McPhail v Doulton

House of Lords · 1971

Equity And TrustsExpress Trusts

McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (HL); [1970] UKHL 1

A staff fund told its trustees to distribute income, as they saw fit, among employees and their relatives and dependants. The settlor’s executors said the class was too uncertain. What must a court be able to say about it?

Clarified by Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch 9 (CA); [1972] EWCA Civ 10

On the remittal of this deed the Court of Appeal (Sachs, Megaw and Stamp LJJ) applied the House of Lords’ test in Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2), and each Lord Justice explained it differently. Sachs LJ treated the is-or-is-not test as a test of conceptual certainty: once the class is conceptually certain, whether a person is within it is a question of fact to be decided on evidence. Megaw LJ said the test is satisfied if, as regards at least a substantial number of objects, it can be said with certainty that they fall within the trust, even though for other persons the answer may be that it is not proven whether they are in or out. Stamp LJ said that validity depends on whether it can be said of any individual that he is or is not a member of the class, not only of the person whose claim is being considered. A student who states the test should say which of these explanations is being used.

What happened?

Bertram Baden established a fund by a deed dated 17 July 1941 for the benefit, broadly, of the staff of Matthew Hall & Co Ltd (Lord Wilberforce). Clause 9(a) provided that “The Trustees shall apply the net income of the Fund in making at their absolute discretion grants to or for benefit of any of the officers and employees or ex-officers or ex-employees of the Company or to any relatives or dependants of any such persons in such amounts at such times and on such conditions (if any) as they think fit” (Lord Wilberforce). Clause 9(b) said the trustees were not bound to exhaust the income of any year in making such grants, and clause 10 said that all benefits were at the trustees’ absolute discretion and that no person had any right, title or interest in the fund otherwise than pursuant to the exercise of that discretion (Lord Wilberforce).

Baden died in April 1960. His executors claimed that the deed was wholly void, so that the fund was payable to his estate (Lord Hodson; Lord Wilberforce). The trustees began the proceedings in 1963 by originating summons in the Chancery Division (Lord Wilberforce). Goff J held that clause 9(a) gave a power and not a trust, and that on that footing it was valid (Lord Wilberforce). The Court of Appeal by majority upheld the decision that clause 9(a) conferred a power, but held that Goff J had applied the wrong test of validity for a power, the correct test being the one the House of Lords had stated in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement, and remitted the case to the Chancery Division (Lord Wilberforce). Russell LJ took the view that clause 9(a) was a trust (Lord Hodson; Lord Wilberforce).

The executors appealed to the House of Lords. Two questions arose: whether clause 9(a) constituted a trust or a power; and, if it was a trust, whether the existing test of validity, which stood on the Court of Appeal’s decision in IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20, was right in law and, if it was not, what the test ought to be (Lord Wilberforce). The respondents asked the House to review the Broadway Cottages decision and challenged its correctness (Lord Wilberforce).

What did the Court decide?

The House of Lords allowed the executors’ appeal. Lord Reid, Lord Hodson, Lord Guest, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Wilberforce each delivered a speech, and all five agreed that clause 9(a) constituted a trust for distribution and not a mere power (Lord Wilberforce; Lord Hodson; Lord Guest; Viscount Dilhorne). The House declared that the provisions of clause 9(a) constitute a trust and remitted the case to the Chancery Division to determine, subject to s 164 of the Law of Property Act 1925, whether clause 9 is valid or void for uncertainty (Lord Wilberforce; Lord Hodson). The House did not itself decide that question. Lord Wilberforce proposed that the appellants’ costs of the appeal, taxed on a common fund basis, be paid out of so much of the trust fund as was derived from Bertram Baden.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Lord Wilberforce took the basis of the Broadway Cottages principle to be that a trust cannot be valid unless, if need be, the Court can execute it, and that the Court can execute it only by ordering an equal distribution in which every beneficiary shares. He was prepared to assume, for present purposes, that validity depends on whether the trust can be executed by the Court, but said that “it does not follow that execution is impossible unless there can be equal division”.

Equal division among a wide class was, he said, “surely the last thing the settlor ever intended”. He examined the older cases, from Moseley v Moseley to Richardson v Chapman, in which the Court had executed discretionary trusts otherwise than by equal division, and concluded that they seemed to prove that the supposed rule as to equal division “does not rest on any principle inherent in the nature of a trust”. He then read Lord Upjohn’s remarks in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement, which the appellants had relied on as endorsing the earlier rule, and said that in a case where a direct and fully argued attack had been made on Broadway Cottages he could not regard those remarks as an endorsement of it, so that “we are free to review” that case.

His conclusion was that the wide distinction between the validity test for powers and the test for trust powers was “unfortunate and wrong”, that the Broadway Cottages rule “ought to be discarded”, and that the test for the validity of trust powers ought to be similar to the one this House had accepted in Gulbenkian for powers, namely that “the trust is valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class”.

He added that assimilating the validity test did not involve “the complete assimilation of trust powers with powers”: in the case of a trust power, “if the trustees do not exercise it, the Court will”, and the trustees ought to make such a survey of the range of objects or possible beneficiaries as will enable them to carry out their fiduciary duty. “A wider and more comprehensive range of enquiry is called for in the case of trusts powers than in the case of powers.”

Lord Wilberforce then made what he called two final points. The first was the distinction between “linguistic or semantic uncertainty which, if unresolved by the Court, renders the gift void”, and the difficulty of ascertaining the existence or whereabouts of members of the class, “a matter with which the Court can appropriately deal on an application for directions”. The second was that there “may be a third case” in which the meaning of the words used is clear but the definition of beneficiaries is “so hopelessly wide” that the trust is “administratively unworkable”. He hesitated to give examples but suggested “all the residents of Greater London”, and said that he did not think a discretionary trust for relatives, even of a living person, fell within that category.

Lord Reid gave a one-sentence speech adopting Lord Wilberforce’s reasons. Viscount Dilhorne agreed with Lord Wilberforce’s opinion and said that he entirely agreed with “his observations as to the tests to be applied to determine the validity of a trust”.

Lord Hodson, dissenting on the test, adhered to Broadway Cottages. He said that “a mere power is a different animal from a trust” and that the test of certainty for trusts, which stems from Morice v Bishop of Durham, “should not readily yield to the test which is sufficient in the case of mere powers”. He accepted that there was force in the argument that an equal division could lead towards absurdity, and regretted that the Court was driven to adopt a non possumus attitude where trustees fail to exercise a trust power, but he held it “impermissible to sanction” the authorisation by the Court of a scheme of distribution such as Lord Wilberforce suggested.

He concluded: “I still adhere to the view I have previously expressed in the Broadway Cottages case and in the Gulbenkian case as to the requirements for certainty in the case of the objects of a trust.”

Lord Guest, also dissenting on the test, agreed with Lord Hodson’s speech and added his own reasons. He said that the proposed assimilation was “a change of direction” from the opinion expressed by the majority in Gulbenkian in 1968, justified not on the ground that the earlier decision was plainly wrong but “upon the basis of expediency”. He regarded the relations cases as resting on an insecure foundation, said that if the objects are not ascertainable then to distribute among the known objects is to “take a narrower class than the settlor has directed”, and said that if saving trusts of this kind is desirable “the remedy is by legislation and not by judicial reform”.

Why does this case matter?

Problems on certainty of objects usually present a short clause and ask whether the trust survives, and McPhail is the English House of Lords decision on which such answers draw. An answer can go wrong by citing one sentence from the leading speech without saying whose speech it is, who adopted it, or that the House sent the validity of this particular deed back to the Chancery Division.

Exam and application relevance

McPhail is an English House of Lords decision on an English deed, so an answer prepared for an Australian court should present it as persuasive English authority.

Identify what the clause requires of the trustees before choosing a test. Cite each speech by Law Lord, and say whose reasons that Law Lord adopted or whether he wrote separately. Distinguish what the House decided about this deed from what individual Law Lords said about the way a trust of this kind should be tested, and ask what kind of uncertainty the problem actually alleges.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Court of Appeal’s majority decide about clause 9(a), and why did it remit the case to the Chancery Division (Lord Wilberforce)?

2. Which Law Lord wrote only a single sentence, and whose reasons did he adopt (Lord Reid)?

3. What did Lord Wilberforce say Lord Upjohn’s remarks in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement did and did not amount to, and what followed for the Broadway Cottages case?

4. Which kinds of uncertainty did Lord Wilberforce distinguish in his closing passage, and what consequence did he attach to each?

5. What did Lord Guest say was the way to bring about a change if it is thought desirable to save trusts of this kind (Lord Guest)?