Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd

Court of Appeal of England and Wales · 2002

ContractVitiating Factors

Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679

A salvage company hired a bulk carrier for emergency stand-by duty, both sides believing the ships were a few hours apart. They were 410 miles apart. Could the hirer treat that shared error as undoing the contract?

What happened?

In September 1999 the Cape Providence, carrying iron ore from Brazil to China, suffered serious structural damage in the South Indian Ocean ([5]). The defendants, Tsavliris (International) Ltd, had offered salvage services on Lloyd’s Open Form, and a tug was coming from Singapore that would take five or six days to arrive ([5]). Worried that the vessel might go down, they asked a London broker to find a merchant vessel nearby that could help evacuate the crew ([5]). The broker was told by Ocean Routes that the Great Peace, a vessel owned by the claimants, Great Peace Shipping Ltd, was the nearest and should be close to a rendezvous position within about twelve hours, but the position he was given was wrong ([6]).

The parties agreed a fixture of the Great Peace at a gross rate of US$16,500 a day, for escort and stand-by services for the purpose of saving life, with a minimum of five days ([10]-[11], [23]). Later that morning the defendants’ Captain Lambrides told the broker that the vessels were 410 miles apart; if Ocean Routes’ information had been accurate they would have been about 35 miles apart ([16]-[17]). He said he was looking to cancel but first wanted to know whether a nearer vessel was available ([18]). Another vessel, the Nordfarer, passed the Cape Providence, and at 10.10 the defendants told the broker they had contracted directly with the Nordfarer’s owners and instructed him to cancel the Great Peace ([20]). They were not prepared to pay anything, and the claimants issued proceedings ([22]).

The claimants claimed US$82,500, the minimum five days’ hire, as money due under the contract or alternatively as damages for wrongful repudiation ([23]-[24]). The defendants said that both parties had proceeded on the fundamental assumption that the Great Peace was in close proximity to the Cape Providence, so that the contract was void in law or voidable and open to rescission in equity ([25]). Toulson J rejected those contentions and awarded the sum claimed, and the defendants appealed ([27]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ) gave a single judgment of the Court, delivered by Lord Phillips MR. It dismissed the appeal, with costs to be assessed on an indemnity basis, so that the defendants remained liable for the cancellation fee of five days’ hire ([166]-[167] and the order at the end of the judgment).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court described the defendants’ case as an allegation of a common mistaken assumption of fact which renders the service that will be provided if the contract is performed in accordance with its terms something different from the performance that the parties contemplated ([32]). It said that the theory of an implied term is “as unrealistic when considering common mistake as when considering frustration” and that “The avoidance of a contract on the ground of common mistake results from a rule of law under which, if it transpires that one or both of the parties have agreed to do something which it is impossible to perform, no obligation arises out of that agreement” ([73]).

It added that identifying what the parties agreed would be performed involves looking at the express terms and at any implications arising from the surrounding circumstances ([74]), and that, as with frustration, if on a true construction a party warrants that the subject matter exists or that performance will be possible, there is no scope to hold the contract void for common mistake ([75]). Applying Lord Alverstone CJ’s statement in Hobson v Pattenden to common mistake, it said “it suggests that the following elements must be present if common mistake is to avoid a contract”: a common assumption as to the existence of a state of affairs; no warranty by either party that it exists; its non-existence not attributable to the fault of either party; its non-existence rendering performance of the contract impossible; and the state of affairs being the existence, or a vital attribute, of the consideration to be provided or circumstances which must subsist if performance of the contractual adventure is to be possible ([76]).

The Court set out Steyn J’s statement in Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord that before one turns to the rules as to mistake, “one must first determine whether the contract itself, by express or implied condition precedent or otherwise, provides who bears the risk of the relevant mistake” ([80]); said that an allegation of this kind “will often raise important issues of construction” ([82]); and concurred in Steyn J’s summary of the law, subject to the proviso that the result in McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission can be explained on the basis of construction ([91]).

It thought that contracts found void for common mistake are “few and far between” ([85]). On the facts, the Court said the issue was whether the mistake about the distance between the vessels meant that the services the Great Peace was in a position to provide were “something essentially different from that to which the parties had agreed” ([94]). It accepted that both parties had unquestionably assumed that the vessels were close enough for the Great Peace to carry out the service ([162]), but held that the Great Peace would arrive in time to provide several days of escort service and that “The fact that the vessels were further apart than both parties had appreciated did not mean that it was impossible to perform the contractual adventure” ([165]).

It rejected one of Toulson J’s reasons, that the Cape Providence could have turned towards the Great Peace, as unrealistic ([164]), but agreed that the defendants’ reaction on learning the true positions, wanting to cancel only once they knew whether a nearer vessel was available, was a telling indication ([165]). The parties had made a binding contract which gave the defendants an express right to cancel on payment of the cancellation fee of five days’ hire, and there was no injustice in that result ([166]).

On the alternative claim to rescission in equity, the Court framed three questions: whether equity had established, before Bell v Lever Brothers, a doctrine permitting rescission for common mistake where the contract was valid at common law; whether such a doctrine could stand with Bell v Lever Brothers; and whether the Court was nonetheless bound to find that it exists because of Solle v Butcher and later decisions ([98]). On the first, it examined Cooper v Phibbs and concluded that the House of Lords in Bell v Lever Brothers considered that equity’s intervention, as shown in Cooper v Phibbs, occurred where the common law would have held the contract void, and that “The jurisprudence established no such right” ([118]); it did not consider that Cooper v Phibbs “demonstrated or established an equitable jurisdiction to grant rescission for common mistake in circumstances that fell short of those in which the common law held a contract void” ([126]).

On the second, it said that none of the cases that purported to follow Solle v Butcher defined the test of mistake giving rise to the equitable jurisdiction in a way that distinguishes it from the test for a mistake rendering a contract void in law ([153]), that it could not distinguish a “fundamental” mistake from Lord Atkin’s mistake as to quality ([154]), and that “The effect of Solle v Butcher is not to supplement or mitigate the common law; it is to say that Bell v Lever Brothers was wrongly decided” ([156]).

Its conclusion was that “it is impossible to reconcile Solle v Butcher with Bell v Lever Brothers”, and that coherence could be restored only “by declaring that there is no jurisdiction to grant rescission of a contract on the ground of common mistake where that contract is valid and enforceable on ordinary principles of contract law”, which was also Toulson J’s conclusion ([157]). On the third question, the Court considered Noble v Southern Railway Company and Holden & Co v Crown Prosecution Service on what a court does when faced with a Court of Appeal decision inconsistent with a House of Lords decision ([158]-[159]).

It recorded that it had been in some doubt whether those authorities went far enough, that it was conscious of later decisions following Solle v Butcher, and that in West Sussex Properties Ltd v Chichester DC the Court of Appeal had felt bound by Solle v Butcher, and that there leading counsel had accepted that it was good law unless and until overturned by the House of Lords ([160]). Having heard full argument for what it believed was the first time in that court, it said “we can see no way that Solle v Butcher can stand with Bell v Lever Brothers” and “we can see no option but so to hold” ([160]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)

Read judgment: [94] (opens in a new tab), [162]–[166] (opens in a new tab)

The common law defence failed because the Court held that the distance between the vessels did not make performance of the contractual adventure impossible ([165]). That application to the facts is what the dismissal of the defence on the void-contract limb depended on.

Classification unresolved · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)

Read judgment: [73]–[76] (opens in a new tab), [80]–[85] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs set out the Court’s analysis of common mistake at common law, including the five elements it said applying the Hobson v Pattenden passage suggests ([76]). The appeal was decided on impossibility of performance ([165]); the Court did not apply the elements about warranty or fault to the facts, so a single ratio or obiter label would overstate how far each element was necessary to the result, and the Court itself introduced the elements with the word suggests.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)

Read judgment: [118] (opens in a new tab), [126] (opens in a new tab), [153]–[157] (opens in a new tab), [160] (opens in a new tab)

The defendants’ alternative case was rescission in equity. The Court rejected it by holding that there is no jurisdiction to rescind for common mistake a contract valid and enforceable on ordinary principles, and that Solle v Butcher could not stand with Bell v Lever Brothers ([157], [160]). That holding was the ground on which the equitable limb of the defence failed.

Why does this case matter?

A shared mistake of fact is a tempting ground to raise when a bargain has turned out badly for one side, and these facts show a mistake that was real, mutual and important to the party that raised it. Problems on this topic usually ask two things at once: what a court may do about the shared error, and where in the contract the error was dealt with. Keeping the Court’s treatment of those two questions apart is what separates a structured answer from a general plea of unfairness.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a contract made on a shared false assumption, identify the assumption, who held it and what the contract says about it before you choose a doctrine. This is an English decision, so in an Australian answer it is persuasive and does not bind an Australian court. Separate what the Court applied to the facts ([162]-[166]) from its wider analysis of the law ([73]-[91]) and from its reasoning on equity ([95]-[160]), and cite it as the Court’s judgment rather than as one judge’s view.

Before relying on the English position on equity in an Australian problem, check what Australian courts have said about it. Compare the High Court decisions in McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission and Svanosio v McNamara on how each dealt with the terms of the contract.

Check your understanding

1. What assumption did the defendants say both parties made, and how far apart were the vessels in fact ([16], [25])?

2. Which earlier judge’s statement did the Court apply to common mistake to arrive at its list of elements, and how did it introduce the list ([65], [76])?

3. What did the Court say, citing Steyn J, must be determined before the rules about mistake are turned to ([80])?

4. What did the Court say the issue on the facts turned on, and what features of the case did it rely on in answering it ([94], [165]-[166])?

5. What did the Court conclude about Solle v Butcher and Bell v Lever Brothers, and what did it say about the earlier Court of Appeal decisions that had followed Solle v Butcher ([157], [160])?