Re Blyth
Re Blyth [1997] QSC 30
A will left the residue to the Public Trustee to share among bodies it thought worked to end war or to lift living standards worldwide. The next of kin said the gift was too uncertain to stand. Were they right?
What happened?
James Frederick Blyth made his last will on 4 December 1937 at Colchester, England, and died on 28 August 1986 at Redcliffe, Queensland, with assets in England and Queensland worth more than $1.3 million (Thomas J, introductory passage). By clauses 2, 3 and 4 he made gifts to various persons, but all of them died in the 49 years between the will and his death. The Public Trustee of Queensland was granted an order to administer the whole estate on 17 January 1991 (Thomas J, introductory passage).
Clause 5 provided that after a period of accumulation the Public Trustee should hold the residue upon trust to distribute and divide it “in such manner as in his uncontrolled discretion he shall think fit among such Organizations as in the Public Trustee’s opinion are working for the elimination of war and also among such Organizations as in the Public Trustee’s opinion are formed for the purpose of raising the standard of life throughout the world”. The clause declared that the division was left entirely to the Public Trustee’s discretion and its decision on the method of division was final, and that any charities or organisations which considered that they had a claim and had not received any part had no claim against the Public Trustee or the estate (Thomas J, introductory passage).
The Public Trustee applied for construction of clause 5. A representative defendant, Mr Whitney, appeared for the next of kin and submitted that the gift failed and that the next of kin were entitled as on an intestacy. The United Nations Association of Australia, Queensland Incorporated (the UNAA) had indicated an interest as a body meeting the criteria in clause 5; after the Public Trustee advertised the criteria in The Courier Mail on 23 March 1996, under directions of Mackenzie J, no further response came.
The Court heard the next of kin, the UNAA, the Attorney-General for Queensland and the Public Trustee (Thomas J, introductory passage). The Public Trustee’s questions concerned whether the gifts were charitable. Thomas J thought there was an anterior question, whether the trustee had been given a valid discretionary power of appointment, and a question of choice of law, and he organised his reasons under six questions (Thomas J, introductory passage).
What did the Court decide?
Thomas J of the Supreme Court of Queensland, sitting alone, heard the application on 18 December 1996 and delivered reasons for judgment on 6 March 1997. His six questions were which law applied, whether there was a valid discretionary power of appointment, whether the gifts were charitable, whether any charitable intention was specific or general, whether a scheme was needed, and whether the estate went to the UNAA as the only possible donee (Thomas J, introductory passage). He treated the two descriptions in clause 5 separately, and said that the orders should include a determination on the validity of the gift of residue in respect of each description (Thomas J, Orders).
On the remaining questions he said that any charitable intention for the elimination of war purpose was general, that no scheme was needed, that it could not at that stage be said that the estate must go to the UNAA as the only possible donee although it was the only eligible donee to have emerged so far, and that it would be appropriate for the trustee to advertise more widely (Thomas J, questions 4 to 6). He said that the orders should also appoint Mr Whitney to represent the next of kin and direct that the costs of all parties be taxed on a solicitor and own client basis and paid out of the estate, and that he would hear submissions on the form of order (Thomas J, Orders).
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Thomas J concluded that two principles governed. First, questions of construction, in the sense of finding the testator’s intention from the meaning of the words used, were determined by the law of the testator’s domicile when he made the will, which was England, although he did not think there were relevant differences between the approaches of the courts of the two countries to that exercise. Second, the validity of the dispositions and the effect to be given to them were determined by the law of the testator’s domicile at death, so that the law of Australia, and where applicable of Queensland, applied (Thomas J, Choice of Law).
In the same part he treated the question whether the words amounted to a valid discretionary power of appointment as going to validity, and said that he would apply the law currently recognised in Australia on whether a power of appointment is void for uncertainty, bearing in mind that English cases continue to be of considerable value in the area. The parties accepted that the testator was domiciled in England when he made his will and in Queensland when he died, and the property was movable property in Australia and England.
Thomas J held that the Public Trustee had an exclusive power of selection: clause 5 did not require it to select every eligible organisation or to give equal shares, because the word divide often implies an equal division but its meaning is controlled by context, and because the closing words of the clause, that organisations which considered they had a claim and had received nothing were to have no claim against the Public Trustee or the estate, were a persuasive indication that the power of selection included the right to exclude organisations that might be eligible (Thomas J, Discretion to select).
He had little doubt that the discretionary power of selection was “a power in the nature of a trust”, because the residue was given to the trustee expressly upon trust, there was no gift over in default, and the testator plainly intended that the power of selection and appointment should be exercised; it was a special power, a gift to such member or members of a limited class as the trustee selected, and not a general power to appoint anyone (Thomas J, Trust or power).
He rejected a submission that the clause should be construed as a purpose trust, which could be valid only if charitable: a testator who confers a power of selection on a trustee and confines it only by a criterion or purpose may have no specific organisation in mind, and the gifts were to such organisation or organisations as the trustee might select (Thomas J, Not a purpose trust).
Thomas J said that the former rule, that a trust to select from a class failed unless the whole range of beneficiaries was ascertainable so that the trustees could consider all potential claims (IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust), was overruled in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts, which extended to trusts the less stringent rule that applied to powers in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements: it is now accepted that neither a trust nor a power fails merely because it is impossible to ascertain all potential members of the class, but it is still necessary to be able to say with certainty whether any given individual is or is not a member of the class (Thomas J, Certainty of object, citing Re Baden’s Deed Trusts at 456).
The degree of certainty required is “criterion certainty”, as distinct from “list certainty”, and the definition of the objects need not allow complete enumeration but should not be so hopelessly wide that the class is administratively unworkable (Thomas J, Certainty of object, citing Lord Wilberforce at 457). In Queensland, s 64 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) as it then stood provided that a power to appoint or a trust to distribute property, created by will, is not void as a delegation of the testator’s power to make a will if the same power or trust would be valid if created by an instrument made inter vivos.
Thomas J held that it removed the unduly restrictive approach to powers of appointment in wills taken in cases such as Tatham v Huxtable and the Lutheran Church case, with the result that a trust power of appointment in a will would be invalid only if too uncertain to be enforced by the courts (Thomas J, Certainty of object). He noted that Horan v James showed that, on the law of certainty as distinct from delegation of testamentary power, the New South Wales Court of Appeal regarded the Baden principles as acceptable, that J D Phillips J in McCracken v Attorney-General had been prepared to apply them, and that Gummow J in Herdegen v Federal Commissioner of Taxation had regarded the Baden explanation of the authorities with approval (Thomas J, Certainty of object).
His conclusion was framed cautiously: “I shall proceed on the footing that the law as stated in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts contains tests that may appropriately be applied in the present matter” (Thomas J, Certainty of object).
Thomas J thought it likely that there could never be list certainty of the organisations capable of being encompassed by either description, and said it seemed quite obvious that a world-wide search could never produce a satisfactory total list. He held that criterion certainty was nevertheless attainable for organisations working for the elimination of war: there were undoubtedly bodies that met the description, there was little doubt that the United Nations Association of Australia was one, and the criterion was clear enough to enable it to be said with certainty whether any given organisation was or was not a member of the class (Thomas J, Criterion certainty).
He had considerable doubts that the same could be said of organisations formed for the purpose of raising the standard of life throughout the world. He asked whether the description took in scientific organisations researching grain species or fish farms, organisations lobbying governments on the greenhouse effect, or environmental organisations taking a world-wide view, said that the phrase means different things to most people, and held that the notion amply met Lord Wilberforce’s test of being so hopelessly wide as to be administratively unworkable, so that the power of appointment for that description failed for uncertainty (Thomas J, Criterion certainty; Primary findings on question 2).
On the second gift he went on to hold that it could not be saved as a charitable gift: it was too wide and vague to identify any charity intended, the breadth and uncertainty of its non-charitable aspects with the lack of any clear charitable object revealed no significant charitable intention, and severing it under s 104 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) would remould the provision in a way that section did not contemplate (Thomas J, question 3, the raising the standard of life purpose).
Whether the elimination of war purpose would be charitable was considered only in the alternative, in case the primary conclusion on that gift was wrong, and he said that the trend of judicial interpretation suggested that the purpose should be regarded as within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, so that if the gift were invalid as a private trust it could be saved as a charitable trust (Thomas J, question 3, the elimination of war purpose).
He indicated that the orders should include a determination that the gift of residue was good and valid to the extent that it was a gift on trust to be distributed and divided among organisations that in the Public Trustee’s opinion were working for the elimination of war, and invalid insofar as it purported to be a gift on trust among organisations that in the Public Trustee’s opinion were formed for the purpose of raising the standard of life throughout the world (Thomas J, Orders).
Why does this case matter?
Students tend to meet this case as an Australian application of an English test to a will. Reading it shows how much the judge had to settle before reaching any certainty question, and how he described the test he applied. It also shows one clause being tested in two parts, with different results.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a gift to be shared among bodies or people that a trustee selects, begin with the instrument: decide whether the trustee is bound to distribute or free to choose whether to distribute, and what the words say about how the selection is to be made. Identify which law governs the construction of the words and which governs validity, and test each description of the class separately against the certainty test you are applying, saying whose test it is and what level of court has stated it.
This is a single-judge decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, persuasive in other Australian jurisdictions. The judge relied in part on s 64 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) as it stood in 1997. Section 64 was repealed in 2006, and s 33R of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld), in the compilation current as at 28 April 2026, now carries the corresponding rule; that is continuity, not a reversal of the reasoning. The charitable saving reasoning applied s 104 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld).
That Act has since been repealed by s 220 of the Trusts Act 2025 (Qld), and s 194 of the 2025 Act now deals with a trust whose purposes include both a charitable purpose and a non-charitable and invalid purpose. Thomas J’s reasoning on s 104 is therefore historical, and the transitional provisions and the present text should be checked before it is applied to a trust today. Check also the law of the State governing the will in your problem.
Check your understanding
1. When and where did Mr Blyth make his will, and what happened to the gifts in clauses 2, 3 and 4 (Thomas J, introductory passage)?
2. What did clause 5 direct the Public Trustee to do, and what did its closing words say about organisations that considered they had a claim (Thomas J, introductory passage)?
3. Which law did Thomas J say applied to construction and which to validity, and why did he treat the question whether the words made a valid power of appointment as one of validity (Thomas J, Choice of Law)?
4. What reasons did Thomas J give for saying that the Public Trustee had an exclusive power of selection and that it was a power in the nature of a trust (Thomas J, Discretion to select; Trust or power)?
5. What did s 64 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) provide as it stood, and what did Thomas J say it did to the approach taken in Tatham v Huxtable (Thomas J, Certainty of object)?
6. How did Thomas J describe his adoption of the tests in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (Thomas J, Certainty of object)?
7. What questions did he ask about the description of organisations formed for the purpose of raising the standard of life throughout the world (Thomas J, Criterion certainty)?
8. What did the judge say about the elimination of war purpose being charitable, and why did he say that discussion was strictly unnecessary (Thomas J, question 3)?