Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344; (2005) 64 NSWLR 149
A family company in crisis is offered more credit by its bank, but only if its owners sign papers that put their homes at risk. When does a hard bargain like that become pressure the law will not tolerate?
Qualified by Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 49
In Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49 the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ) described as a difficult question whether duress should rest on any unlawful threat or conduct or whether other illegitimate yet lawful threats or conduct might suffice ([27]). They found it unnecessary to address the arguments for or against Karam’s conclusion that duress at common law requires proof of threatened or actual unlawful conduct, or whether recognising lawful act duress adds anything to the doctrine of unconscionable conduct ([28]-[29]). Nettle J, agreeing in the orders, said that Karam’s rejection of illegitimate pressure by lawful means was not necessarily doctrinally valid and was a significant departure from the preponderance of relevant Australian authority, but that detailed argument and deep consideration of the ramifications of departing from Karam would be needed before the High Court would contemplate that course ([70]-[73]). The High Court has therefore not decided whether Karam’s approach is correct.
Qualified by SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119
In SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119 Doyle JA (Mullins P and Brown JA agreeing) said that the law in Australia on the limits of illegitimate pressure is somewhat unsettled ([71]), that Karam’s formulation had been followed largely without close analysis ([73]), and that, given the divergence of views, the Karam approach cannot be said to be an unchallenged view of the common law and the Court was free to prefer the wider approach in Crescendo Management, at least extending what is unlawful for economic duress to threatened or actual unconscionable conduct ([81]). He said that if it were necessary he would uphold the primary judge’s conclusion that the agreement was the product of economic duress, but that it was unnecessary to determine the precise limits of conduct that can be unlawful for duress, because relief rested on unconscionable conduct ([86]-[87]). Those observations on duress were not necessary to the decision. SHRL is a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal.
What happened?
Karam Bros Footwear Pty Ltd (the Company) was a family company whose shareholders were two brothers, Charles and John Karam, and their wives, Diane and Nada; the brothers were its directors, as the wives had been until 22 February 1993 ([1], [47]). In 1980 the four Karams each signed what were described as unlimited guarantees of the Company’s indebtedness to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (the Bank), supported by a mortgage over the Regents Park factory land and by mortgages over the brothers’ homes that had originally secured home loans ([11], [37]).
The Company later borrowed heavily to buy land and build a new factory at Ingleburn and, by 1992 and 1993, was under financial stress and struggling to pay its creditors ([14], [15]). In early June 1993 its cheques were being dishonoured and it needed further accommodation urgently ([74], [83]). On their own evidence the Karams believed at that time that their homes, and probably the Regents Park property, were not security for the Company’s debts ([86]).
A Bank diary note of 9 June 1993 recorded advice from the Bank’s solicitors that the Bank had a possible exposure to risk on the 1980 guarantees and the mortgages lodged in support of them, and that the solicitor had then provided an Acknowledgment, to be signed by all the guarantors after independent legal and financial advice, stating that the existing securities covered present and future liabilities to the Bank ([82]). The Bank’s decision to provide further accommodation was subject to conditions that included each Karam signing the Acknowledgment ([83]).
The four Karams signed it on 10 June 1993, after a meeting with their solicitor, Mr Marsden, that the primary judge found lasted around 15 minutes, and Mr Marsden had not been given the security documents the Acknowledgment listed ([84], [85]). On 1 October 1993 they signed a cross-deed of covenant, accompanied by certificates of independent legal and financial advice, under which each signatory undertook to pay the Bank what was owing and unpaid by the other signatories ([33], [117]).
The brothers sold their homes in November and December 1993 and the Bank received the proceeds in 1994 ([20]). In November 1995 the Bank appointed a receiver and manager to the Company ([21]).
Santow J, in the Equity Division, found that the Acknowledgment and the cross-deed of covenant were procured by the Bank “unconscionably and by the exercise of economic duress”, and declared them void and set them aside ([33]). He had concluded that the pressure was illegitimate because it derived from the Bank exploiting the financial vulnerability of the Company and the Karams in their desperate financial circumstances ([93]). The Bank appealed against his orders and the Karams cross-appealed ([2], [3], [145]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA) allowed the Bank’s appeal. It held that the declarations about the 1993 documents (declarations 15 to 17) could not be supported ([137]) and that judgment should have been given for the Bank against each respondent in the amount of $3,729,049.89, to be recalculated for interest ([141], [143]). It dismissed the Karams’ cross-appeal and ordered the Company and the Karams to pay the Bank’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the Equity Division ([146], [147]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court (Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA, in a single set of joint reasons) set out Lord Scarman’s statement in The Universe Sentinel that duress has two elements, “pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim” and “the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted” ([48]), and traced McHugh JA’s treatment of illegitimate pressure in Crescendo Management, in terms in which the other members of that Court did not join, which counted unlawful threats and unconscionable conduct as illegitimate ([52]-[53]), and the later cases ([55]-[58]).
It said that care must be taken in using a phrase such as economic duress, which may have an ordinary meaning broader than its legal counterpart ([47]), and that “How the doctrine of economic duress fits with the equitable doctrines is unclear”, the concepts of illegitimate pressure and unconscionable conduct lacking clear meaning, if they do not refer to equitable principles, outside possibly the field of industrial relations ([61]). It framed the question as whether the doctrine operates where the conduct in question is not in some sense unlawful, noted Professor Beatson’s observation that The Universe Sentinel was not a case involving a threat of lawful action, and said that “the principled approach is to adopt equitable principles relating to unconscionability”, as McHugh JA had suggested in Crescendo Management and Kirby P in Equiticorp, so that a weaker party may invoke undue influence, or unconscionable conduct where it suffers from a special disadvantage in the sense identified in Amadio, and may have relief where a statute permits ([62]).
It accepted Kirby P’s view, in dissent in the result in Equiticorp, that a principled approach should in effect abandon the term economic duress ([57]). At [66] it said that the vagueness inherent in the terms economic duress and illegitimate pressure can be avoided by treating duress as “limited to threatened or actual unlawful conduct”, which need not be directed to the person or property of the victim narrowly identified but can be to the legitimate commercial and financial interests of the party; that if the conduct or threat is not unlawful the agreement may nevertheless be set aside for undue influence, actual or presumptive, or for unconscionable conduct based on an unconscientious taking advantage of special disability or special disadvantage in the Amadio sense; and that where a statutory provision such as s 51AA, s 51AB or s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) engages the power to grant relief, a broader range of circumstances may be taken into account ([66]).
The Court added that the statutory use of the word legitimate in relation to a party’s commercial interests tends to strengthen the argument against the generic term illegitimate pressure ([67]).
The Court (Beazley, Ipp and Basten JJA, in joint reasons) held that the primary judge’s finding that the Bank imposed illegitimate economic pressure was not supportable ([96]). It said that the absence of practical choice is only one of the two elements of economic duress and that the critical issue was whether the pressure the Bank placed on the Karams was illegitimate; the Bank’s case was that it was offering an indulgence, further credit, in return for improved security ([94]).
Once it was accepted, correctly, that the perilous financial circumstances of the Company were “not the Bank’s doing”, there was no basis for saying that the Bank, in a legal sense, subjected the Karams to pressure: it was the Karams who were seeking additional credit, without which the Company would have to cease trading, and the Bank was under no obligation to extend the credit facilities already granted, nor to do so without securing its own position ([95]). The implication of deviousness in the Bank’s seeking to have the Karams sell their own properties had to be viewed in light of the history, in which the Karams had themselves promised to sell property to pay down the Company’s debt and the Court inferred that, by June 1993, the Karams and the Bank were equally aware that the choice was to sell the remaining properties or to recognise that the Company was insolvent ([96]).
The Court also held that the primary judge’s conclusion that requiring a solicitor’s certificate was deceptive and unconscionable was not supportable, because the discussion between Mr Marsden and the Karams on the morning of the signing gave ample basis for inferring that they were very much aware of the choice they were being required to make, between preserving their homes and preserving the Company’s business ([97]-[98]). It added that the Karams were not in a position of special disadvantage vis-a-vis the Bank in the sense that the Bank knew the true circumstances and they did not, because the Company was their own and their knowledge of its financial circumstances was the same as the Bank’s ([47]), and that the fact that one party is in financial difficulties, of which the other party is aware, “will be relevant, but not sufficient” to establish unconscionable conduct by the stronger party: “Something more is required and may be sought in the terms of the particular transaction”, and “The greater the financial risk, the greater the justification for increased security” ([68]).
On the cross-deed of covenant signed on 1 October 1993, it found nothing in the material to support the conclusion that its execution was attended by unconscionable conduct: the Court said the primary judge’s conclusion appeared to rely on the June finding and on treating the parlous financial state of the business as itself a form of illegitimate pressure, and on failing to recognise that the Karams had received financial and legal advice from persons with relevant expertise, with the relevant materials available to them and, by the Bank’s concession, the time they required ([123]-[124]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Beazley JA, Ipp JA and Basten JA (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [62]–[66] (opens in a new tab)
The Court adopted the approach in [62] and [66] as its answer to the primary judge’s broader approach ([63]) and found no unlawful or unconscionable conduct by the Bank ([73]). It also held independently, on the facts, that the Bank did not in a legal sense subject the Karams to pressure ([95]-[96]), so the orders did not depend on the choice of approach alone. A plain ratio label would overstate the part the choice played in the result, and a plain obiter label would understate that the Court applied it. Later courts treat the choice as contested: see the notes on Thorne v Kennedy and SHRL Ventures.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Beazley JA, Ipp JA and Basten JA (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [93]–[98] (opens in a new tab)
The Court’s rejection of the primary judge’s finding of illegitimate economic pressure ([96]) and of his conclusion about the solicitor’s certificate ([97]-[98]) is the ground on which the declarations that the June 1993 documents were procured by economic duress were set aside ([137]).
Ratio · Beazley JA, Ipp JA and Basten JA (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [123]–[124] (opens in a new tab)
The conclusion that the execution of the cross-deed of covenant was not attended by unconscionable conduct, with the reasons given at [123], is the ground on which the cross-deed and accompanying documents were held enforceable according to their terms ([124], [137]).
Ratio · Beazley JA, Ipp JA and Basten JA (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [47] (opens in a new tab)
The Court’s reasons for finding that the Karams were not in a position of special disadvantage in the Amadio sense form part of its rejection of the unconscionable conduct case.
Why does this case matter?
Questions on duress often ask a student to classify pressure that falls short of a threat to do something plainly wrongful, such as a lender insisting on better security before it will keep a business afloat. Karam is the New South Wales appellate decision on a bank in that position, and High Court Justices and State appellate judges have since measured their own views against it. Students often write about how little choice the borrowers had and stop there; an examiner wants the facts weighed against the doctrine, and this case supplies a dense set of facts to practise on: a deadline, a solicitor, and a bank protecting its own position.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a bargain made under commercial pressure from a lender or supplier, identify what the stronger party did or threatened, who created the weaker party’s difficulties, what the weaker party understood and what advice it had. Cite the Court’s statements by paragraph ([62], [66], [95]-[96]).
This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. It binds courts within the New South Wales hierarchy and is persuasive elsewhere. Later courts have responded differently to its approach to the limits of duress, so state the position of Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49, of Murphy JA in Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2013] WASCA 36 at [159], and of SHRL Ventures Pty Ltd v Pedro-X Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 119, rather than treating Karam as the whole answer.
The judgment applies the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) as they stood in 2005; check the current text of the legislation before relying on those parts of the reasoning.
Check your understanding
1. Which judges sat, and whose name does the judgment carry ([1])?
2. What did the Bank’s solicitors advise on 9 June 1993, and what did the Bank then require each Karam to sign ([82], [83])?
3. What did Santow J find about the Acknowledgment and the cross-deed of covenant, and what did the Court of Appeal say about those findings ([33], [137])?
4. What two elements of duress did the Court take from Lord Scarman’s speech in The Universe Sentinel ([48])?
5. What did the Court say at [61] about how the doctrine of economic duress fits with the equitable doctrines?
6. What did the Court say at [66] about the vagueness of the terms economic duress and illegitimate pressure, and about conduct or a threat that is not unlawful?
7. Why did the Court say there was no basis for saying that the Bank, in a legal sense, subjected the Karams to pressure ([95])?
8. What did the Court say about the financial and legal advice the Karams had before they signed the cross-deed of covenant ([121]-[123])?
9. What did the plurality in Thorne v Kennedy say about Karam at [28]-[29], and what did Nettle J say at [70]-[73]?