Kinsela v Caldwell

High Court of Australia · 1975

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

Kinsela v Caldwell (1975) 132 CLR 458; [1975] HCA 10

A settlor’s trust deed said that, twenty years on, if no family member named in it was alive, the fund would go to whoever the intestacy law of that future day would pick as next-of-kin. Is a gift void when nobody can yet say who will take?

Clarified by West v Weston [1998] NSWSC 419; (1998) 44 NSWLR 657

Young J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, called this case the only relevant Australian authority and said that the High Court did not deal with the problem before him: whether a fixed trust fails unless a complete list of its beneficiaries can be compiled. He went on to follow the English rule with a modification of his own for present-day Australian conditions. That is the view of a single judge at first instance.

What happened?

On 20 October 1964 the appellant, Mr Kinsela, made a deed of trust of shares in Charles Kinsela Pty Ltd, some of which he then owned and others of which he was entitled to in remainder through the estate of his father, Charles Henry William Kinsela, who was dead (at 460). In a suit in the Supreme Court of New South Wales the appellant, as plaintiff, claimed a transfer of shares that some of the present respondents held as trustees under the deed (at 460). Mahoney J made an order against which he appealed, and the Court said his claim could not succeed without destroying the operation of cl 4(d) of the deed (at 460).

Clause 4(d) provided that “If on the vesting day none of the named beneficiaries is living, the Trustees shall on that day pay and assign the capital and any undistributed income of the Trust to the next-of-kin of the Shareholder in the shares and proportions to which they would be entitled under the laws relating to intestate succession then in force if the Shareholder had died on the vesting day” (at 460). The vesting day was 1 January 1984, the shareholder was the appellant, and the named beneficiaries were the shareholder, his lawful wife from time to time or widow, and his sons, daughters and any remoter issue (at 461).

The deed defined the next-of-kin as the persons who would, if the shareholder died intestate on 1 January 1984, be entitled to a beneficial interest in the estate of the “Testator” under the law of intestate succession then in force; the Testator was the appellant’s father (at 461).

The appellant argued that cl 4(d) was void for uncertainty and, separately, that it was void under s 29B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) (at 460). On uncertainty he contended that it could not be known before 1 January 1984 to whom the shares would be assigned, that it was meaningless to refer to those entitled on an intestacy of a person who had died leaving a will, and that the domicile of the Testator was not stated, so that it was not known what law would identify his next-of-kin (at 461-462). The appeal was first argued before a Bench presided over by the late Sir Douglas Menzies, who died before judgment, and it was re-argued (at 460). The wife and children of the appellant were added as respondents so that they would be bound by the order (at 460).

What did the Court decide?

On 14 March 1975 the Court rejected both of the appellant’s arguments, on uncertainty and on s 29B, and ordered “Appeal dismissed with costs” (at 462).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In a single joint judgment, McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ held that cl 4(d) of the deed was not void for uncertainty. They said that “A trust is not uncertain merely because the actual persons to whom the distribution will be made cannot be known in advance of the date of distribution; it is sufficient that the provisions of the trust ensure that upon that date the beneficiaries can be ascertained with certainty”, and that Mahoney J had so held and they would, with respect, adopt as their own the reasons he gave for the conclusion (at 461-462).

They said that in 1964 the whole range of objects eligible for selection was made capable of ascertainment at the date of distribution, and that the possibility that there would be no such object in 1984, or no New South Wales law of intestate succession then, did not invalidate the trust, citing Re Hain’s Settlement (at 461-462). They added that there is no objection to a trust naming an artificial class of next-of-kin as beneficiaries, provided that the persons within that class can be ascertained at the date of distribution within the perpetuity period (at 461-462).

The Court answered the objection about the Testator’s domicile by recalling that he was dead when the deed was made, said that it was probably common ground when the deed was made that he had died domiciled in New South Wales, and read the deed as referring to those of his next-of-kin determined by the law of New South Wales as if the shareholder had himself died intestate on the vesting day (at 461-462). The Court also said that “it is no objection to a trust which describes a class that difficulty may arise at a future date in determining whether or not a particular person is within the description of the class”, because courts frequently ascertain, albeit with difficulty, who were the next-of-kin of a person long since dead (at 462).

It concluded that those to whom the trustee would be bound to assign the trust property on 1 January 1984 would at that date be ascertainable with complete certainty under the New South Wales intestacy law then in force, whatever had happened or might happen to the family of the Testator (at 462). The joint reasons do not discuss discretionary trusts or powers of appointment.

The Court also held that s 29B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) had no application whatever to cl 4(d). It said that the clause contains no limitation over at all and merely provides for a distribution among an ascertainable class of persons, and that the class makes no reference to the issue of the Testator, the shareholder or any person: the named beneficiaries are not the issue of the shareholder although such issue are included, and the next-of-kin may or may not be his issue (at 462). It agreed with Mahoney J that nothing in the clause was void or incapable of taking effect under that section (at 462).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 461–462 (opens in a new tab)

The sentence stating that a trust is not uncertain merely because the actual takers cannot be known before the distribution date, the application of it to cl 4(d), the answers to the three contentions and the conclusion that the clause was not void were each necessary to the rejection of the uncertainty argument, which was one of two alternative arguments (the other is s 29B) that the Court had to reject to dismiss the appeal. The Court adopted Mahoney J’s reasons for the conclusion.

Obiter · McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: pp 461–462 (opens in a new tab)

The proviso that an artificial class of next-of-kin must be ascertainable at the distribution date within the perpetuity period states a general condition. The judgment records no perpetuity objection and does not apply the condition to any contested point.

Proposition 2

Ratio · McTiernan, Stephen and Mason JJ (one joint judgment)

Read judgment: p 462 (opens in a new tab)

The appellant put two alternative arguments for destroying cl 4(d), uncertainty and s 29B (at 460). Either, if accepted, would have supported his claim, so the Court had to reject each to dismiss the appeal; the answer on s 29B is a separate ground of decision, necessary to the result alongside the answer on uncertainty.

Why does this case matter?

Certainty of beneficiaries is a topic in which students tend to reach for the nearest High Court sentence and apply it to other kinds of trust. Whether that works depends on the clause the Court was dealing with and the question it was asked, and a short joint judgment is easy to credit with more than it says.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a trust or gift to a class, identify what kind of clause is in issue and what exactly is said to make the takers uncertain: a future date, a description, or difficulty in proving who fits it. Set the clause in your problem beside the clause the Court considered before you say what the case can support, and cite the joint reasons by report page.

This is a decision of the High Court on one clause of a 1964 deed governed by New South Wales law. The Court applied s 29B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) as it stood in 1975, so check the provision in its current form before relying on that part of the case.

Check your understanding

1. What did cl 4(d) direct the trustees to do if none of the named beneficiaries was living on the vesting day, and what was the vesting day (at 460-461)?

2. What three contentions did the appellant make in support of the argument that the clause was uncertain (at 461-462)?

3. Whose reasons on the uncertainty question did the Court say it adopted as its own (at 461-462)?

4. Which English decision did the Court cite on the possibility that there would be no object in 1984 (at 462)?

5. What did the Court say about difficulty at a later date in deciding whether a person is within a described class, and what example of courts doing so did it give (at 462)?

6. Why did the Court say s 29B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) had no application to cl 4(d) (at 462)?