Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd
Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 81
A haulier buys a truck whose engine was not fully reconditioned as warranted, cannot afford the repair, and keeps driving at a loss. Can the seller say the haulier should have limited his own loss?
What happened?
In about July 1977 Mr Burns, an owner-driver, and MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd entered a contract under which the company sold a diesel prime mover to a finance company, Esanda Limited, for hire to Mr Burns, and warranted that its engine had been fully reconditioned. The company knew that he meant to use it in an interstate haulage business and should have known that he was not in affluent circumstances (Gibbs CJ). The cash price shown in the hire-purchase agreement was $31,000 (Gibbs CJ).
The engine had not been fully reconditioned and gave him constant difficulty. In June 1978 the prime mover broke down and in July 1978, when the engine was stripped down, he became aware, if he had not already suspected, that it was in a very defective state. It would then have cost $7,000 to $8,000 to put the engine into the warranted condition, which he could not afford to pay, and the company would do nothing to rectify it. He had some repairs done, borrowed a further $1,400 from Esanda to pay for them, and used the vehicle in cartage in central Queensland instead of interstate haulage. In November 1979 it finally broke down, and Esanda later repossessed it. At all times after July 1977 his business was carried on at a loss (Gibbs CJ).
The trial judge, Moynihan J, awarded $220,122.90, which included $131,000 for loss of earnings over what he found would have been about four years of effective life for a fully reconditioned engine and $85,000 interest (Gibbs CJ). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland reduced the award to $70,253.06. Connolly J, with whom Andrews CJ agreed, said that it was not a case of mitigation but that by July 1978 the damages had fully materialised; Macrossan J treated the decision to carry on after that date as not directly attributable to the breach or as too remote (Gibbs CJ; Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). Mr Burns appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. Three sets of reasons were given: by Gibbs CJ, by Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ jointly, and by Brennan J.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Gibbs CJ held that the loss of profits over the four-year effective life of the engine was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, as explained in Victoria Laundry, and that the appellant had to take reasonable steps to mitigate. The question was whether he was debarred from the damage attributable to his failure to take steps he could not afford, and Gibbs CJ answered that question in the negative: a plaintiff’s duty to mitigate “does not require him to do what is unreasonable and it would seem unjust to prevent a plaintiff from recovering in full damages caused by a breach of contract simply because he lacked the means to avert the consequences of the breach”.
The appellant’s financial difficulties were largely brought about by the respondent’s actions in supplying a defective engine and refusing to rectify it. Gibbs CJ respectfully agreed with a statement of Megaw LJ in Dodd Properties that a plaintiff under a duty to mitigate is not obliged to do what he cannot afford, particularly where his financial stringency arose solely from the defendant’s wrongdoing. The appellant was therefore entitled to recover the lost profits he proved over the four years.
However, Gibbs CJ held that it was not reasonable for the appellant to carry on with the defective prime mover once he knew he was operating at a loss and should have known that he had no prospect of making a profit; the case was not one of a purchaser locked into a business, and the respondent should not be charged with the actual losses incurred after June 1978. The evidence of loss was confused and imprecise, the assessment was little better than guesswork, and it was not established that the Full Court’s total was insufficient, so he would dismiss the appeal.
Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ said that the appeal fell to be determined on the facts without regard to the question of impecuniosity and mitigation, on which special leave had been granted. They held that the Full Court’s decision was not open to attack. The appellant was not locked into a situation from which he could not escape, as in cases where a buyer was tricked into buying a business. His hire-purchase agreement entitled him to terminate the hiring by returning the vehicle, and nothing suggested that he could not then have received adequate compensation from the respondent.
They agreed with Connolly J that it was not a case of mitigation at all but one that called for a determination of the point in time beyond which any damage could not be said to be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as flowing from the breach, and that the effect of impecuniosity on the duty to mitigate was irrelevant to that question. It might have been relevant had the appellant been fixed with knowledge of the breach in August 1977 or soon after the November 1977 breakdown.
Brennan J said that, leaving aside mitigation, the only grounds on which loss after July 1978 might not be recoverable were remoteness and causation. He held that foreseeability extended until it would be unreasonable for the injured party to fail to act to mitigate his loss, “and the onus of proving such a failure is on the party in breach”. The limit on recovery of loss that reasonable mitigation would have avoided is “not so draconian as to deny recovery to an impecunious victim who, if he were not impecunious, could have avoided the loss”.
The reasonableness of the steps the appellant took had to be assessed in light of his actual financial situation, and the respondent, on whom the onus lay, had not shown that he was bound to suffer further losses when he went back on the road. Brennan J therefore considered that the Full Court’s assessment had to be set aside and, in the absence of the necessary findings, would have remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for reassessment of damages. He treated the order to be made as that of the majority.
Why does this case matter?
The case is usually cited for how a plaintiff’s lack of money bears on the duty to mitigate. Examiners reward an answer that attributes each statement to the Justice who made it and that keeps remoteness and mitigation apart.
Exam and application relevance
Where a plaintiff goes on incurring loss after a breach and the defendant says the loss could have been avoided, identify which losses were within the parties’ reasonable contemplation when the contract was made, what steps were open to the plaintiff and at what cost, whether he could afford them, and who must prove what.
Name the Justice for each point you take from the case: Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ jointly, or Brennan J.
Check your understanding
1. What did Gibbs CJ say about the relevance of the appellant’s lack of means to the lost profits over the engine’s four-year life, and what did he say about the losses from carrying on trading after June 1978?
2. Why did Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ say that the appeal did not call for a decision on the effect of impecuniosity on the duty to mitigate, and what point in time did they identify as important?
3. Where did Brennan J place the onus of proving a failure to mitigate, and how did he say the reasonableness of the appellant’s steps should be assessed?