Measuring contract damages: cost of cure, loss after breach and wasted expenditure

How a court measures expectation damages for breach of contract: the Robinson v Harman principle, cost of cure against diminution in value, loss accruing after breach and remoteness, the date of assessment, and wasted expenditure.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
contract
Topics
discharge-and-remedies

Learning outcomes

  • State the compensatory principle for contract damages and its corollary that the innocent party is not to end up better off than performance would have left it.
  • Explain when the cost of rectification, rather than diminution in value, measures loss for a breach, using Tabcorp Holdings v Bowen Investments and the qualifications the High Court recorded.
  • Explain why a court may take account of loss after the date of breach, and how the Hadley v Baxendale limit is applied, using Wenham v Ella and Amann Aviation.
  • Identify when a plaintiff recovers wasted expenditure and who bears the onus, using Commonwealth v Amann Aviation.

Once a breach is established, the question is how much the innocent party recovers, and that depends on how the court measures loss. This article states the High Court’s common law approach, which applies in every Australian jurisdiction, through four measuring problems: cost of cure against diminution in value, loss accruing after breach, the date of assessment, and wasted expenditure. No statute is cited here, so legislation that can alter damages is not covered, and neither are causation, mitigation as a doctrine, penalties, equitable relief or restitution.

The starting point and its corollary

The ruling principle is Parke B’s statement in Robinson v Harman, as quoted by the joint reasons in Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 8: “where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.”1 Robinson v Harman is an English decision and is known here only through that quotation. The joint reasons added that “the same situation” does not mean “as good a financial position”, so a measure that merely tracks financial loss may fall short of performance (at [13]).

The corollary is a limit. In Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64, Mason CJ and Dawson J said that a plaintiff “is not entitled, by the award of damages upon breach, to be placed in a superior position to that which he or she would have been in had the contract been performed” (at [28]).2

Cost of cure or diminution in value

Tabcorp shows the choice between two measures. A tenant covenanted not to make any substantial alteration to the premises without the landlord’s written approval. Knowing that approval had not been given, it destroyed a recently built, high-quality foyer and replaced it. The trial judge awarded $34,820, mostly the difference in value of the property with the old and new foyers; the Full Federal Court awarded $1.38 million, comprising $580,000 for restoring the foyer and $800,000 for loss of rent during the work (at [5]). The High Court dismissed the tenant’s appeal in joint reasons.

Their Honours reasoned that the landlord “was contractually entitled to the preservation of the premises without alterations not consented to”, so its loss was the cost of restoring the premises to the condition they would have been in had the covenant not been breached (at [15]). The landlord’s commercial purpose did not displace that measure: a party who contracts for what it thinks serves its interests is, in the passage the joint reasons quoted from Oliver J, entitled to be compensated by the cost of supplying it, so long as it seeks “compensation for a genuine loss and not merely using a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit” (at [16]).

The qualification comes from Bellgrove v Eldridge, as the joint reasons described it: the work must be necessary to produce conformity and must be a reasonable course. The joint reasons said that the example given in Bellgrove tends to indicate that the test of unreasonableness is satisfied only by fairly exceptional circumstances, and that the requirement of reasonableness did not mean that any excess over the amount recoverable on a diminution in value is unreasonable (at [17], [19]). They treated Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth, where the cost of rebuilding a pool was out of all proportion to the benefit, as exceptional and distinguishable (at [18]).

Read the result narrowly. The Court rested on a short ground about the express negative covenant, and said “If the benefit of the covenant in cl 2.13 were to be secured to the Landlord, it is necessary that reinstatement damages be paid” (at [11], [20]). It did not consider the tenant’s other complaints (at [21]). It left open the landlord’s claim under Lord Cairns’ Act, a discount for betterment (none was sought) and the date of assessment (at [23], [25]-[26]). A student should tie the result to the covenant and to the deliberate breach, not state a free-standing rule that rectification cost is the usual measure.

Loss accruing after the breach

In Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454 the vendor had agreed to procure the transfer to the purchaser of a six-twentieth interest in income-producing land, and the purchaser had parted with the whole price. The transfer was never delivered and specific performance had become impossible. The trial judge awarded the value of the interest and, in addition, the return it would have produced up to judgment. The appellants said damages must be assessed at the date of breach, so the second sum was double recovery. The appeal failed, in five separate judgments with no joint reasons.3

Barwick CJ answered that “to assess damages in contract as at the date of the breach does not mean that damages accruing thereafter by reason of the breach are not recoverable” (at 460). Gibbs J said that the date-of-breach principle “does not mean that events that have occurred after that date may never be considered”, and found no duplication, because by the breach the purchaser had lost both the income and the interest (at 473-474). Walsh J treated such rules as “prima facie rules which may be displaced or modified” to achieve reasonable compensation (at 466).

Three features limit the decision. The purchaser had fully performed, so he could not mitigate by buying elsewhere, and Menzies J and Gibbs J each said that where a purchaser has not paid the position may differ (at 464, 472). The interest was income-producing land rather than a marketable commodity. And, on Gibbs J’s analysis, recovery was subject to the Hadley v Baxendale limit.

Gibbs J said that the general principle is limited by the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, which he quoted: recoverable damages are those arising naturally, “according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself”, or those that may reasonably be supposed to have been in both parties’ contemplation when contracting as the probable result of the breach (at 471-472). He also quoted Lord Reid’s statement of the rule in Koufos, and held the loss of income within it. Both are English decisions, known here only as Gibbs J quoted them. In Amann, Mason CJ and Dawson J described the Hadley v Baxendale rule as now accepted to be “a single principle” whose application may depend on the defendant’s knowledge, and held that the parties necessarily contemplated the loss of the prospect of renewal as the probable result of repudiation (at [51]-[53]).

The date of assessment

Neither Tabcorp nor Wenham fixes a single date. In Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351, a solicitor’s negligence case pleaded in negligence and contract, Mason CJ said there is “a general rule that damages for torts or breach of contract are assessed as at the date of breach or when the cause of action arises. But this rule is not universal; it must give way in particular cases” to the solution that most fairly compensates the plaintiff (at [5]). He added that the rule has been applied more uniformly in contract than in tort, and that where a replacement can be bought in a market the date of non-delivery is usually the appropriate date, whereas without a market a later date may be appropriate (at [6]-[7]).4 These are one Justice’s reasons in a solicitor’s negligence case; other Justices wrote separately and are not relied on here.

Wasted expenditure

In Amann the Commonwealth purported to terminate a contract for aerial surveillance of the northern coast. It accepted in the High Court that its notice of termination was invalid, so only damages were in issue. The contractor had spent heavily on specially equipped aircraft whose resale value was far below their cost (at [9]).

Mason CJ and Dawson J did not regard loss of profits and wasted expenditure as alternatives between which a plaintiff must elect. They called them “two manifestations of the general principle enunciated in Robinson v. Harman”, the claim being framed by whether the contract, if performed, would have been shown to be profitable (at [35]-[36]). If the expenditure would not have been fully recouped, full compensation for it is not awarded (at [33]). They placed the onus of showing that on the party in breach, partly by a presumption that a party would not enter into a contract in which its costs were not recoverable (at [42], [45]).2

That last step has since been qualified. In Cessnock City Council v 123 259 932 Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 17 a council had promised, in an agreement for lease, to take all reasonable action to register a subdivision plan, and broke the promise; the tenant had spent almost $3.7 million building a hangar. The Council’s appeal against an award of that expenditure was dismissed, but in four sets of reasons.5 The joint reasons of Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ said the legal onus to prove loss stays with the plaintiff, but that where the breach has caused or increased uncertainty about the position the plaintiff would have been in, proof is facilitated by inferring that the plaintiff would have recovered the expenditure it reasonably incurred, the inference’s strength depending on the extent of that uncertainty (at [61]). They said that the presumption relied on in Amann “cannot be accepted” and that “there is no presumption of fact” (at [149]-[150]). Gageler CJ put a legal onus on the defendant to show that the expenditure would still have been wasted had the contract been performed (at [3]-[4]), and Jagot J described a presumption of fact (at [190]). Gordon J, too, separately said the wrongdoer should bear the onus (at [56]). So cite Cessnock, say whose reasons you use, and do not present the Amann presumption as current. The joint reasons also recorded that each member of the Amann majority rejected the notion that reliance damages are an alternative the plaintiff may elect (at [145]).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. State the principle from Robinson v Harman as quoted in Tabcorp, and the limit that the plaintiff is not to be put in a superior position (Amann, Mason CJ and Dawson J).
  2. For a defective or altered performance, ask whether the plaintiff contracted for the thing itself; then ask whether the cost of cure is necessary and a reasonable course, remembering that Tabcorp turned on an express covenant and a deliberate breach, and that the Court left betterment and the date of assessment open.
  3. If loss continued after the breach, do not treat the date of breach as a rigid cut-off (Wenham, Barwick, Walsh and Gibbs JJ), but check the facts: whether the plaintiff had performed fully, whether a replacement was available, and whether the loss meets the Hadley v Baxendale limit as Gibbs J stated it.
  4. If profit is hard to prove, consider wasted expenditure and test whether performance would have recouped the outlay; for the onus, rely on Cessnock and identify which Justices’ reasons you use, not on the Amann presumption.
  5. Say which date of assessment is argued and why, citing Mason CJ in Johnson v Perez only as one Justice’s statement that the date-of-breach rule is general but not universal.

Self-check

  • Have I stated Robinson v Harman, Hadley v Baxendale and Koufos as quoted by the High Court, not as binding in themselves?
  • Have I attributed each point to the joint reasons or the individual Justice, and tied Tabcorp to its covenant and facts?

Where the authority sits

The authorities are High Court decisions of the common law, binding in every Australian jurisdiction. State and Territory legislation can change the measure, so identify the jurisdiction and check for it; none is covered here.

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