Performance, timing and revocation in contract formation

Three questions the basic offer-and-acceptance analysis leaves open: when performing the act an offer asks for is acceptance, when an acceptance takes effect (including by post and by electronic communication), and when an offer can no longer be revoked.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
contract-formation

Learning outcomes

  • Explain why performing the act an offer asks for is not acceptance unless it is done in response to the offer, applying R v Clarke.
  • State the general rule that acceptance must be communicated, the condition on which posting can complete a contract, and the uncertain status of the postal rule in Australia, applying Tallerman v Nathan’s Merchandise and Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance.
  • Identify what the Commonwealth and New South Wales electronic transactions provisions say about the time of dispatch and receipt of an electronic communication, when the Commonwealth provisions reach a contract, and what the provisions do not say.
  • Distinguish a revocable offer from an option given for value, and state the consequence of revoking an option, applying Goldsbrough, Mort & Co v Quinn.

The basic analysis of offer and acceptance asks whether an offer was made and whether it was accepted. Three further questions decide many problem questions: whether performing the act an offer asks for is itself an acceptance, when an acceptance takes effect once it is sent by post or electronic means, and when an offer can no longer be withdrawn. The common law answers are stated in High Court decisions and apply in every Australian jurisdiction. The statutory provisions on electronic communications are different: this article sets out only the Commonwealth and New South Wales provisions, and a student must identify the proper law of the contract before relying on either.

Performance as acceptance

Where an offer asks for an act rather than a promise, the act can be the acceptance. In R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 2271 the Western Australian Government offered a reward of £1,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the murderers of two police officers. Clarke, who was under arrest on a murder charge, gave information. The trial judge found that he gave it to clear himself and not on the faith of the offer. The High Court allowed the Crown’s appeal.

The reasoning of Isaacs ACJ is the part to learn. Performance of the stipulated act can be the method of acceptance, but it is an acceptance only if it is done in response to the offer. His Honour said the information must be given in exchange for the offer, and gave the example of a person thrown overboard who swims a hundred yards to save his life without any thought of an offer of £100 to anyone who swims that distance: the act is the one the offer describes, but the offeror is under no contractual obligation. Knowing of the offer is not enough where the performance was not, objectively, a response to it. Higgins J held there was no contract, and Starke J recorded the trial judge’s finding that Clarke did not act on the faith of the offer.

Edelman J has since explained Clarke in ACCC v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 10.7 In his Honour’s own reasons, and not as a joint holding, some of the discussion in Clarke can be read as requiring a subjective intention to respond to the offer, but the better understanding, consistent with the objective theory of contract, is that the performance must be objectively referable to the offer. Whether the performer was privately motivated by the reward is therefore not the test.

Two points follow. First, a person who performs the act in ignorance of the offer has not accepted, and neither has one whose performance is, objectively understood, engaged in solely for a distinct object, as Clarke’s was. A private motive unrelated to the reward does not by itself prevent acceptance where the performance is objectively a response to the offer. Secondly, the offeror may prescribe acceptance by performance and may expressly or impliedly waive separate communication of the acceptance. Isaacs ACJ accepted that, in a reward transaction of the kind before him, the language and nature of the offer showed that the offeror did not require notice of acceptance apart from notice of the performance.

When an acceptance takes effect

The general rule is that a contract is not completed until acceptance is actually communicated to the offeror. In Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 932 Dixon CJ and Fullagar J stated that rule and added that a finding that posting a letter of acceptance completes the contract cannot be justified unless it is to be inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended that the offer might be accepted by doing that act.

That is the condition Dixon CJ and Fullagar J proposed for the postal rule, and its status as the governing Australian test is unsettled, as the next paragraph explains. On their Honours’ formulation, posting completes acceptance only where it can be inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended acceptance by the act of posting itself. Contemplating that the post might carry an acceptance is not the same thing, and the offeror’s own communications may show which was meant. Their Honours thought it easy to draw that inference in some cases, but not where solicitors were conducting a highly contentious correspondence, where they would have expected actual communication to be regarded as essential to agreement.

Their Honours stated that view and then dealt with the case on counsel’s contrary assumption, so the statement did not decide the postal rule. In Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 1073 Campbell JA, with Barrett JA and Sackville AJA agreeing on the postal rule, noted that Dixon CJ and Fullagar J had recognised their statement was not relevant to the outcome before them. His Honour said that until a case turns on the present status of the postal acceptance rule it is safer to proceed on the basis that the law stated in the English cases continues to be the law in Australia. A student should therefore state the general rule, attribute the condition to Dixon CJ and Fullagar J, and say that the High Court has not decided the point in a case that depended on it and that the Court of Appeal of New South Wales has advised proceeding on the English authorities.

The rule has a second consequence. Where a contract is made by posting a letter of acceptance and it becomes material where the contract was made, it is taken to have been made at the place where the letter was posted. This is why the question mattered in Tallerman: the parties had proceeded on the assumption that a posting in Sydney meant a contract made in New South Wales, which would support service of a New South Wales writ. The Court dealt with the case on that assumption and did not decide the point, so the statement about the place of contracting is conditional on the assumption.

Electronic communications

Two Acts fix the time at which an electronic communication is dispatched or received. They do not state when an acceptance takes effect, and nothing in the sections cited here applies the postal rule to email. A student who writes that an email acceptance takes effect on sending, or on receipt, has to say which rule of formation produces that result.

The Commonwealth rules are in the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth).5 Unless otherwise agreed, under s 14(1) the time of dispatch is when the communication leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on the originator’s behalf. If it has not left such a system, the time of dispatch is when the addressee receives it. Under s 14A(1), unless otherwise agreed, the time of receipt is when the communication becomes capable of being retrieved at an electronic address designated by the addressee. At any other address of the addressee it is when it is capable of being retrieved there and the addressee has become aware that it was sent there. Under s 14A(2) a communication is assumed capable of being retrieved when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address.

Sections 14 and 14A are expressed to apply “for the purposes of a law of the Commonwealth”, but s 15E applies them to a contract, and to a communication relating to its formation, as if those words were omitted. That extension operates under s 15A(2) only where the proper law of the contract is the law of a State or Territory and, at the time the contract is formed, no law of that State or Territory is in terms substantially the same as the Commonwealth Part. Section 15E(2) also excludes it to the extent that the Commonwealth’s general provisions would of their own force have the same effect, or a State or Territory law in substantially the same terms would.

New South Wales has a time-of-receipt provision in s 13A of the Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NSW).6 It applies for the purposes of a “law of this jurisdiction”, which the Act defines as any law in force in New South Wales, whether written or unwritten, other than a law of the Commonwealth. By that definition the rule is not confined to statutes. Schedule 1 cl 18 provides that Part 2, which contains s 13A, does not apply to matters relating to the practice or procedure of a court, including the filing, issue or service of documents. Whether a given jurisdiction’s law is “in terms substantially the same” as the Commonwealth Act is a question for the jurisdiction in question: the Acts of the other States and Territories are not set out here and must be read for the contract’s proper law.

Revocation and options

An offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. A bare promise to keep an offer open for a period, given without consideration, is not binding and does not prevent withdrawal. These propositions are stated by Griffith CJ in Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd v Quinn (1910) 10 CLR 674.4

The exception is the option. Quinn signed a document, in consideration of five shillings, granting the company the right to purchase his land within one week at a stated price. He said that before the week ended he told the company’s solicitor he repudiated the offer, and the company accepted within the week without other notice of that. Griffith CJ held that where consideration is given for the promise to keep the offer open, the promise is binding: an option given for value is not revocable. O’Connor J added that the offeror who withdraws during the period is liable at law for depriving the offeree of the right of acceptance, and that a court of equity will disregard the withdrawal and treat the offer as if it had been accepted while still open. The High Court allowed the company’s appeal, and O’Connor J held the company entitled to have the agreement specifically performed, subject to the ordinary equitable requirements for that remedy.

The consequence is that the label matters less than the consideration. An offer that is “open for seven days” can be revoked on the second day; an option for which something was paid cannot.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the act the offer asks for. If it is an act and not a promise, ask whether the claimant knew of the offer and whether the act was, objectively, a response to it.
  2. Ask whether the offeror prescribed or contemplated a method of acceptance, and whether that method requires the acceptance to reach the offeror.
  3. If acceptance was posted, ask whether it can be inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended acceptance by the act of posting itself, and say that the status of the postal rule has not been decided by the High Court in a case that turned on it. If posting did complete the contract, the place of contracting is where the letter was posted.
  4. If acceptance was electronic, identify the proper law of the contract and which electronic transactions provision applies, state what it says about dispatch and receipt, and say that it does not itself decide when acceptance takes effect.
  5. If the offeror withdrew, ask whether anything was given for the promise to keep the offer open. If so, treat it as an option and the withdrawal as ineffective to prevent acceptance.

Self-check

  • Have I asked whether the performance was in response to the offer, and not only whether it matched the act described?
  • Have I attributed the posting condition to Dixon CJ and Fullagar J, and noted that its status is unsettled?
  • Have I named the jurisdiction before stating an electronic transactions provision?
  • Have I checked whether a promise to keep the offer open was supported by consideration before treating the offer as revoked?

Where the authority sits

The rules on performance, communication and options are common law stated in High Court decisions, which bind every Australian court on what they decided; the caution on the postal rule comes from the New South Wales Court of Appeal and is persuasive elsewhere. The electronic transactions provisions are statutory and differ by jurisdiction. This article states the Commonwealth Act and the New South Wales Act only. It does not cover tenders, auctions, conflicting standard terms or the effect of a revocation that the offeree has not received.

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