to next-of-kin, worked out under the intestacy law in force that day. The settlor said this clause was void for uncertainty, meaning too vague to be a valid trust.
Three judges, in one joint judgment, rejected this argument. They said a trust is not uncertain just because you cannot know in advance who the actual beneficiaries will be. It is enough that the trust’s terms let you work out the beneficiaries with certainty once the vesting day arrives.[^cite:kinsela-v-caldwell-ascertainable-at-distribution]
They also said it is no problem if, later on, it is hard to tell whether one particular person fits the class description. The class itself just needs to be clearly described.
This decision binds lower Australian courts on what it actually decided. The High Court itself can later reconsider its own decisions.
But the decision has limits. The joint judgment adopts reasoning from Mahoney J at first instance, without that reasoning being set out directly. It does not cite the cases McPhail or Gulbenkian, and does not lay down a general test for discretionary trusts or mere powers.
Young J later said the High Court “did not deal with the present problem” in Kinsela. That problem was a fixed trust whose class of beneficiaries could not be fully listed.[^cite:west-v-weston-fixed-trust-modified-list-test]
Applying this in a problem question
Start by classifying the clause yourself. Ask whether it is a fixed trust, a discretionary trust, or a mere power. Do this by construing the actual wording, not by trusting the settlor’s label.
For a discretionary trust or a mere power, use the “is or is not” test. This asks whether a given person is or is not a member of the class. It comes from Gulbenkian and, by majority, McPhail, both House of Lords decisions, English and only persuasive here. Re Blyth applied it too, but that is a single judge’s decision and does not bind other courts. No High Court decision confirming this test is cited.
Next, apply Lord Wilberforce’s two questions. First, are the words themselves unclear? Second, is it merely hard to prove who the members are? On his reasoning, difficulty finding members is something the court can sort out later, on an application for directions, not true uncertainty. For a discretionary trust only, also ask whether the class is so wide it becomes administratively unworkable. His comments on this point concerned a trust; this article doesn’t say the same applies to a mere power.
For a fixed trust, start with Kinsela v Caldwell. It binds lower Australian courts, though the High Court could revisit it. There, a class fixed by a future distribution date was certain, and later difficulty working out who qualified was no objection. Whether beneficiaries must also be capable of being completely listed remains unsettled: see the English approach noted by Young J, his modification of it, Wilson J’s choice to leave the question open, and Ross J’s application of it to an intestate estate. All of these are single-judge decisions.
Always note the status of each authority you rely on. The only legislation mentioned here is s 33R of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), and no decision after 2017 on this issue is cited. So check the relevant legislation and case law for the actual State in your problem.
Self-check
Before moving on, check your work. Did you classify the disposition first, then pick the right test?
Remember that McPhail and Gulbenkian are English cases. They are persuasive only, not binding. The McPhail test also came from a majority, not every judge.
Check that you have stuck to what Kinsela v Caldwell actually decided. Do not say the High Court set a test if it did not.
Finally, treat West v Weston as one first-instance judge’s modification only. It is not a settled rule.
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