Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1957

ContractContract Formation

Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd [1957] HCA 10; (1957) 98 CLR 93

The buyer refused goods ordered in Melbourne, and the seller sued in Sydney on later letters. Where was the contract made, and does it matter where an acceptance letter was posted?

Qualified by Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107

Dixon CJ and Fullagar J’s statement of the general rule, and of the condition on which posting completes a contract, was not relevant to the outcome of Tallerman because the case was conducted on counsel’s contrary assumption. In Wardle v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 107 Campbell JA (Barrett JA and Sackville AJA agreeing on the postal rule) said that until a case turns on the present status of the postal acceptance rule it is safer to proceed on the basis that the law stated in the English cases continues to be the law in Australia. The statement is therefore strong guidance, not a settled High Court holding.

What happened?

Two written orders for 1,000,000 bullets each were given in 1951 through the seller’s Melbourne office. Each was made in Melbourne, and delivery and payment were to be in Melbourne (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J at 102). In February 1952 the seller consigned 1,800,000 bullets from Sydney to Melbourne. The buyer refused to take delivery, and the goods were sent back to Sydney (at 103).

The parties’ solicitors then exchanged letters in March and June 1952. The buyer’s solicitors wrote on 21 March proposing a delivery arrangement. The seller’s solicitors replied on 26 March with a counter-proposal on payment and storage. On 3 April the buyer’s solicitors refused it and said that the buyer was not prepared to vary its proposal for delivery (at 104-105). On 4 June the seller’s solicitors wrote that they had been instructed to accept the buyer’s offer in the letter of 21 March. That letter was posted in Sydney, and the letters of 21 March and 4 June were both expressed to be without prejudice (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J at 105, 110).

The seller sued in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for £8,800, the price of the bullets, or alternatively for damages for breach of contract. The joint reasons describe the court’s jurisdiction as subject to limitations that were real or supposed, so the parties treated the claim as one on a contract found in the 1952 correspondence, made in New South Wales if the letter of 4 June completed it (at 109). The Full Court of New South Wales entered judgment for the buyer, on the view that the letters did not create a new and independent contract made in Sydney (at 110).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs, except that the judgment for the buyer was varied to a judgment of non-suit, so that the seller was not precluded from asserting any other right against the buyer (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J at 114). Dixon CJ and Fullagar J held that the seller must fail even on the assumption that the letters had altered the parties’ legal position (at 111). Taylor J would also have entered a judgment of non-suit and otherwise dismissed the appeal (at 150). Kitto J would instead have entered a verdict for the seller on the third count and ordered a new trial limited to damages (at 137). Williams J would not have upheld the order for the buyer (at 129).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The general rule, as the joint reasons’ own view. Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said that “the general rule is that a contract is not completed until acceptance of an offer is actually communicated to the offeror” (at 111-112). A finding that a contract is completed by posting a letter of acceptance “cannot be justified unless it is to be inferred that the offeror contemplated and intended that his offer might be accepted by the doing of that act” (at 112). They added that, where solicitors were conducting a contentious correspondence, “one would have thought that actual communication would be regarded as essential” (at 112).

The footing. The joint reasons say that counsel’s understanding “was plainly based on a contrary assumption, and the case must be dealt with on that assumption” (at 112). That assumption was that the posted acceptance completed the contract.

The place of making, on that assumption. “Dealing with it on that assumption”, the joint reasons state that a contract made by posting a letter of acceptance, where it becomes material to determine where it was made, “must be taken to have been made at the place where the letter of acceptance was posted” (at 112-113).

The separate route. Williams J took the posting point as the basis for a Sydney place of making, whether the letters made a new contract or only varied the existing ones, without discussing whether acceptance had to be communicated (at 121-123).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Obiter · Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: pp 111–112 (opens in a new tab)

The ground of decision was that the seller must fail even on the assumption that the 1952 letters altered the parties’ legal position (at 111). The statements that acceptance must be communicated, and that posting completes a contract only where the offeror contemplated it, were stated as the joint reasons’ own view of the law, but they were not needed for that ground, and the joint reasons then dealt with the case on counsel’s contrary assumption (at 112).

Obiter · Dixon CJ and Fullagar J (joint reasons)

Read judgment: pp 112–113 (opens in a new tab)

The statement of where a contract by posted acceptance was made is expressly given on the assumption the Court adopted for the case (at 112-113). It was not needed for the ground of decision, and it does not state a conclusion the Court reached on the postal rule.

Separate reasoning · Williams J (dissenting from the order for the buyer)

Read judgment: pp 121–123 (opens in a new tab)

Williams J held that if the letters made a new contract, it was made in Sydney when the letter of 4 June was posted there, and that the position was the same if the letters only varied the existing contracts. He took the posting point as the basis of the place of making and did not discuss whether acceptance must be communicated. He would not have upheld the order for the buyer, and agreed with Kitto J that damages should be retried (at 129).

Why does this case matter?

A student who states the postal rule as settled Australian law, and cites this case for it without the pages, cannot show what the judges actually said. The examiner will look for the difference between the judges’ own words and a rule taken from a textbook summary, in an answer about how a contract by letter is completed and where it is made.

Exam and application relevance

Sort the correspondence in a problem of this kind into offers, counter-offers, rejections and acceptances, and fix the date and the place of each step. Then decide whether the problem turns on when the contract was completed, or on where it was made, and give the pages of the authority for whichever question you need.

Check the later decisions on the postal rule before stating its present status in Australia, and do not carry a point from one court’s reasons into another court’s answer without checking whose reasons they are.

Check your understanding

1. Who wrote the letter of 21 March 1952, and what did it propose?

2. What did the joint reasons call the limitation on the New South Wales court’s jurisdiction, and why did the parties treat the claim as one on a contract made in New South Wales?

3. What did the joint reasons say about the communication of acceptance in a case where solicitors were conducting a contentious correspondence?

4. On what footing did the joint reasons say the case must be dealt with, and which of their statements did that footing qualify?

5. What did Dixon CJ and Fullagar J decide about the seller’s claim even if the 1952 letters had altered the parties’ legal position?