Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria · 2012

ContractVitiating Factors

Beerens v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 209; (2012) 39 VR 1

A supplier told a company’s director it would back another creditor’s winding-up application unless he signed a personal guarantee. The application proved to be an abuse of process. Was the guarantee obtained by illegitimate pressure?

Qualified by Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 49

The plurality in Thorne v Kennedy said at [26] that duress focuses on the effect of a particular type of pressure and does not require that the person’s will be overborne or that the pressure deprive the person of free agency or the ability to decide; a person under duress is usually able to assess alternatives and make a choice, and a choice made according to interest does not exclude duress. Thorne did not mention Beerens and did not decide whether pressure by lawful means can be illegitimate ([29]). It bears on one part of Nettle JA’s reasoning: the question at [46] whether a transaction is the product of a wish to compromise rather than the overbearing effect of the demand on the debtor’s mind cannot be read as requiring an overborne will. Nettle JA’s conclusion on good faith recovery proceedings and the other judges’ reasons are not touched.

What happened?

BlueScope Distribution Pty Ltd (BlueScope), formerly Smorgon Steel, was a distributor of steel products that supplied Griffiths & Beerens Pty Ltd (the company), which made chainsaw guide bars and sprockets and timber harvesting equipment; Mr Beerens was its director (Nettle JA at [9]). After a dispute over BlueScope’s Conditions of Sale, BlueScope stopped supply on 18 June 2007, and the parties then agreed a payment plan in July and August 2007 ([5], [21], [22]). Clause 6.6 of the Conditions of Sale allowed BlueScope, if a purchaser company was presumed insolvent under the Corporations Act, to withdraw credit and require immediate payment of all moneys owed ([51]).

Proline Private Limited, a Singapore company and customer of the company, issued a statutory demand that the company failed through an oversight to contest, and on or about 2 October 2007 issued a winding up application ([25]). On or about 8 October 2007 BlueScope restricted supply to cash on delivery, relying on cl 6.6 and the presumption of insolvency under s 459C(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ([27]). About a week after the application was filed, BlueScope’s credit manager, Mr Persaud, came unannounced to the company’s office and told Mr Beerens, the trial judge found, that if he wanted to get off cash on delivery terms he would have to sign a guarantee and that otherwise BlueScope would “get on the back of the winding up proceeding” ([28]).

The trial judge accepted the evidence of Mr Beerens and Mr Gwynne about that meeting over Mr Persaud’s denial of any threat (Tate JA at [133]). Mr Beerens consulted a solicitor, who advised that if BlueScope supported the application the company would lose the solvency hearing and be wound up, and the solicitors then negotiated the terms of the guarantee ([29]-[34]). Mr Beerens signed it, saying that BlueScope’s threat to join the winding up proceeding forced him to, and the trial judge accepted that evidence ([35]). BlueScope resumed supply on credit on 30 October 2007 ([36]).

The company went into receivership on 10 September 2008 and was wound up on 11 September 2008 on the application of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation ([9], [37]). In December 2008 Efthim AsJ dismissed Proline’s application, which he found to be an abuse of process (Tate JA at [130]). BlueScope sued Mr Beerens on the guarantee and indemnity in the County Court and obtained judgment for $164,358.07 and $272,209.92 ([8]). Mr Beerens appealed, arguing among other things that the guarantee was voidable for economic duress ([40]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal of Victoria (Nettle, Redlich and Tate JJA) dismissed the appeal. Nettle JA would dismiss it ([89]), Redlich JA agreed that it should be dismissed for the reasons Nettle JA and Tate JA had each given ([90]), and Tate JA concluded that it should be dismissed ([213]). The economic duress grounds failed ([50], [174]), and so did the grounds about the debt, the construction of the guarantee, the price and the failure to mitigate (Nettle JA at [59], [71], [79], [88]; Tate JA at [123], [205], [212]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Nettle JA agreed in large part with the primary judge. He said that, assuming cl 6.6 of the Conditions of Sale was engaged, BlueScope was entitled to demand payment of all amounts outstanding and to refuse to supply on credit unless and until a guarantee was provided, and that there was nothing improper about BlueScope demanding that on this occasion ([42]). He said: “Generally speaking, it is not improper pressure to threaten recovery proceedings, including bankruptcy and winding up proceedings, in good faith in order to persuade a debtor to pay what is due” ([43]).

He then turned to the further question whether BlueScope’s threat to support a winding up application brought by another creditor, Proline, which was later found to be an abuse of process, was itself improper pressure, and said that the primary judge, although he did not expressly deal with the argument, was right to reject it: the argument that, because the Proline application was improper, BlueScope’s threat to support it was improper too ([44], [45]). He said: “If a creditor makes a threat to bring a proceeding which the creditor knows to be groundless or for an improper purpose, the threat is improper and may impose improper pressure sufficient to vitiate a transaction or payment of which it is a substantial cause” ([46]).

He added that, where a creditor threatens something unlawful that it believes it is lawfully entitled to do, there are circumstances in which the law will regard the threat as improper pressure, but in a commercial context those circumstances are likely to be rare; that it is not unlawful to support an application to wind up a company, and nothing in authority or principle supports the view that it is improper pressure to do so where all that is known of the application’s validity is that the debtor disputes it; and that, even where there is improper pressure, it will not necessarily vitiate the transaction, because that depends on whether the transaction is the product of a wish to compromise in order to avoid the burden of disputing the demand, as opposed to the overbearing effect of the demand on the debtor’s mind ([46]).

On the facts he found no reason to infer that BlueScope knew the Proline application was improper, since there was no evidence that it knew more of the application’s validity than that the company disputed it for the reasons its solicitor gave ([47]). He concluded that BlueScope’s threat was not shown to be other than a threat to invoke winding up process in good faith in order to recover amounts which were or would accrue due to it; that any pressure was no more than the pressure of knowing that BlueScope could justly succeed in having the company wound up on the basis of those amounts even if Proline’s application were invalid; and that Mr Beerens’s decision to sign was not shown to be other than a decision to compromise BlueScope’s claim ([48]). He was strengthened in that conclusion by the fact that Mr Beerens took legal advice before signing and that the solicitors then negotiated the terms of the guarantee ([49]).

Tate JA recorded that the challenge under the head of economic duress consisted of three related claims: that the pressure amounted to unconscionable conduct, that BlueScope breached a contractual obligation of good faith, and that its conduct was analogous to knowingly assisting a breach of fiduciary duty ([137]). On the first claim, Mr Beerens accepted that BlueScope had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the facts that made the Proline application an abuse, but said that BlueScope knew the company asserted an improper purpose and that the assertion might have some justification, so that it was under a duty at least to satisfy itself that Proline was acting genuinely before using the application as leverage ([139]-[141]).

Tate JA found two flaws in that submission. First, the basis of illegitimacy had not been put at trial as a breach of a duty to inquire, so the trial judge made no findings about BlueScope’s knowledge or inquiries, BlueScope was deprived of the opportunity to call evidence on those questions, and Mr Beerens ought not be permitted to raise the issue on appeal ([144]-[147]). Second, the submission did not identify the scope of the alleged duty to inquire ([148]).

Tate JA said that illegitimate pressure will amount to economic duress, as McHugh JA characterised it in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, “if it consists of unlawful threats or amounts to unconscionable conduct” ([145]). The company’s failure to set aside the statutory demand within 21 days gave rise to a presumption of insolvency that enlivened BlueScope’s rights under cl 6.6, and the trial judge found that BlueScope bona fide believed it was entitled to repayment of the debts the company owed it ([149]).

Tate JA agreed with BlueScope’s submission that its threat amounted to no more than a statement that, unless the guarantee was signed, it would exercise its rights under cl 6.6 to demand immediate payment and become a supporting creditor in the winding up application ([149], [150]). Tate JA said: “In general, a payment made in response to the threat of legal proceedings in a commercial context by a party with a bona fide belief in its entitlement is not coerced or compelled” ([151]), and that BlueScope’s threat to exercise its contractual rights bona fide, and join as a supporting creditor, “can scarcely be different from a bona fide threat to sue” ([152]).

Tate JA noted Mr Beerens’s evidence that he had legal advice that the company would not be able to prove solvency if BlueScope or any other supporting creditor joined the Proline application, said that the participation of a genuine creditor would have been fatal to the company’s capacity to resist the application and that the company would have been wound up regardless of any conduct on behalf of BlueScope or of the outcome of the claim made by Proline, and held that the company’s presumptive insolvency, together with the risk that it could not prove its solvency independently of the Proline claim, justified BlueScope in protecting its own commercial position by obtaining the guarantee, and that “the threat to engage in a lawful act in a commercial context in pursuit of a bona fide claim, in the exercise of contractual rights, did not amount to unconscionable conduct” ([153]).

On the second claim, Tate JA noted that the primary submission was that the unconscionability lay in BlueScope’s threat to join the tainted Proline application, and that the secondary submission was that BlueScope was constrained by an obligation to enable the company to have the benefit of the Credit Agreement made in 2007, or alternatively to act in good faith ([154]). Tate JA referred to the High Court’s emphasis on the primacy of express terms and on precision about the content and application of an alleged implied obligation of co-operation or good faith, and to the High Court’s leaving open in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council the debate over an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing ([159]-[162]).

Tate JA agreed with BlueScope’s submission that the term contended for would negate BlueScope’s rights under cl 6.6 and be at odds with the plain terms of the Conditions of Sale ([163], [164]). Tate JA did not accept that, as the law currently stands, the content of any implied obligation of good faith in the exercise of contractual rights requires compliance with an overriding standard of reasonableness that would deny BlueScope the exercise of its rights under cl 6.6 in the promotion of its legitimate commercial interests when the conditions for the exercise of those rights are met ([167]).

Tate JA considered in any event that BlueScope’s reliance on the Proline application was not unreasonable and not unlawful ([168], [169]), and that the good faith submission was not pleaded, particularised or raised at trial and should not be raised on appeal ([170]). Nettle JA, who also rejected the implied obligation arguments, said that they were not advanced below and it was too late to advance them on appeal ([53]); that the implied duty to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract is informed by the express terms and is not a duty to act generally in the other party’s best interests ([54]); and that any implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing over and above that duty would not have restricted decisions and actions reasonably taken to promote BlueScope’s legitimate interests ([55]).

On the third claim, Tate JA said that knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty requires knowledge falling within one of the first four categories in Baden, as the High Court held in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, and that the evidence at most supported the fifth category, knowledge of circumstances that would put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry, which does not suffice ([171]-[173]). Tate JA concluded that the grounds based on economic duress or illegitimate pressure failed and that the guarantee and indemnity was enforceable ([174]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Nettle JA

Read judgment: [42]–[45] (opens in a new tab), [47]–[50] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are Nettle JA’s reasons for rejecting the economic duress grounds (Grounds 15 and 16), which were necessary to the conclusion that the guarantee was not voidable ([50]).

Classification unresolved · Nettle JA

Read judgment: [46] (opens in a new tab)

Paragraph [46] states the improper-threat rule applied at [47]-[48] and the compromise-versus-overbearing question applied at [48], but also contains observations about unlawful threats believed lawful and their rarity in commercial settings that the reasons do not apply because supporting a winding up application is not unlawful; a single label would hide that.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Tate JA

Read judgment: [143]–[153] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are Tate JA’s reasons for rejecting the unconscionable conduct claim, the first of the three claims made under the head of economic duress, and they are necessary to Tate JA’s conclusion that the duress grounds fail ([174]).

Separate reasoning · Tate JA

Read judgment: [144]–[148] (opens in a new tab)

Tate JA’s reasons that a duty to inquire was not put at trial and has no identified scope are Tate JA’s own route to rejecting that argument; Nettle JA instead found on the evidence that there was no reason to infer BlueScope knew the Proline application was improper ([47]), and Redlich JA agreed with the reasons each gave ([90]).

Proposition 3

Ratio · Tate JA

Read judgment: [163]–[164] (opens in a new tab), [167]–[170] (opens in a new tab), [173] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are Tate JA’s reasons for rejecting the good faith and knowing assistance claims, which were the second and third claims made under the head of economic duress ([137]).

Separate reasoning · Nettle JA

Read judgment: [53]–[57] (opens in a new tab)

Nettle JA reaches the same result on the implied obligation arguments by his own reasons, including that they were raised too late ([53]); Redlich JA agreed with the reasons Nettle JA and Tate JA each gave ([90]).

Why does this case matter?

Problems about commercial pressure often involve a creditor or supplier who uses a legal right as leverage to obtain a guarantee, a release or a payment. This decision gives an examiner a set of facts that can be altered one detail at a time: what was threatened, what the threatening party knew and believed, what the other party faced, and what advice and negotiation preceded the signature. An answer that attributes each step to the judge who took it will be more reliable than one that refers to the Court of Appeal in general.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where a guarantee, release or payment follows a threat to use legal process or contractual rights, identify what exactly was threatened and whether it was lawful, what the threatening party believed about its entitlement and what it knew about the validity of any proceeding it threatened to support or bring, what the other party faced if the threat was carried out and what practical alternatives were open to it, and whether the other party took legal advice and negotiated terms. Then ask which of the grounds argued in this case the facts engage (illegitimate pressure, unconscionable conduct, an implied obligation of good faith, and the analogy to knowing assistance) and attribute each point to Nettle JA or Tate JA by paragraph.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Victoria, so it is binding on lower Victorian courts and persuasive elsewhere. Check later authority on lawful-act pressure before relying on it in a current problem. The Corporations Act provisions the judges describe are stated as they stood when the case was decided, so check the current text before relying on them.

Check your understanding

1. What did Mr Persaud tell Mr Beerens at the meeting a week after the winding up application was filed, and whose account of it did the trial judge accept ([28], Tate JA at [133])?

2. What had happened to the Proline application by December 2008, and what did Mr Beerens accept about BlueScope’s knowledge of the facts that made it an abuse (Tate JA at [130], [139])?

3. Which proceedings did Nettle JA say a creditor may threaten in good faith without improper pressure, and what did he say about a threat to bring a proceeding the creditor knows to be groundless or for an improper purpose ([43], [46])?

4. According to Nettle JA, what does the question whether improper pressure vitiates a transaction depend on ([46])?

5. What two flaws did Tate JA find in the submission that BlueScope was under a duty to inquire ([143]-[148])?

6. Which categories of knowledge did Tate JA say suffice for knowing assistance, and which category did Tate JA say the evidence at most supported ([171]-[173])?

7. What did Redlich JA say about the reasons of Nettle JA and Tate JA ([90])?