Wenham v Ella

High Court of Australia · 1972

ContractDischarge And Remedies

Wenham v Ella [1972] HCA 43; (1972) 127 CLR 454

A buyer paid the full price for a share of a building, but the transfer never came and the share could no longer be delivered. Can the buyer recover only the share’s value at breach, or also the income it would have earned?

What happened?

Ella, the respondent in this Court, transferred his shares in a company, and assigned a debt the company owed him, to the Wenham group. The total price was $76,400. The Wenham group paid Ella $50,000 in cash when the agreement was signed, and the balance of $26,400 was to be satisfied by the delivery of transfers of a six-twentieth interest in a building at Broadmeadow, in New South Wales, to Ella or his nominee. The interest was held through a syndicate, and the Wenham group undertook to procure its transfer (Barwick CJ at 456-457).

The Wenham group paid Ella the monthly return on that interest from November 1967 to July 1968, and then stopped. The transfer was never delivered. By the time Ella sued in the Supreme Court of Queensland in July 1969, the company had disposed of its interests in the syndicate, so the transfer could not be obtained and specific performance was not available (Barwick CJ at 457-458).

At trial Ella recovered the value of the interest, $26,400, less a set-off of $5,000. He also recovered $5,394.78 for the return he would have received from July 1968 until judgment, making a total of $26,794.78. The Full Court dismissed the Wenhams’ appeal (Barwick CJ at 458-459).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs, and all five Justices joined in dismissing it. The High Court did not disturb the trial award, and the calculation of the return was not challenged on the appeal (Gibbs J at 474).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The income element, on Barwick CJ’s reasons. The Chief Justice said that assessing damages in contract “as at the date of the breach does not mean that damages accruing thereafter by reason of the breach are not recoverable” (at 460). He held that the purchaser who had paid could recover, in addition to the value of the interest, the income it would have produced from the date when the transfers should have been delivered to judgment (at 461).

Fair dealing and prima facie rules. Menzies J said that fair dealing required the damages “should not be confined to judgment for the value of the land at the date of the breach” (at 463). Walsh J described the rules for measuring damages at the date of breach as “prima facie rules which may be displaced or modified whenever it is necessary to do so” to achieve reasonable compensation (at 466-467).

No duplication. Gibbs J held that the award did not duplicate any element of damages (at 472-473). Stephen J held that the market value of the interest reflected only a discounted part of its future income, so the income lost in the interval was not double counted (at 475).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Barwick CJ

Read judgment: pp 460–461 (opens in a new tab)

Barwick CJ treats the case as one for damages for breach of a contract to procure a transfer of an income-producing interest, and holds that the respondent recovers both the value of the interest and the income it would have produced from the date of transfer to judgment. He rejects the argument that the value of the interest already included the income. The award was upheld on this basis.

Separate reasoning · Menzies J (concurring)

Read judgment: p 463 (opens in a new tab)

Menzies J says that where a purchaser has paid for land not transferred, fair dealing requires that damages not be confined to the value of the land at the date of breach, because the purchaser is out of pocket for the return in the interval. He agrees with the Chief Justice’s conclusion.

Separate reasoning · Walsh J (concurring)

Read judgment: pp 466–467 (opens in a new tab)

Walsh J treats the rules for assessing damages at the date of breach as prima facie rules that may be displaced where needed for reasonable compensation without giving the other party more than it contemplated. He agrees that the appeal should be dismissed.

Separate reasoning · Gibbs J (concurring)

Read judgment: pp 472–474 (opens in a new tab)

Gibbs J holds that the award does not duplicate damages, because the purchaser lost both the income and the interest in the land (at 472-473). He says the general principle that damages are measured at the date of breach ‘does not mean that events that have occurred after that date may never be considered’ (at 474). He does not treat the award as interest, and he expresses no view on the detail of the calculation (at 474).

Separate reasoning · Stephen J (concurring)

Read judgment: pp 475–476 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J holds that the market value of the interest reflects only a discounted part of its future income, so the income lost in the interval is not duplicated by the value (at 475). He says the trial judge was correct to award both, because the evidence gave no basis for separating a discounted income element from the value (at 476).

Why does this case matter?

In an examination problem about a broken promise to transfer property, the examiner will ask for each head of loss the facts support, and for a total that is checked against the figures in the problem. An answer that stops at the first figure the facts supply may lose those marks.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a purchaser who has paid and has not received an income-producing interest, identify what was paid, the date on which the interest should have been transferred, and the date of judgment. List what the purchaser had received in the meantime and what the vendor still held. State each head of loss separately, and name the Justice whose reasons support each head, with the page.

If you rely on the trial calculation of the return, say that the calculation was not challenged on the appeal.

Check your understanding

1. What did Ella pay, and what was the balance of the price to be satisfied by?

2. Why was specific performance not available when Ella sued in July 1969?

3. What two elements made up the award at trial, and what was the total?

4. What did Barwick CJ say about assessing damages in contract as at the date of breach?

5. What did Stephen J say about the market value of the interest and the income it would have produced?