West v Weston

Supreme Court of New South Wales · 1998

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

West v Weston [1998] NSWSC 419; (1998) 44 NSWLR 657

A will divides the residue equally among the living descendants of four grandparents. Two years of genealogical research have found 1,675 people and more may exist. Can the gift stand if no complete list may ever be possible?

Clarified by Prosper v Wojtowicz [2005] QSC 177

In Prosper v Wojtowicz [2005] QSC 177 at [33]-[35], some parties urged Wilson J of the Supreme Court of Queensland to follow West v Weston and others submitted that it was wrongly decided. She said that it deals with a different problem from the one before her: in West v Weston a complete list of beneficiaries could not have been compiled at the date of the testator’s death, whereas in her case the difficulty arose from a later omission to keep a complete record of the class. She set out Young J’s reformulation of the rule, recorded that it had been “trenchantly criticised as contrary to principle and contrary to the High Court’s decision in Kinsela v Caldwell” in two works she cited, without saying that she agreed, and held that it was not necessary to decide whether West v Weston ought to be followed. Prosper is the decision of a single judge, and it neither adopts nor rejects Young J’s reformulation.

What happened?

Joseph William Castles died between 20 and 25 July 1994, aged 76, leaving no issue, with both parents predeceased and no brothers or sisters, grandparents, uncles or aunts, and no dependants (Young J, introduction). By his will of 30 May 1994, probate of which was granted to Mrs West on 19 January 1995, clause 4(b) directed his trustee to divide the balance of his residuary estate “equally (per capita) amongst such of the issue living at my death of my four grandparents”, whom the will named, “as attain the age of twenty-one (21) years”. His net estate was about $500,000, and Young J said that if the trust failed it would appear to go as bona vacantia.

The executrix, who had become the trustee, approached the Master for directions, and the Master authorised money to be spent on inquiries into who came within clause 4(b). Assisted by a genealogist and historical researcher she had found 1,225 people who qualified from the Castles side of the family and 450 Coghlans, and in the month between the case being set down for trial and its hearing the number of beneficiaries identified rose from 1,385 to 1,675. The searching had gone on for about two years, and Young J thought it possible that more claimants would come to light.

The evidence showed the executrix’s difficulties, including ex-nuptial children whose surnames bore no resemblance to anyone in the family tree. Master McLaughlin appointed the defendant to represent all the descendants of the four named grandparents who were living on 25 July 1994. The plaintiff executrix sought a determination of the validity of the trusts in the will, and the real question, Young J said, was whether the gift in clause 4(b) was valid.

Mr J B Whittle appeared for the plaintiff and presented the material the executrix had collected together with what Young J called a most scholarly dissertation of the law. Mr P Hallen SC appeared for the defendant. He did not dispute that Mr Whittle’s propositions were the law of England and agreed that there was no Australian authority that assisted the Court. He argued that, on a proper reading of some of the English decisions, the gift succeeded, and that the English decisions did not represent the law of Australia. Section 7(2) of the Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976 provides that a reference to issue is a reference to persons related in fact even if the relationship is traced through an ex-nuptial child, unless a contrary intention appears, and neither counsel argued that there was a contrary intention.

What did the Court decide?

Young J gave his reasons on 26 August 1998. He did not make final orders but published the reasons and stood the matter over for directions. His reasons proceed to the administration of the gift in clause 4(b). He indicated that the genealogist should bring her research up to date at 2 November 1998 and that an advertisement should be placed in a nationally circulating newspaper requiring everyone who claimed to be a descendant of the four grandparents to lodge a claim with the executrix’s solicitors by 2 November 1998.

He said he would list the matter on 24 November 1998 to give the executrix directions under s 63 of the Trustee Act 1925 that she would be justified in setting aside shares for people who might be legitimate claimants but had not yet fully satisfied her by evidence, and in distributing the balance to those who as at 2 November 1998 had satisfied her of their eligibility. He also said that people who trace their relationship through an ex-nuptial child fall within the class of issue and that people who were adopted do not qualify as issue; that he would declare that clause 3 gives the executrix 10 per cent of the residue after the payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses; and that the costs of all parties on the indemnity basis should be paid out of the estate.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Young J described the basal problem as the tendency of the relevant cases to show that “unless one can, with reasonable certainty, identify each and every beneficiary and the quantum of that beneficiary’s share, then the trust fails”. He accepted Mr Whittle’s submission that the present problem was one of evidential certainty, and he took the standard from Cross J in Re Saxone Shoe Co Ltd’s Trust Deed, who had declined to follow Re Eden and said that the court must be satisfied “that a complete list of the beneficiaries could probably be compiled”.

He called the defendant’s argument that, after extensive inquiries, a court deals in probabilities and not possibilities “a good argument as far as it goes”, but said that the genealogist’s researches showed “that more likely than not there are other people out there who have not yet been ascertained”. He said that the inquiry must be made as at the date of the trust, here the date of the testator’s death, assumed to be 25 July 1994; that what has in fact happened in the inquiries can be used to say what the probabilities were at that date; and that it did not seem to him that a deadline could now be set for the ascertainment of the beneficiaries.

He therefore could not accede to the defendant’s submission “at least in its starkest form”. Asking whether the English cases should be followed, he said that the certainty rules had been considerably modified for discretionary trusts by McPhail v Doulton but that the leading English texts had almost unanimously concluded that the rule still applied to fixed trusts, that there was a need for certainty in the law of trusts throughout the common law world, and that it would take very considerable arguments to persuade a single judge in equity in New South Wales not to follow that line, so that McPhail was not a sufficient reason to depart from the rule as Cross J stated it.

He found American, New Zealand and Irish materials consistent with the English rule, and said that the only relevant Australian authority was Kinsela v Caldwell, in which the unreported judgment of Mahoney J of 28 June 1973 seemed to him to show that generally the English line should be followed and the High Court “did not deal with the present problem”. He concluded that, unless there was some very good reason to the contrary, the English cases should be followed here.

Young J said that, although the authorities showed that he should follow the English rule, he would be justified in “slightly modifying its operation for Australian conditions of the present day”, and he stated the modified rule: “The rule will be satisfied if, within a reasonable time after the gift comes into effect, the court can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the substantial majority of the beneficiaries have been ascertained and that no reasonable inquiries could be made which would improve the situation.”

He said there were some reasons why the English cases should not be followed. First, a court of equity must always be “on the qui vive to realize that community circumstances have changed”, as the decision in Carmody v Delehunt (affirmed as Delehunt v Carmody) showed when equity followed an amendment of the statute law on joint tenancies. He contrasted the old system, in which marriages and land transactions were conducted openly and the registers of births, deaths and marriages were fairly good, with present conditions, in which marriage is not a prerequisite to having children, a child may be given a surname other than the father’s, unmarried parents often give the mother’s surname, and in remote areas and some Aboriginal communities births are not always registered, so that “All these factors produce greater uncertainties than would have been the case when the rules as to certainty were laid down.”

Furthermore, the rules on future interests had changed with the Perpetuities Act 1984, which turned attention from possibilities at the date of the instrument to a wait-and-see rule, as s 8 shows. He located the reason for the English rule in Mahoney J’s unreported reasons in Kinsela v Caldwell, quoting In re Astor’s Settlement Trusts and Lord Eldon in Morice v Bishop of Durham, that a court of equity does not recognise as valid a trust which it cannot both enforce and control, and said that this purpose “is, in modern conditions, just as well catered for by the modification I have made as is the rule in its original form”.

He added that it was better accommodated because, “instead of the testator’s intention being completely frustrated and the money passing as bona vacantia, at least 1,675 people who can be ascertained and do fit within the description will benefit as the testator intended notwithstanding that it might not be possible to make a complete list with certainty”. He then went on to deal with unregistered births, ex-nuptial children, missing beneficiaries and adoption, said that he believed little further could be done beyond an updated search and a national advertisement, and indicated the directions he would give.

Why does this case matter?

A gift to everyone descended from named ancestors is a familiar way of describing a class, and the difficulty of finding every member is a familiar objection to it. This is the decision of a single judge, and it is easy to cite it for more than it is. An examiner looks for an answer that says whose reasoning is being used, which court it came from, and how a later court has treated it.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a gift to a class defined by a description, first decide from the wording whether the trustee must divide the property among the members of the class or has a discretion over who takes and how much, because the argument before Young J, and his discussion of McPhail v Doulton, turned on that difference. Then identify what makes the class hard to list on the facts, when that difficulty existed, and what the evidence shows about how likely it is that the class has been, or can be, identified. Attribute each step to Young J by name. The decision is persuasive authority outside New South Wales.

Re Meyerstein [2009] VSC 564 (Ross J) applied Young J’s formulation in an application about the distribution of an intestate estate, so that decision does not itself concern the validity of a trust. The New South Wales statutes the judgment mentions, the Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976, the Perpetuities Act 1984 and the Trustee Act 1925, are mentioned as they stood in 1998; check the current provisions before relying on them in a problem.

Check your understanding

1. What did clause 4(b) of the will direct, and by reference to whom was the class defined?

2. How many people had been identified by the hearing, how long had the search gone on, and what did Young J say would happen to the estate if the trust failed?

3. Under the rule as Young J modified it, what must the court be satisfied of, to what standard, and within what time?

4. Whose words did Young J take as the standard of certainty, and what did he say about the date at which the inquiry must be made?

5. Why did Young J say that McPhail v Doulton was not a sufficient reason to depart from the English rule?

6. What did Young J say about Kinsela v Caldwell, and how did he describe the position of the English cases in the common law world?

7. Which changes in social conditions and in the law did Young J point to as reasons for departing from the English cases, and what did he say the rule was for?

8. Which steps did Young J indicate should be taken before the matter returned on 24 November 1998?