Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2)

Court of Appeal of England and Wales · 1973

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch 9 (CA); [1972] EWCA Civ 10

The executors argued that a staff trust for employees and their relatives and dependants could not meet the House of Lords’ test, because nobody can say with certainty who is not a relative. Did the trust survive?

What happened?

The Matthew Hall Staff Trust Fund was established by a deed dated 17 July 1941 made by Bertram Baden, then chairman and managing director of Matthew Hall Ltd, which had a pay roll of some 4,300 employees (Sachs LJ). Clause 9(a) directed the trustees to apply the net income of the fund in making grants at their absolute discretion to or for the benefit of officers, employees, ex-officers and ex-employees of the company, or to any relatives or dependants of any of those persons, in such amounts, at such times and on such conditions as they thought fit (Sachs LJ). Mr Baden died on 4 April 1960, and on 8 August 1962 his executors notified the trustees that they alleged the trusts were wholly void (Sachs LJ).

The trustees issued an originating summons on 14 January 1963 (Sachs LJ). Goff J held that the deed gave mere powers, the Court of Appeal by majority upheld that view but remitted the case in light of the House of Lords’ decision in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements, and the House of Lords then determined that the provisions constituted a discretionary trust and that the tests applicable as regards uncertainty remained the same as if the trustees had been given mere powers (Sachs LJ). It had been agreed that there was not enough material to decide whether those tests were met, so the case went back to the Chancery Division, where Brightman J, after a four day hearing and further evidence, held that there was no such uncertainty and that the trusts were valid (Sachs LJ).

The executors appealed again. They submitted that each of the words relatives and dependants imported such uncertainty that the trusts as a whole were void (Sachs LJ). Their counsel argued that the Court must be able to say whether any given postulant is not within the class as well as whether he is within it (Sachs LJ), that the words or is not in the House of Lords’ test have only one possible meaning, and that it would be impracticable for the trustees in many cases to ascertain that a particular person was not a relative (Megaw LJ). He expressly disclaimed any argument that either class was so large that the trusts were administratively unworkable (Sachs LJ).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Sachs, Megaw and Stamp LJJ) dismissed the executors’ appeal against Brightman J’s decision that the trusts were valid. Each Lord Justice delivered a separate judgment. The order was that the appeal be dismissed with both respondents’ costs on a party and party basis, and the discussion of leave to appeal to the House of Lords was adjourned until the next term (order at the end of the report).

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Sachs LJ said that in construing the House of Lords’ test “it is essential to bear in mind the difference between conceptual uncertainty and evidential difficulties”, and held it clear that “it is conceptual certainty” to which the test referred. He continued: “Once the class of persons to be benefited is conceptually certain it then becomes a question of fact to be determined on evidence whether any postulant has on inquiry been proved to be within it; if he is not so proved then he is not in it.”

The suggestion that such trusts could be invalid because it might be impossible to prove of a given individual that he was not in the class was, he said, “wholly fallacious”. He said that the word range in Lord Wilberforce’s reference to a survey of the range of objects has “an inbuilt and obvious element of considerable elasticity”, and read the reference as relating to the width of the field from which beneficiaries may be drawn, so that the trustees can adapt their methods of discretionary selection to it.

Applying the test, he found “no conceptual uncertainty inherent in” the word dependants, and, agreeing with Brightman J on relatives, held that “the widest meaning that has been suggested for that word does not in my judgment produce uncertainty”.

Megaw LJ said that “much too great emphasis” was placed in the executors’ argument on the words or is not. His own formulation was that “the test is satisfied if, as regards at least a substantial number of objects, it can be said with certainty that they fall within the trust”, even though for a substantial number of other persons the answer would have to be that “it is not proven whether they are in or out”. What is a substantial number, he said, is a question of common sense and degree in relation to the particular trust.

He reasoned that, because the House of Lords had rejected a test requiring the whole range of objects to be ascertained or capable of ascertainment, a trust for selection will not fail simply because the whole range cannot be ascertained, and he read the House’s criticism of the Court of Appeal in Gulbenkian as directed to the view that it was enough to show that one single person was within the class. He agreed with Lord Wilberforce’s remark that a discretionary trust for relatives was not administratively unworkable, which he described as obiter, and held that such a trust is not administratively unworkable.

Stamp LJ read the House of Lords as having rejected both the complete ascertainment test of Broadway Cottages and the Court of Appeal’s test in Gulbenkian, under which it was enough to find individuals who were clearly members of the class, so that validity depends on whether you can say of any individual that he is or is not a member of the class, and “the accent must be upon that word” any. He said that, if the matter rested there and relatives meant all descendants of a common ancestor, a trust of this kind “would not be valid”, because any survey of the range of objects would be incomplete and he could discern no principle on which such a survey could be conducted.

But, he said, the matter did not rest there. The older cases that Lord Wilberforce relied on in rejecting Broadway Cottages, such as Harding v Glyn, in which a discretionary trust for relations was executed by distribution to the next of kin, were part of the foundation of the House’s conclusion, and on that footing “The class of beneficiaries thus becomes a clearly defined class and there is no difficulty in determining whether a given individual is within it or without it.”

A trust for the next of kin of a person, without more, was a trust for his nearest blood relations, and to execute a discretionary trust for the relatives of a living person by distribution among them “appears to me a satisfactory method of so doing”. If it were necessary to construe relatives in an inter vivos settlement, construing it as a reference to nearest blood relations “would be far more likely to give effect to the intention” than a construction embracing all who were descended from one of his ancestors.

He added that he remained haunted by Lord Wilberforce’s reference to relations as a very wide class, but resisted the respondents’ invitation to go outside the question whether the trust was valid. On dependants, he held that the word connotes financial dependence in context, and that doubt about a sufficient degree of dependence is a question the court can determine and does not introduce linguistic uncertainty.

None of the three judgments refers to the reasons of another Lord Justice on the test.

Why does this case matter?

An answer on certainty of objects that stops at the House of Lords’ formulation leaves unexamined how that formulation works on the words of an actual deed. Relatives and dependants are everyday words in employee and family trusts, and this is the decision in which the Court of Appeal tested them on the very deed the House of Lords had remitted. An answer can go wrong by citing the case without saying which Lord Justice’s reasons it relies on.

Exam and application relevance

Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) is an English Court of Appeal decision, so an answer prepared for an Australian court should present it as persuasive English authority.

Cite each judgment by Lord Justice and say which Lord Justice’s reasons you are applying to the words in the problem. The Court dealt with the words relatives and dependants as they appeared in this deed, and a different instrument may use different words, so ask what the words in the problem are and which kind of uncertainty is alleged.

Check your understanding

1. Who heard the case on the remittal, and what did he hold (Sachs LJ)?

2. What did the executors say the words or is not required, and what consequence did they say followed for a class of relatives (Megaw LJ)?

3. What examples did Sachs LJ give of a conceptually uncertain class and a conceptually certain one, and what did he say follows once a class is conceptually certain?

4. Which two tests did Stamp LJ say the House of Lords had rejected, and what did he say about the accent in the test it adopted?

5. What did Stamp LJ say the word dependants connotes, and how did he treat doubt about the degree of dependence?