Australia Estates Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland · 2005

ContractVitiating Factors

Australia Estates Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council [2005] QCA 328

A buyer’s solicitor confirms a settlement date once a council’s decision notice has issued. A revised notice follows, and the buyer says both sides had misread which notice counted. Does that undo the agreed date?

What happened?

By a contract dated 9 May 2003, Cairns City Council (the Council) agreed to sell land in Grafton and Lake Streets, Cairns, to Australia Estates Pty Ltd (Australia Estates) for $3,000,000, with some of it to be leased back to the Council ([26]). The contract was subject to the purchaser obtaining the Council’s approval of its application to develop the land, and the Council was both the vendor and the local government acting as assessment manager ([27], [29]). Under cl 2.8 and cl 2.9 of the special conditions the purchaser had five business days from receipt of the decision notice to tell the vendor whether the conditions of the approval were satisfactory, and could terminate if they were not; if it did not terminate in that time it was deemed to have given notice that they were satisfactory. Under cl 5.1 the completion date was 60 days after cl 2 was satisfied ([28], [30]).

Under the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) (IPA) the Council issued two decision notices on 26 July 2004, one a preliminary approval with conditions and the other the approval of a development permit, and Australia Estates received them on 30 July ([32]). On 2 August 2004 it made representations to change a condition about car parking. If the assessment manager agreed with any of the representations, it had to give a negotiated decision notice, which replaced the decision notice previously given ([33], [34]).

On 9 August the purchaser’s solicitors accepted that the development permit was an approval for the purposes of cl 2 ([36]). On 13 August the Council’s solicitors proposed that the date of their letter be taken as the date on which cl 2 was satisfied and that completion be on 12 October 2004, with time of the essence ([39]). On 18 August the purchaser’s solicitor wrote “I confirm the settlement date as 12 October 2004” ([40]). The Council decided the representations on 26 August and issued a negotiated decision notice making slight changes on 31 August ([34]).

On 8 October 2004, four days before the agreed date, Australia Estates contended for the first time that the negotiated decision notice, and not the decision notice, was the approval for the purposes of the contract, so that completion was due on 25 October ([41]). Settlement did not occur on 12 October, and on 13 October the Council terminated the contract ([42]). Australia Estates lodged a caveat over the land ([5]). The primary judge refused its application for a declaration that the contract was not lawfully terminated and ordered that the caveat be removed ([6]). On appeal Australia Estates argued that it had received development approval only when the negotiated decision notice issued, and that in agreeing to vary the contract on 18 August 2004 both parties had acted under a common mistake as to the effect of the contract, so that the varied contract should be set aside ([7]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Jerrard JA and Atkinson J) dismissed the appeal with costs ([13], [25], [77]). Each judge gave separate reasons and each concurred in the order.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

All three judges concluded that the appeal failed because no mistake relevant to the variation was shown. McMurdo P said that special condition cl 2.9 emphasised the purchaser’s right to terminate if the terms of the approval were unsatisfactory to it, and that its solicitor’s agreement on 18 August 2004 that settlement would be on 12 October 2004 must objectively be taken as an acceptance that the terms of the approval then held under the decision notice of 26 July 2004 were satisfactory and as agreement to the variation ([9]).

That decision notice had not been replaced by a negotiated decision notice and remained a valid development approval on that date ([10]), and there was “simply no evidence that the parties acted under any common mistake” ([11]). Jerrard JA said that there was no fact about which any party was mistaken on 18 August 2004, when no negotiated decision notice had been made and the application for one might have been refused ([16]); that the date of 12 October 2004 was fixed irrespective of either possible construction of the contract ([18]); that the solicitor’s evidence, if accepted, established “only a period of ignorance of the relevant law, not any common or unilateral mistake of fact” ([19]); and that the proper construction of the contract was that the parties objectively intended not to include a negotiated decision notice as a decision notice referred to in cl 2 ([20]).

Atkinson J held that, under ss 3.5.17 and 3.5.19 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld), a negotiated decision notice becomes the development approval from the time it issues and not before, and replaces the earlier notice from then, without meaning that the earlier notice never had effect ([69]). The contract refers only to the decision notice and makes its receipt the trigger for the steps in cl 2 ([70], [73]), so that when the variation was agreed the only approval was the decision notices of 26 July 2004 and there was “no operative mistake” ([71]).

She added that any mistake about when approval was given was not about a fundamental term of the agreement to vary the completion date but was, at most, one that motivated that agreement ([75]), and that on the test in Taylor v Johnson the Council did not believe that Australia Estates was labouring under any such error and did not deliberately set out to keep it from becoming aware of one ([76]).

Atkinson J set out the principles from Solle v Butcher on which the appellant relied ([44]) and observed that Solle v Butcher had been overruled in England by Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd, a decision of which the parties had been unaware and on which they were given leave to file further submissions ([45]). She summarised Great Peace as requiring five elements for a common mistake to avoid a contract at common law, and as holding that there is no equitable jurisdiction to rescind for common mistake a contract that is valid and enforceable at common law ([48]-[50]).

Treating decisions of United Kingdom courts as useful only to the degree of the persuasiveness of their reasoning ([51]), she considered that the persuasiveness of the reasoning in Great Peace, Heydon JA’s negative reference to Solle v Butcher in Harris v Digital Pulse, and the “somewhat qualified approach” taken to Solle v Butcher by the High Court (whose treatment of it she reviewed at [53]-[62]) suggested that “the law as stated in Great Peace Shipping should be applied by this Court in preference to the law as stated in Solle v Butcher” ([52]).

She said that the correct question was whether the agreement was void at common law for common mistake, to be answered by the five elements in Great Peace, and stated: “There is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside, on the ground of common mistake, an agreement, which is valid and enforceable at common law” ([64]). Her Honour also said that the appellant would fail even if the Solle v Butcher test applied ([63]) or if the test were that in Taylor v Johnson ([65]-[66], [76]).

Jerrard JA agreed with Atkinson J’s reasons ([14]) and, at [25], with her analysis of the law, other than that he considered Cooper v Phibbs to be a case of mistake, even at common law, in which only an equitable remedy was appropriate. McMurdo P, having found no evidence of any common mistake, said that it was unnecessary to consider the effect in Australia of Great Peace ([11]). Later courts have considered this part of the reasoning. In In the matter of Border Express Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 769, Attiwill J declined to follow Australia Estates insofar as the majority stated in obiter that there is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside a contract on the ground of common mistake, saying that this is contrary to the High Court’s decision in Taylor v Johnson ([184]-[186]); and in Croser v Croser [2025] SASCA 145 Livesey P, who would have dismissed the appeal, said that the ruling in Australia Estates was by way of obiter dicta and would have declined to follow it until the High Court determines otherwise, while S Doyle JA, with whom Bleby JA agreed, said that clarity about the existence and extent of an equitable jurisdiction under Australian law to set aside a contract for common mistake must await further guidance from the High Court.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McMurdo P, Jerrard JA and Atkinson J, each in separate reasons concurring in the order

Read judgment: [9]–[11] (opens in a new tab), [16]–[21] (opens in a new tab), [69]–[75] (opens in a new tab)

Each judge gave separate reasons for dismissing the appeal because no relevant mistake was shown when the variation was agreed on 18 August 2004 (McMurdo P [9]-[11]; Jerrard JA [16]-[21]; Atkinson J [69]-[75]). This was the ground of decision; the three routes differ in detail, so agreement in the order does not adopt every step of each judge.

Ratio · Atkinson J

Read judgment: [65]–[66] (opens in a new tab), [76] (opens in a new tab)

Atkinson J’s alternative ground, that the appellant would also fail on the test in Taylor v Johnson because the Council did not know of any mistake and did not deliberately keep Australia Estates from discovering one, was an independent reason for dismissing the appeal on her reasoning; neither of the other judges addresses that test.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Atkinson J (Jerrard JA agreeing with her analysis of the law, subject to the Cooper v Phibbs exception at [25])

Read judgment: [44]–[52] (opens in a new tab), [63]–[64] (opens in a new tab), [14] (opens in a new tab), [25] (opens in a new tab)

The preference for Great Peace over Solle v Butcher and the statement that there is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside, for common mistake, a contract valid and enforceable at common law were not necessary to dismiss the appeal, because Atkinson J found no mistake on any of the three tests she considered ([63]-[66], [71], [76]) and Jerrard JA’s own reasons rest on the absence of any mistake ([16]-[24]). Later courts also describe the passage as obiter.

Classification unresolved · McMurdo P

Read judgment: [11] (opens in a new tab)

McMurdo P found no evidence of any common mistake and said it was unnecessary to consider the effect in Australia of Great Peace; she neither adopted nor rejected Atkinson J’s analysis of the law, and a binary label would conceal that she expressly left the question undecided.

Why does this case matter?

Land-sale disputes in which both sides misunderstood something tempt a student to treat a shared misunderstanding as enough to undo the bargain. This case is useful for practising the questions that come before that step: what exactly each side was mistaken about, when the mistaken belief was said to operate, whether the contract itself already dealt with the later event, and whether the problem concerns the original contract or a later variation of it.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem in which both parties are said to have misunderstood something, identify the agreement said to be affected and the date on which it was made, what each party believed on that date, and what the contract said about the matter. Attribute each statement to McMurdo P, Jerrard JA or Atkinson J, who gave separate reasons, and ask of each statement whose reasons it is in and whether that judge needed it to dismiss the appeal.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland. It binds the lower courts of that State and is persuasive elsewhere. Courts in other States have since considered part of its reasoning, so check how the courts of the relevant State, and the High Court, have dealt with that reasoning before relying on it. The decision also turns in part on ss 3.5.15 to 3.5.19 of the IPA as quoted in the judgment; check the current Queensland planning legislation before applying that part of the reasoning.

Check your understanding

1. What did cl 2.9 of the special conditions allow the purchaser to do if the approval was granted on unsatisfactory terms, and what was it deemed to have given if it did not act within five business days ([3], [28])?

2. What did the Council’s decision notices of 26 July 2004 contain, and what did Australia Estates ask the Council to change on 2 August 2004 ([32], [34])?

3. What did the Council’s solicitors propose on 13 August 2004, and what did the purchaser’s solicitor write on 18 August 2004 ([39], [40])?

4. When did Australia Estates first contend that the negotiated decision notice was the approval, and what did the Council do on 13 October 2004 ([41], [42])?

5. What did McMurdo P say the purchaser’s solicitor’s agreement on 18 August 2004 must objectively be taken to be, and what did she say about the decision notice of 26 July 2004 on that date ([9], [10])?

6. What did Jerrard JA say the solicitor’s evidence about his unfamiliarity with the IPA established ([19])?

7. When did Atkinson J say a negotiated decision notice becomes the development approval, and what did she say about the earlier decision notice ([69])?

8. What reservation did Jerrard JA state to his agreement with Atkinson J’s analysis of the law, and what did McMurdo P say it was unnecessary to consider ([25], [11])?