Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 10
A union threatened a builder with industrial action unless a subcontractor was kept off site. The builder complied and said nothing. Was there an “understanding” between them, and what does that ask of contract law?
What happened?
J Hutchinson Pty Ltd was the head contractor on a construction project in Queensland. In March 2016 it entered into a subcontract with Waterproofing Industries Qld Pty Ltd for waterproofing works at the site ([5]). The subcontractor had no enterprise bargaining agreement with the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (the CFMEU).
On 11 June 2016 a CFMEU representative told Hutchinson’s project manager that the union would “sit the job down” if the subcontractor was allowed back on site ([6]). Hutchinson reacted by excluding the subcontractor and then terminating the subcontract by a letter dated 26 July 2016 ([6]). At no point did Hutchinson give the CFMEU any verbal or written assent that it would do so ([7]).
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC) brought civil penalty proceedings alleging that Hutchinson had contravened ss 45E(3) and 45EA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which concern a contract, arrangement or understanding with a union containing a provision for a proscribed purpose, and that the union was involved in the contraventions. The primary judge found the contraventions and imposed penalties; the Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously allowed the appeals ([2]). In the High Court the ACCC no longer contended that Hutchinson had made an arrangement with the union and argued that Hutchinson had arrived at an understanding by yielding to the threat ([18]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the ACCC’s appeals in both matters, with costs, so the Full Court’s orders stood.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court dismissed both appeals, four Justices to one. Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ, in joint reasons, held that “[a] person who succumbs to a threat of industrial action by doing what is demanded under sanction of the threat, without express or tacit communication of a commitment to do so, does not arrive at an understanding with the person who makes the threat for the purposes of s 45E(3) (and s 45EA) of the Act” ([4]), because arriving at an understanding “necessarily involves interaction between them by which one expressly or tacitly communicates by words or conduct to the other a commitment to act or refrain from acting in a particular way” ([20]).
Edelman J agreed that the appeals should be dismissed ([72]) and gave his own reasons. He said that a contract, arrangement or understanding “requires reciprocity in the sense of reciprocal conduct between two or more people” ([31]); that where one party makes a unilateral undertaking with a request for performance, “a communication that the requested performance has been or will be undertaken will be necessary unless the party making the unilateral undertaking expressly or impliedly dispenses with any need for that communication” ([56]); and that the ACCC had not run a case that the union had dispensed with it ([32], [69]).
In the course of those reasons he said of R v Clarke that, although “some of the discussion can be taken to suggest that Mr Clarke needed to have had a subjective intention of responding to the offer in order to obtain the reward”, “the better understanding” is that Clarke’s performance was not in reference to the reward but was “an act that, objectively understood, was engaged in solely for the” distinct object of clearing himself from a charge of murder ([51]).
By contrast, Mrs Carlill’s conduct in using the smoke ball “after the offer of a reward was brought to her attention, was objectively referable to that offer”, and whether her own reasons for buying it were the reward or a wish to prevent influenza “was irrelevant” ([51]). He added that “all members of the Court” in Clarke held that in a “unilateral contract” the promisor could waive the requirement that acceptance be communicated ([52]).
Steward J dissented and would have allowed the appeals ([73]-[75], [112]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [20] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [26] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons require express or tacit communication of a commitment before an understanding is reached. That requirement is necessary to their rejection of the ACCC’s contention: termination in response to the threat, without proof of such communication, did not establish an understanding under ss 45E(3) and 45EA.
Separate reasoning · Edelman J
Read judgment: [52] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [56] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [69] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)
Edelman J concurs in dismissing the appeals through his own analysis of reciprocity. His discussion of waiver of communication in R v Clarke supplies a foundation for the rule that communication is required unless dispensed with. He applies that rule because the ACCC did not establish dispensation and no assent was communicated. This is his distinct route to the result; agreement in the orders does not make every step part of the joint reasons.
Obiter · Edelman J
Read judgment: [51] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
The objective reinterpretation of Clarke’s performance and the comparison with Mrs Carlill’s motives are observations in Edelman J’s separate concurring reasons. Choosing between subjective and objective explanations of Clarke’s failure to recover the reward was unnecessary to dismiss these statutory appeals, which failed on the absence of communication and of a case that communication had been dispensed with. These observations are not a holding of the joint majority about R v Clarke.
Separate reasoning · Steward J
Read judgment: [96] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab), [112] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)
Steward J dissents. In his view the statutory purpose makes compliance with the union’s threat sufficient without a further communication of assent, and he would allow the appeals. This contrary construction explains the division; it is not the governing ground of dismissal.
Why does this case matter?
The case reaches a contract course through a competition statute, so a student who cites it for contract law has to say which Justice’s reasoning is being used.
For a student the practical consequence is currency. An account of R v Clarke written before 2025 may need the later view noted, and the answer should say whose view it is.
Exam and application relevance
Attribute each point to the reasons that carry it: the joint reasons, Edelman J’s separate reasons and Steward J’s dissent are different sources, and the paragraph numbers in the Proposition show which is which.
When a question turns on whether performance of an offer’s terms was acceptance, or on whether a person who yielded to a demand reached an understanding with the person who made it, identify what passed between the parties and which reasons support your answer.
Check your understanding
1. What did Hutchinson do after the CFMEU’s threat of 11 June 2016, and what did it not do?
2. According to the joint reasons, what must pass between the parties before an understanding is arrived at?
3. Which Justice discussed R v Clarke, and how did he say Clarke’s performance should be understood?
4. What did Edelman J say about Mrs Carlill’s reasons for buying the smoke ball?