Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679
A salvage company hired a bulk carrier for emergency stand-by duty, both sides believing the ships were a few hours apart. They were 410 miles apart. Could the hirer treat that shared error as undoing the contract?
What happened?
In September 1999 the Cape Providence was badly damaged in the South Indian Ocean. The defendants, salvors, needed a nearby vessel to stand by and help evacuate the crew.
Their broker was told the claimants’ Great Peace was closest, about twelve hours away. That position was wrong; the vessels were 410 miles apart.
The parties had fixed the Great Peace at US$16,500 a day, minimum five days. The defendants hired another vessel and cancelled, refusing to pay.
The claimants sued for US$82,500. The defendants argued common mistake about proximity. Toulson J rejected that and awarded the sum; the defendants appealed.
Ask yourself: when does a shared wrong assumption affect a contract?
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Costs were assessed on an indemnity basis. Defendants stayed liable for the five-day cancellation fee.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court characterised the defendants’ argument as a claim of common mistake. This is a shared wrong assumption of fact. It makes the contract’s actual performance different from what both parties expected.
The Court rejected the “implied term” theory for common mistake, just as it had rejected it for frustration. Instead, it said common mistake avoids a contract through a rule of law. If performance turns out impossible, no obligation arises.
Working out what was agreed requires looking at the express terms. It also means considering implications from the surrounding circumstances. As with frustration, if a party has warranted that performance is possible, the contract cannot be void for common mistake.
The Court adapted Lord Alverstone CJ’s test from Hobson v Pattenden to common mistake. It listed the elements needed: a shared assumption about some state of affairs; no warranty by either party that it exists; its absence not being either party’s fault; its absence making performance impossible; and that state of affairs being essential to the consideration or to the contract’s performance.
The Court referred to Steyn J’s approach in Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v Credit du Nord. Before applying mistake doctrine, one must first ask whether the contract itself allocates the risk of the mistake, whether expressly or by implied condition.
The Court said allegations of common mistake “will often raise important issues of construction” (interpreting the contract’s terms). It agreed with Steyn J’s summary of the law. However, it added a proviso: the outcome in McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission could be explained through construction instead.
The Court observed that contracts held void for common mistake are “few and far between.” This signals that the doctrine operates narrowly, not as a general escape route.
On the facts, the issue was whether the mistaken distance between the vessels meant the services the Great Peace could actually provide were something different from what was contracted for.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)
Read judgment: [94] (opens in a new tab), [162]–[166] (opens in a new tab)
The common law defence failed because the Court held that the distance between the vessels did not make performance of the contractual adventure impossible ([165]). That application to the facts is what the dismissal of the defence on the void-contract limb depended on.
Classification unresolved · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)
Read judgment: [73]–[76] (opens in a new tab), [80]–[85] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs set out the Court’s analysis of common mistake at common law, including the five elements it said applying the Hobson v Pattenden passage suggests ([76]). The appeal was decided on impossibility of performance ([165]); the Court did not apply the elements about warranty or fault to the facts, so a single ratio or obiter label would overstate how far each element was necessary to the result, and the Court itself introduced the elements with the word suggests.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the Court (Lord Phillips MR, May LJ and Laws LJ)
Read judgment: [118] (opens in a new tab), [126] (opens in a new tab), [153]–[157] (opens in a new tab), [160] (opens in a new tab)
The defendants’ alternative case was rescission in equity. The Court rejected it by holding that there is no jurisdiction to rescind for common mistake a contract valid and enforceable on ordinary principles, and that Solle v Butcher could not stand with Bell v Lever Brothers ([157], [160]). That holding was the ground on which the equitable limb of the defence failed.
Why does this case matter?
A bad bargain tempts a shared mistake argument. Here the mistake was real, mutual and important.
Ask two questions: what the court may do, and where the contract handled the error.
Check your understanding
What assumption did both parties make, and how far apart were the vessels?
What did the Court say must be determined before turning to the rules on mistake?
What did it conclude about Solle v Butcher and Bell v Lever Brothers?