Common mistake and the allocation of risk

How Australian courts treat a claim that both parties shared a false assumption: ask first what the contract promised, as in McRae and Svanosio, then what is left for equity, with the English Great Peace and its divided reception in Queensland, Victoria and South Australia kept distinct from High Court authority.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
vitiating-factors

Learning outcomes

  • Explain why a common mistake claim begins with what the contract promised, using McRae and Svanosio.
  • State, with the right attribution, what the High Court reasons read leave open about equitable relief for common mistake.
  • Use Great Peace as persuasive English authority, and the divided Queensland, Victorian and South Australian treatments of it as persuasive only, without presenting any of them as High Court law.

Common mistake is the case where both parties share the same false assumption about a fact, and the prior question for a student is not “was the assumption fundamental?” but “did the contract itself say who bears the risk that the assumption was false?”. This article states common law and equitable principles from two High Court decisions, which bind lower Australian courts on what they decided, together with one English Court of Appeal decision, which is persuasive only in Australia, and Australian decisions below the High Court, which are persuasive outside their own States. It does not examine any statute, and it does not repeat the treatment of unilateral mistake, mutual mistake, non est factum and rectification in the article on mistake. In both High Court decisions cited here a claim of common mistake was answered by asking what the contract promised, and in neither was the contract held void.

Start with what the contract promised

In McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 3771 the Commission advertised for tenders for “an OIL TANKER lying on JOURMAUND REEF, which is approximately 100 miles NORTH OF SAMARAI”, and accepted the plaintiffs’ tender. The High Court found that there was no oil tanker at or near that location, and that the Commission’s officers had no better foundation for supposing they had one to sell than what Dixon and Fullagar JJ called “mere gossip”. The Commission’s defence was that the contract was void because both parties were mistaken about the tanker’s existence.

Dixon and Fullagar JJ, in the joint judgment, rejected that defence. Their reasons can be separated into three steps; the steps are a way of organising the reasons, not the judges’ own numbering.

  • The question is one of construction. Their Honours, speaking of whether a promisor is excused from performance by existing or supervening impossibility, said that the common law “has always regarded the fundamental question as being: ‘What did the promisor really promise?’”. They held that the only proper construction of the contract was that it included “a promise by the Commission that there was a tanker in the position specified”, so that the Commission was in breach and the plaintiffs were entitled to damages.
  • No implied condition that the tanker existed. Their Honours held it was impossible to imply such a condition precedent, because the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances excluded it and the buyers had relied on the Commission’s assertion that there was a tanker.
  • Even if the case is treated as one of mistake. Their Honours quoted the statement of Denning LJ in Solle v Butcher that neither party can rely on his own mistake to say a contract was a nullity from the beginning, and said: “But, even if this be not wholly and strictly correct, yet at least it must be true to say that a party cannot rely on mutual mistake where the mistake consists of a belief which is, on the one hand, entertained by him without any reasonable ground, and, on the other hand, deliberately induced by him in the mind of the other party”. They said it “seems out of the question” that the Commission, whose officers had no reasonable ground for their belief and had asserted the tanker’s existence, should be able to assert that no contract was concluded.

McTiernan J concurred in the conclusions “that there was a contract, that it was not void for mistake” and that the plaintiffs should recover damages for breach. Dixon and Fullagar JJ also held, on the assumption that a contract was made, that a clause selling the goods “as and where they lie with all faults” could not help the Commission, because what was sold was an “oil tanker”.

Svanosio: a common mistake assumed, and the contract not void

In Svanosio v McNamara (1956) 96 CLR 1862 a purchaser bought land with a hotel and licence, believing that the hotel stood wholly on the land sold. After completion it emerged that about one third of the building stood on unalienated Crown land. The purchaser sought to have the contract and conveyance declared void or set aside for common mistake. The High Court dismissed his appeal.

Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said that it might be assumed that all parties believed the hotel stood wholly on the land sold, so that there was a “common mistake”, but “these facts do not make the contract void”. As there was no fraud or misrepresentation, “the position must depend on the terms, express and implied, of the contract”, and the description of the property involved a promise to convey the whole of the land on which the hotel was erected. McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ gave separate joint reasons. They said that if the contract “contemplates and makes provision for such a misdescription of the land sold how can it be said that it is void or voidable for common mistake”, and that “the proper principle appears to be” that, for a completed contract of sale, rescission for common mistake is possible only where, contrary to the belief of the parties, “there is nothing to contract about”. That was their view of the principle in that case, not a general test.

Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said that, after conveyance, equity will not undo a sale of land unless there has been fraud or a total failure of consideration, or something amounting practically to that, and that “generally speaking, and in the absence of misrepresentation” a purchaser who omits the ordinary precaution of a survey may fairly be regarded as doing so at his own risk.

Equity: what the High Court reasons cited here leave open

If a common mistake does not make the contract void, the question is whether equity will set it aside. The High Court reasons cited here give no confident answer.

  • Dixon CJ and Fullagar J in Svanosio. They said that there may be cases of “mistake” in which it would be so inequitable to hold a party to the contract that equity would set it aside, with no rule laid down a priori, but that it is “difficult to conceive any circumstances in which equity could properly give relief by setting aside the contract unless there has been fraud or misrepresentation or a condition can be found expressed or implied in the contract”.
  • Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ in Taylor v Johnson. In a case of unilateral mistake, their Honours3 quoted that passage and said that “Presumably” Dixon CJ and Fullagar J were referring to fraud “in the wide equitable sense which includes unconscionable dealing”, and that, if they were not, “we do not share the difficulty to which they referred”. That passage concerns unilateral mistake and does not decide the position for common mistake.

Svanosio and Taylor v Johnson both quote remarks of Denning LJ in Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671, which is not among the authorities cited here, so the remarks are reported only as those cases quote them. None of the High Court reasons cited here decides whether equity may set aside, for common mistake, a contract that is valid and enforceable at common law, and nothing here says that the High Court has accepted or rejected such a jurisdiction.

The English position, which is persuasive only

Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 14074 is an English Court of Appeal decision, persuasive only in Australia. The defendants engaged the plaintiffs’ ship, the Great Peace, to escort a damaged vessel for the purpose of saving life, on the footing that the ships were in close proximity. They were in fact reported to be 410 miles apart, where they should on the information given have been about 35 miles apart. The defendants cancelled and resisted the claim for hire for common mistake. The Court of Appeal (Lord Phillips MR giving the judgment of the Court) dismissed their appeal.

The Court said that, applying a passage of an earlier English judgment to a case of common mistake, “it suggests that the following elements must be present if common mistake is to avoid a contract”. This is the Court’s own list of English law, and the High Court has not been shown here to have adopted it:

  1. there must be a common assumption as to the existence of a state of affairs;
  2. there must be no warranty by either party that that state of affairs exists;
  3. the non-existence of the state of affairs must not be attributable to the fault of either party;
  4. the non-existence of the state of affairs must render performance of the contract impossible; and
  5. the state of affairs may be the existence, or a vital attribute, of the consideration to be provided or circumstances which must subsist if performance of the contractual adventure is to be possible.

It held that the greater distance did not mean that it was impossible to perform the contractual adventure, and that the parties had entered into a binding contract. The Court also concluded that “it is impossible to reconcile Solle v Butcher with Bell v Lever Brothers” and held that, in England, “there is no jurisdiction to grant rescission of a contract on the ground of common mistake where that contract is valid and enforceable on ordinary principles of contract law”. That is English law, and the Court’s reasoning does not bind any Australian court.

On McRae, the Court said that the second and third elements are “well exemplified” by it, and that the result in McRae “can, we believe, be explained on the basis of construction”. The Court also quoted a statement of Steyn J that “one must first determine whether the contract itself, by express or implied condition precedent or otherwise, provides who bears the risk of the relevant mistake”. Drawn from McRae and Svanosio, the point is that the contract’s terms come first; the sources cited here do not show that the High Court has adopted Steyn J’s words.

Australian courts below the High Court on Great Peace

Three decisions cited here address whether Great Peace should be followed in Australia. None is a High Court decision, and they do not agree on equity.

Queensland Court of Appeal

In Australia Estates Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council [2005] QCA 3285 a purchaser argued that a variation of a land contract’s completion date was made under a common mistake and should be set aside. Each member of the Court gave separate reasons and each agreed the appeal should be dismissed. It is persuasive outside Queensland.

  • McMurdo P said there was “simply no evidence” of any common mistake, and so it was unnecessary to consider “the interesting question” of the effect in Australia of Great Peace.
  • Jerrard JA agreed with Atkinson J’s reasons and orders, and that there was no relevant mistake.
  • Atkinson J said that Solle v Butcher had been overruled in England by Great Peace and that the persuasiveness of its reasoning, and “the somewhat qualified approach taken to Solle v Butcher by the High Court”, suggested that the law as stated in Great Peace “should be applied by this Court in preference to the law as stated in Solle v Butcher and the cases which have followed it”. Her Honour said that the test to be applied was the five elements set out in Great Peace and that “There is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside, on the ground of common mistake, an agreement, which is valid and enforceable at common law”. She also found that there was no mistake.

Atkinson J’s statement about equity was made in reasons that also found no mistake, and McMurdo P regarded the Great Peace question as unnecessary to decide.

Victorian Supreme Court

In In the matter of Border Express Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 7696 a company applied under s 175(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to correct its register of members, arguing that share issue contracts were void or liable to be set aside for common mistake about a tax consequence of a later sale. Attiwill J dismissed the proceeding. On equity his Honour said:

  • that a contract may be set aside in equity for common mistake in circumstances of equitable fraud (in the wide sense, including unconscionable dealing) or misrepresentation or where a condition can be found expressed or implied in the contract, that it is otherwise difficult to conceive of other circumstances, that fault is relevant, and that the mistake must be fundamental;
  • that it was not necessary to consider Great Peace further “given the judgment of the High Court in Taylor”; and
  • that he declined to follow Australia Estates “insofar as the majority stated in obiter that there is no equitable jurisdiction to set aside a contract on the basis of common mistake”, because “[i]t is contrary to the decision of the High Court in Taylor”.

McMillan J had declined to follow Australia Estates on the same point in Rees v Rees, as Attiwill J recorded; Rees v Rees itself is not among the authorities cited here. This is a single judge’s decision, persuasive outside Victoria.

South Australian Court of Appeal

In Croser v Croser [2025] SASCA 1457 the South Australian Court of Appeal (Livesey P, S Doyle JA and Bleby JA) heard an appeal from a decision setting aside a consent order for common mistake about a valuation. S Doyle JA, with whom Bleby JA agreed, allowed the appeal, holding that the primary judge erred in finding common mistake. His Honour said that “any clarity in relation to the existence and extent of an equitable jurisdiction under Australian law to set aside a contract for common mistake must await further guidance from the High Court”, so that “there is little utility in me attempting any definitive statement of the position under Australian law”. He offered “some tentative observations”: that the High Court has recognised an equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts affected by mistake in McRae, Svanosio and Taylor v Johnson, that “[t]he issue is the extent of this jurisdiction”, and that the High Court has so far confined itself to cases where the mistake is accompanied by some form of equitable fraud in the widest sense, encompassing any form of unconscionable dealing. He called these “necessarily tentative views”.

Livesey P dissented. His Honour said that Solle v Butcher should be followed until the High Court determines otherwise and that Australia Estates should not be followed, and described the ruling in Australia Estates as obiter dicta.

So Atkinson J and Attiwill J took opposite positions on whether equity may set aside for common mistake a contract valid at common law, and the South Australian majority declined to decide it. The High Court has not been shown to have resolved the disagreement.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the false assumption and confirm both parties shared it; if only one held it, start with the article on mistake.
  2. Ask first what the contract promised, as McRae did: “What did the promisor really promise?”. Check any risk-allocating clause against what the contract describes; in McRae an “as and where they lie” clause did not help the Commission because of the description of what was sold.
  3. Ask whether a party can rely on the mistake at all. Dixon and Fullagar JJ in McRae affirmed that a party cannot rely on mutual mistake where the belief was held without any reasonable ground and deliberately induced in the other’s mind. Their qualification, “even if this be not wholly and strictly correct”, concerned Denning LJ’s broader statement and not that narrower proposition.
  4. Place the transaction by stage: in Svanosio Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said that after conveyance equity will not undo a sale of land unless there has been fraud or something amounting practically to a total failure of consideration.
  5. If the contract is not void, consider equity and say that the High Court reasons cited here do not settle whether equity may set aside a contract valid at common law for common mistake. Great Peace is English and persuasive only. Atkinson J in Australia Estates (McMurdo P leaving the question open) rejected an equitable jurisdiction, Attiwill J in Border Express declined to follow her Honour, and in Croser the majority said clarity must await the High Court. Each is persuasive outside its own State.
  6. Consider misrepresentation and misleading conduct in the alternative, as the article on mistake advises.

Self-check

  • Have I asked what the contract promised before asking whether the mistake was fundamental, and attributed each statement to the right judges?
  • Have I said that Great Peace is English and persuasive only, and set the Queensland, Victorian and South Australian approaches against each other, each persuasive only outside its own State?

Where the authority sits

This is common law and equity, with no statute examined, and the High Court decisions cited here bind lower Australian courts on what they decided. The latest Australian authority cited here is Croser (December 2025), and Taylor v Johnson is cited only for its passage on Svanosio and equity. No High Court treatment of Great Peace, and no Australian decision later than Croser, is cited here, so check for later treatment before relying on this article. Current sale of goods and property legislation is not stated here.

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