Cessnock City Council v 123 259 932 Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2024

ContractDischarge And Remedies

Cessnock City Council v 123 259 932 Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 17

A council promised to take all reasonable action to register a subdivision, then would not spend about $1.3 million on sewerage. The tenant had already built a $3.7 million hangar. What must it prove to get that money back?

What happened?

Cessnock City Council owned the land on which Cessnock Airport is located ([62]). By an agreement for lease executed by the Council on 26 July 2007, it promised to grant 123 259 932 Pty Ltd, the respondent, a 30-year lease of proposed Lot 104 from the day after registration of a plan of subdivision ([83]). By cl 4.2(a)(2) the Council promised to take all reasonable action to apply for and obtain registration by 30 September 2011, the Sunset Date ([85]). The respondent was licensed to enter the proposed lot, and built a hangar there at a cost of $3,697,234.41 ([84], [111]).

In February 2010 the Council’s consultants estimated that a further $1,317,764 was needed to comply with the development consent, and an internal bid for that money was refused ([90]). On 13 September 2011 the Council wrote that it had been unable to achieve registration and offered the respondent a licence or short leases, which the respondent declined ([92]-[93]). The plan was never registered and no lease was granted. After the respondent was deregistered, the Council acquired the hangar for $1 in May 2016 ([94]-[95]). The respondent was reinstated and sued in 2017 for damages measured by its wasted expenditure ([103]).

The primary judge, Adamson J, found breach, held that no presumption of recoupment arose and that any such presumption was in any event rebutted, held the expenditure too remote, and awarded $1 in nominal damages ([104]-[108]). The Court of Appeal (Brereton JA, Macfarlan and Mitchelmore JJA agreeing) held that a presumption arose and was not rebutted and awarded the respondent damages including interest of $6,154,459.40 ([109]-[113], [46], [189]). The Council’s grounds in the High Court were confined to whether a presumption arose that the respondent would at least have recouped its wasted expenditure and whether it was rebutted ([115]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs. Seven Justices sat and wrote four sets of reasons: Gageler CJ; Gordon J; Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ jointly; and Jagot J. Each set agreed that the appeal should be dismissed ([43], [47], [187], [243]). The Council had not run any case that the respondent would have recouped only part of its expenditure, and the joint reasons describe the appeal as brought on an all-or-nothing basis ([66], [185]-[186]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Facilitation of proof (the joint reasons). Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ said: “The legal onus to prove loss arising from a breach of contract rests on the plaintiff as the party seeking to recover damages” ([61]). Where the breach has caused or increased uncertainty about the plaintiff’s position had the contract been performed, discharge of that onus is facilitated by assuming or inferring that expenditure reasonably incurred in anticipation of or reliance on performance would have been recouped, and “the strength of this assumption or inference, and thus the weight of the burden placed on the party in breach to adduce evidence to rebut the inference in whole or in part, will depend on the extent of the uncertainty that results from the breach” ([61]).

They said the word “presumption” is “best avoided in this context” ([128]). Their Honours treated the reasoning of Mason CJ and Dawson J in Amann Aviation that rested on a presumption that a party would not enter into a contract in which its costs were not recoverable as “unnecessary to support the facilitation principle” and said it “cannot be accepted” ([149]); the facts supporting the inference “are for the plaintiff to establish; there is no presumption of fact” ([150]). Remoteness and mitigation continue to limit recovery ([120]).

The separate reasons. Gageler CJ held that the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to wasted expenditure “prevails unless and except to the extent that the defendant establishes the counterfactual that the expenditure would still have been wasted even if the contract had been performed” ([3]), and that “[t]he defendant bears a legal onus” of proving that counterfactual ([20]). Gordon J said “[t]here is no relaxation of proof” ([58]) and that it is “just and fair that the wrongdoer, who caused the difficulty in proof, should bear the onus of showing that the party not in breach would have made a loss on the contract” ([56]). Jagot J held that “a presumption of fact arises that the expenditure is ‘wasted’ by reason of the other party’s breach or repudiation” ([190]).

Characterising wasted expenditure. The Justices did not describe it alike. Gageler CJ: “Wasted expenditure is itself a category of damage” ([9]). Gordon J: damages for wasted expenditure are “not a separate measure or category of expectation damages but a method of calculating damages” ([51]). The joint reasons: a plaintiff’s reliance on a contract is “merely part of an alternative way of proving the plaintiff’s loss” ([119]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ

Read judgment: [61] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [149]–[150] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab), [183]–[186] (PDF p 70) (opens in a new tab)

The four joint authors retained the plaintiff’s legal onus and based assistance in proving recoupment on uncertainty caused or increased by the breach, rejecting a general commercial presumption of recoupment. This supplied their ground for dismissing the appeal: the Council’s breach created substantial uncertainty, requiring substantial contrary evidence, which its all-or-nothing case did not supply. Their conclusion that the expenditure would have been recouped depends on this method of proof. The absence of a partial-recoupment case limits the factual application; it does not exclude reductions where supported by evidence.

Separate reasoning · Gageler CJ

Read judgment: [3] (PDF p 5) (opens in a new tab), [20] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [42] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler CJ concurred in dismissing the appeal through a distinct route: proof of expenditure incurred in reliance on performance and wasted on breach established a prima facie entitlement, with the defendant bearing a legal onus to prove that it would have been wasted anyway. He applied that rule because the Council had not discharged that onus. His concurrence in the result does not adopt the joint authors’ account of a continuing plaintiff’s legal onus assisted by inference.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [56]–[58] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in dismissing the appeal but expressly rejected relaxation of proof and a burden calibrated to the extent of uncertainty. Her route was that the proved outlays were wasted through non-performance, the plaintiff had not shown additional profit, and the Council had not shown that performance would have produced a loss. She placed the onus of showing that loss on the wrongdoer whose breach made proof difficult. These reasons explain her agreement in the result without adopting the joint authors’ facilitation analysis.

Separate reasoning · Jagot J

Read judgment: [190]–[191] (PDF p 73) (opens in a new tab), [236] (PDF p 88) (opens in a new tab), [238] (PDF p 89) (opens in a new tab), [242] (PDF p 90) (opens in a new tab)

Jagot J concurred in dismissing the appeal by applying a presumption of fact that expenditure incurred in reliance on the contractual promise was wasted by its breach. She treated the presumption as constant, with the evidence needed to rebut it varying with the circumstances, and held that the Council had not proved non-recoupment had it performed. This is her distinct ground for the result, rather than adoption of the joint authors’ inference whose strength varies with breach-created uncertainty.

Why does this case matter?

It is the High Court’s most recent extended treatment of a claim for wasted expenditure, delivered on 8 May 2024, so an answer that stops at Amann Aviation is out of date on the burden of proof. It is also an awkward case to cite, because the words used for the burden (legal onus, presumption, facilitation) are not interchangeable. The usual error is to lift one phrase from one set of reasons and present it as the Court’s holding.

Exam and application relevance

Say whose reasons you are relying on when you state the rule on the onus. Give the paragraph with the name.

In a problem where a plaintiff proves expenditure reasonably incurred in reliance on the defendant’s promise, a breach that left it wasted, and difficulty proving what performance would have yielded, ask what uncertainty the breach caused or increased, and then what evidence the defendant has led. On the joint reasons, the answer to the second question affects how much of the expenditure is recovered ([167], [184]).

Check your understanding

1. On the joint reasons, who bears the legal onus of proving loss, and what does the facilitation principle assist?

2. Which Justices described the defendant’s burden as a legal onus, and which described it as a presumption of fact?

3. What did the joint reasons say about the presumption that Mason CJ and Dawson J relied on in Amann Aviation?

4. On what basis was the appeal argued, and what did the joint reasons say a defendant must establish to reduce recovery in whole or in part ([61], [167])?

5. What was the order, and how many sets of reasons supported it?