Illegitimate pressure and the Australian law of duress

What pressure counts as duress in Australian contract law: the inducement and illegitimacy questions, pressure to the person, goods and commercial interests, the limits set by refusal to deal and good-faith enforcement, and the open question whether lawful pressure can be illegitimate.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
vitiating-factors

Learning outcomes

  • Separate the question whether pressure induced a contract from the question whether the pressure was illegitimate, and say what Australian authority supports each.
  • Apply the Australian decisions on threatened breach of contract, refusal to deal and good-faith enforcement of rights to decide whether commercial pressure is duress.
  • Explain why it is open in Australia whether pressure that is itself lawful can be illegitimate, and say what the High Court, the New South Wales, Victorian and Western Australian courts and the English Supreme Court have each said.

The existing article on duress states the elements; this one asks what the pressure must be like before an Australian court treats it as duress, and where the contested boundary lies. It states the common law as applied by Australian courts. The High Court’s plurality in Thorne v Kennedy (2017) gave authoritative guidance on the nature of duress but left the central boundary open, and the appellate decisions on that boundary cited here come from New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland; no appellate decision from South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory or the Australian Capital Territory is cited here, so the position there is not stated. English decisions are persuasive only, and no statute is covered.

Two questions: inducement and illegitimacy

The High Court has said that the vitiating factor of duress “focuses upon the effect of a particular type of pressure on the person seeking to set aside the transaction”.1 In Thorne v Kennedy the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ) added that duress does not require that the person’s will be overborne, and that a person subjected to it is usually able to assess alternatives and make a choice, submitting to the demand knowing “only too well” what he or she is doing. Those statements describe the doctrine; the Court decided the appeal on undue influence and unconscionable conduct, not duress.

The House of Lords in Universe Tankships produced the formulation that Australian courts still work from.2 Lord Scarman, who dissented on how the principles applied to the facts, described two elements: pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim, and the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. He said the pressure must be one whose practical effect is “compulsion or the absence of choice”. Lord Diplock, whose speech prevailed on the duress point, left open when commercial pressure that coerces a weaker party may nonetheless be legitimate. It is an English decision, persuasive only in Australia.

As quoted by Payne JA in Elite Realty Development Pty Ltd v Sadek and by the Court in Karam, McHugh JA said in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 that the proper approach is to ask whether any applied pressure induced the victim to enter into the contract, and then whether that pressure went beyond what the law is prepared to countenance as legitimate.56 Crescendo itself is described here only as those two decisions quote it. Presenting the cases in terms of those two questions, inducement and then illegitimacy, is a way of organising them.

Duress to the person

Threats of violence are the paradigm. In Elite Realty, Mr Afyouni was the subject of a gun attack by Mr Dennaoui, and the primary judge found that Mr Sadek either procured the attack or acted in a common design to bring it about. Soon afterwards Mr Afyouni and Mr Sadek agreed to terminate a property development joint venture. The primary judge found that Mr Afyouni entered the termination agreement under duress, and the Court of Appeal recorded that no appeal was brought from that finding. The issue decided on appeal was affirmation, which this article leaves to the article on rescission, affirmation and the bars.

The Court recorded that the primary judge’s statement of principle was not challenged and did not re-examine it. It included an objective question, whether it was reasonable for the person alleging duress to believe the other would take the action foreshadowed. Payne JA (Mitchelmore and Stern JJA agreeing) said that psychiatric illness is not co-extensive with duress in a contractual or restitutionary sense, and that a person can suffer from a psychiatric illness with the ability to make decisions freely intact.

Duress to goods, and threatened breach of contract

The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy described the history: the early common law rule required an unlawful threat or conduct in relation to the person’s body, and duress in relation to goods was a basis for restitution of a payment but not for avoiding an agreement. The abandonment of that restriction introduced the question whether any unlawful threat suffices or whether other illegitimate yet lawful threats might.1 The Court in Karam records that the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 298 rejected the distinction between duress to the person and duress of goods; Hawker Pacific is described only as Karam reports it.6

In Furphy v Nixon (1925) 37 CLR 161, purchasers paid vendors the sum demanded under a threat of cancellation of the contract, part of the sum being admittedly not due under it. Isaacs J held that the vendors had exerted pressure under a threat “sufficient to alarm a reasonable man in the position of the purchasers and thereby to coerce his will”, and the High Court dismissed the appeal.4 It concerned recovery of an overpayment, not avoidance of a contract.

In Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd the Western Australian Court of Appeal applied duress to a refusal to supply gas. McLure P (Newnes JA agreeing) said that an actual or threatened breach of contract is unlawful conduct for the economic duress doctrine, that the question is whether pressure was “applied”, not whether threats or demands were made, and that the sellers’ genuine belief that they were not in breach did not preclude duress; she held the sellers’ breach was illegitimate pressure that made the buyer’s later agreements voidable.8 But on further appeal a majority of the High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) held that the long-term agreement did not oblige the sellers to supply the gas in the circumstances that arose, and found it unnecessary to decide the economic duress and restitution issues.10 The Court of Appeal’s finding of breach, on which its application of duress depended, was set aside, so this article uses McLure P’s statements as statements of principle only, not tested in the High Court, and not as an illustration that a refusal to supply is duress.

When pressure is not illegitimate

Refusing to deal is not, without more, duress. In Smith v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38 a miller sued to recover a surcharge it had paid to the Wheat Harvest Board, whose manager had said the Board did not contend it had a legal right to it, after the Board said that otherwise it would decline to do further business with the miller. The High Court allowed the appeal from a judgment for the miller. Isaacs J said that a mere abstention from selling goods except on condition of a stated payment cannot, in the absence of some special relation, answer the description of compulsion, however serious the payer’s situation arising from other circumstances may be.3 This article relies on Isaacs J’s reasons only; the other Justices wrote separately. Charlick is a common law decision on recovering a payment. In Thorne v Kennedy Nettle J noted that Karam had been said to be consistent with it, and said that even if it were, equity’s power to relieve against illegitimate pressure exerted by lawful means had by then become established, so Charlick does not decide whether equity will relieve against the same pressure.1

A good-faith threat to enforce one’s rights is likewise treated cautiously. In Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd, a guarantor said he signed because the supplier threatened to support a winding up application against his company. Nettle JA (Victorian Court of Appeal) said that it is generally not improper pressure to threaten recovery proceedings in good faith to persuade a debtor to pay what is due, though a threat to bring a proceeding the creditor knows to be groundless, or brings for an improper purpose, may be improper.7 Tate JA said that a payment made in response to a threat of legal proceedings in a commercial context by a party with a bona fide belief in its entitlement is, in general, not coerced or compelled, and Redlich JA agreed with both. This article does not treat Beerens and McLure P’s statement about genuine belief in Woodside Energy as one rule about good faith; they concern different conduct.

Pressure that is itself lawful

The unsettled question is whether pressure that consists of lawful conduct can be illegitimate. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Karam (the Court, Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA) said that the vagueness of “economic duress” and “illegitimate pressure” could be avoided by treating duress as limited to threatened or actual unlawful conduct, which can be directed to a party’s legitimate commercial and financial interests, and that where the conduct is not unlawful the agreement might still be set aside for undue influence or for unconscionable conduct based on special disadvantage.6

The High Court has not resolved the point in the decisions cited here. In Thorne v Kennedy the plurality found it unnecessary to address the arguments for or against the Court of Appeal’s view, or whether recognising duress by lawful acts adds anything to unconscionable conduct.1 Nettle J, separately, said that Karam had by and large been followed without demur, that it was not necessarily doctrinally valid, and that it was a significant departure from the preponderance of relevant Australian authority. No later High Court decision resolving the point is cited here, so check for one before relying on this.

Intermediate courts have not spoken with one voice. In SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119, Doyle JA (Mullins P and Brown JA agreeing) said that the law is “somewhat unsettled”, that Karam could not be said to be an unchallenged view of the common law, and that the Court was free to prefer the wider Crescendo approach, at least extending what is unlawful for economic duress to threatened or actual unconscionable conduct.11 His Honour found it unnecessary to decide the precise limits because the agreement was set aside for unconscionable conduct under the Australian Consumer Law, which is not stated here; the statements on duress were not necessary to the decision. In Woodside Energy McLure P said that lawful pressure may be illegitimate if there is no reasonable or justifiable connection between the pressure and the demand it supports, while Murphy JA said the view in Karam appears to him correct but that it was unnecessary to decide.8

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has recognised lawful act duress in English law, and its members differed on how widely. Lord Hodge (Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreeing) said that the courts developed it by treating as illegitimate conduct that equity judged to make enforcement unconscionable, and that it has so far been recognised in two circumstances: a defendant using knowledge of criminal activity by the claimant or a close family member to obtain a personal benefit by a threat to report it or initiate a prosecution, and a defendant who has exposed himself to a civil claim deliberately manoeuvring the claimant, by means the law regards as illegitimate, into vulnerability so as to force a waiver of the claim; he said extensions call for caution.9 Lord Burrows would have held that a demand that the other party waive a claim is unjustified where it is made in “bad faith” and the threatening party has deliberately created or increased the other’s vulnerability to it; Lord Hodge regarded that as going beyond the cases in which the doctrine had succeeded. That is persuasive only in Australia, and both approaches treated success in a commercial negotiation as rare.

Causation and onus

In Woodside Energy McLure P said, as a statement of principle not tested in the High Court, that the illegitimate pressure need not be the sole reason for entering the contract; it is sufficient if it is one of the reasons.8 The Court of Appeal in Elite Realty recorded the primary judge’s approach, which was not challenged: the person alleging duress had the onus of proving illegitimate pressure when he entered the agreement, and the other party then had to prove the pressure did not cause him to enter it, the primary judge citing Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 at 120 (Lord Cross). Barton v Armstrong is mentioned only as the Court of Appeal records it. The finding that the duress was at least one reason for entering that agreement was also unchallenged.5 The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy observed, without deciding, that where duress is otherwise shown an inference of causation is readily drawn if the transaction cannot reasonably be accounted for by ordinary motives.1

Where this article stops

Rescission, affirmation and the bars to relief are for the article on those topics, and undue influence and unconscionable dealing have their own articles. The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy also left aside a person taking the benefit of a transaction procured by a third party’s duress, so that position is not stated.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify what the pressure was and who applied it: a threat or conduct to the person, to goods or property, or to commercial interests.
  2. Ask whether the pressure induced the contract or payment, saying that the cases cited here treat it as enough that it was one of the reasons, and that the onus approach in Elite Realty was recorded without challenge, not re-examined.
  3. Ask whether the pressure was illegitimate. If the conduct was unlawful, such as a threatened breach of contract, say so, noting that the statement that threatened breach is unlawful conduct comes from Woodside Energy, whose application did not survive the High Court’s decision on breach; whether a threatened cancellation is unlawful depends on whether the party had a right to cancel, and Furphy v Nixon is a particular example of an involuntary payment under a threat of cancellation of the contract.
  4. If the conduct was lawful, say that the High Court has left open whether lawful pressure can be illegitimate; state the Karam limit and the views in SHRL Ventures, of McLure P and of Nettle J that go further, and identify the court you are in, since the intermediate decisions cited here come from four States and SHRL Ventures did not need to decide the point.
  5. Test the facts against the limits: a refusal to deal without a special relation (Charlick, Isaacs J) and a good-faith threat to enforce rights (Beerens) were not treated as duress; the English decisions are persuasive only.
  6. Plead undue influence or unconscionable conduct in the alternative, and leave the consequences of duress to the article on rescission and the bars.

Self-check

  • Have I said that the High Court’s statements on duress describe the doctrine and were not the ground of decision?
  • Have I said that lawful act duress is open in Australia, which courts have said what, and that SHRL Ventures did not need to decide it?
  • Have I said that the High Court set aside the finding of breach on which the Court of Appeal’s application of duress in Woodside Energy depended?
  • Have I attributed the Crescendo test as quoted in later decisions, treated the English decisions as persuasive only, and identified the jurisdiction?

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