Remedies, loss and causation for misleading or deceptive conduct

What a claimant can recover or obtain once conduct contravenes s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law: damages and compensation orders, the loss and causation they require, the six-year time limit, and the reductions for a careless claimant and concurrent wrongdoers.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
contract
Topics
vitiating-factors

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish a claim for damages under s 236 from an application for orders under ss 237 and 243 of the Australian Consumer Law.
  • Explain what a claimant must show to have suffered loss or damage because of misleading or deceptive conduct.
  • State when the six-year limitation period under s 236(2) starts to run.
  • Identify when a claimant’s own lack of care or another wrongdoer’s contribution reduces what is recoverable.

Showing that conduct was misleading or deceptive under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law is only the first half of a claim. Section 18 states a prohibition and says nothing about what a claimant gets; the money and the orders discussed here come from Chapter 5 of the same Schedule. Damages require loss suffered because of the conduct, and the orders under ss 237 to 239 are directed to actual or likely loss. This article states the Commonwealth application of the Australian Consumer Law, that is, Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) applied by s 131 of that Act as a law of the Commonwealth to the conduct of corporations.6 States and Territories apply the same text as their own law, and their provisions are not stated here. The elements of s 18 are covered in Misleading or deceptive conduct; they are not repeated.

Where the remedies come from

Section 18(1) provides that a person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.1 It is a provision of Chapter 2, and the remedies in Chapter 5 attach to contraventions of Chapter 2.2 This article examines four routes under ss 236 to 239, which differ in who may use them and in what they require. Section 232, which provides for injunctions, is a further route and is not examined here.

  1. Damages under s 236. A claimant who suffers loss or damage because of the conduct of another person, where the conduct contravened a provision of Chapter 2 or 3, may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that person or against any person involved in the contravention.
  2. Orders under s 237. A court may, on the application of a person who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of a contravention, make the orders it thinks appropriate against the person who engaged in the conduct or a person involved in it. The regulator may apply on behalf of injured persons, but only with their written consent.
  3. Orders under s 238. Where a proceeding has been instituted under a provision of Chapter 4 or Chapter 5 (other than s 238 itself) and the court finds that a party has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of a contravention of Chapter 2, 3 or 4, it may make orders against the other person or a person involved in the contravention.
  4. Orders for non-parties under s 239. Only the regulator may apply, the orders exclude an award of damages, and they address loss suffered by a class that includes people who are not parties.

The difference students most often miss is between ss 236 and 237. Damages need loss that has been suffered. An s 237 order is available to a person who is likely to suffer loss, and it must be an order that compensates the injured person in whole or in part, or that prevents or reduces the loss.

Orders that act on the contract

Section 243 says that, without limiting ss 237(1), 238(1) and 239(1), the orders a court may make include several that operate on a contract between the respondent and the injured person, or on a collateral arrangement relating to it.3 The court may declare the whole or part of the contract void and, if it thinks fit, void from the start or from a specified date, which may be earlier than the date of the order. It may vary the contract, and declare it to have had effect as varied from a specified date. It may refuse to enforce any or all of its provisions. The list continues with orders to refund money or return property, to pay the injured person the amount of the loss or damage (except under s 239(1)), to repair goods, to supply services, and to execute an instrument affecting an interest in land.

The text of s 243 does not make these orders depend on a right to rescind at general law. The question is the statutory one: has the applicant suffered, or is the applicant likely to suffer, loss or damage because of the contravention, and will the order compensate for it or prevent or reduce it? A contract that is merely a bad bargain is not enough, as the next section shows.

What counts as loss or damage

Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 4947 was decided under ss 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the earlier provisions that gave damages and orders for misleading conduct. Borrowers had been told that interest would be charged at a base rate plus a fixed margin, and the lender later raised the margin. The reasons of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ state that “The bare fact that a contract has been made which confers rights or imposes obligations that are different from what one party represented to be the case does not demonstrate that the party that was misled has suffered loss or damage.” They add that “A party that is misled suffers no prejudice or disadvantage unless it is shown that that party could have acted in some other way (or refrained from acting in some way) which would have been of greater benefit or less detriment to it than the course in fact adopted.” The borrowers had conceded that no cheaper loan was available, so on the case as argued they had suffered no loss and no order could be made; the reasons do not say that every other kind of loss, such as consequential loss, is excluded.

The lesson for a problem question is that the contrast with what was represented is the start of the loss inquiry, not its end. Ask what the claimant could have done instead, and whether that would have left the claimant better off.

Causation

Section 236(1) says loss “because of” the conduct. The earlier provision said “by”. In Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514,8 the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said that “by” expresses causation without defining it, and that the section should be understood as taking up the common law practical or common-sense concept of causation, except so far as the Act modifies it.

Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 4599 shows how generous that concept is. Gleeson CJ held that “it is not essential that the contravention be the sole cause of the loss or damage”. The claimants’ own careless feasibility study was a concurrent cause of their decision to buy and develop; the misrepresentations by the land agent were another, and that was enough. His Honour added that “Negligence on the part of the victim of a contravention is not a bar to an action under s 82 unless the conduct of the victim is such as to destroy the causal connection between contravention and loss or damage.” The other members of the Court wrote separately, and their reasons are not stated here, so these statements are Gleeson CJ’s and not the holding of the Court.

Gleeson CJ also said that the common law principles for assessing damages in contract or tort “are not directly in point”, although they may give useful guidance and are not controlling. A student should therefore not assume the contract expectation measure or the tort measure applies as of course.

Common-sense causation is not the whole of the current approach. In Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, a case on loss suffered “by” contraventions of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), the joint reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ said that it is doubtful whether there is any “common sense” notion of causation that can provide a useful, still less universal, legal norm, and that notions of cause in a statutory regime are understood by reference to the statutory subject, scope and purpose.10 Tambree was decided under the NSW Act, not the ACL, so the point for a problem question is to ask what the particular provision is directed at, with Wardley as the starting point and not the end of the inquiry.

The six-year limit and when it starts

An action for damages under s 236 may be commenced within 6 years after the day on which the cause of action that relates to the conduct accrued. An application for orders under s 237 must be made before the end of 6 years from the day the cause of action accrued. The clock does not necessarily start when the statement was made. In Wardley the joint reasons held that the cause of action under s 82(1) “does not accrue until actual loss or damage is sustained”. Wardley concerned a three-year period in the old s 82(2), and s 236(2) now says six years. It is still the case to start from on accrual, because s 236(2) uses the same word and the action is still defined by loss suffered because of the conduct.

Reducing and sharing liability

Henville did not have s 137B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) before it. That section applies where a claimant sues under s 236(1) for economic loss or damage to property caused by conduct contravening s 18, and the loss was suffered partly because the claimant failed to take reasonable care and partly because of the conduct.5 The recoverable amount is reduced to the extent the court thinks just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility. There is no reduction if the other person intended to cause the loss or caused it fraudulently. Gleeson CJ’s statement that the victim’s negligence is not a bar must now be read with that section.

Part VIA of the same Act deals with a different situation: more than one person caused the loss. It applies to a claim for damages under s 236 for economic loss or property damage caused by a contravention of s 18.4 A defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer is liable only for the proportion of the loss that the court considers just, having regard to the extent of that defendant’s responsibility, and the court may give judgment against the defendant for no more than that amount. A concurrent wrongdoer who intended to cause the loss, or fraudulently caused it, does not get that protection (s 87CC), and its liability is determined under the legal rules otherwise relevant. A problem with both a careless claimant and several wrongdoers engages both provisions; how they interact is not established by the sources cited here.

Financial services

Section 131A(2)(a) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) provides that Part 2-1 of Schedule 2, which contains s 18, does not apply to conduct engaged in in relation to financial services. A claim about a financial service or product therefore does not proceed under the Commonwealth application of s 18. The legislation that covers it is not stated here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Confirm the conduct contravened s 18, and identify whose law applies: this article covers the Commonwealth application to corporations, and a financial service falls outside it.
  2. Decide the remedy sought. Damages under s 236 need loss already suffered. An order under s 237 can be sought for loss likely to be suffered.
  3. If the claimant wants the contract avoided, varied or not enforced, frame the application under ss 237 and 243 and show the loss that the order will compensate or prevent.
  4. Compare what the claimant received with what the claimant could otherwise have done. On the joint reasons in Marks, a different bargain from the one represented does not by itself show loss.
  5. Argue causation from the statutory words, starting with Wardley’s common-sense concept and then asking what the provision is directed at (Tambree). The misleading conduct need not be the only cause. The claimant’s carelessness does not of itself defeat causation, but it will if it destroys the causal connection between the conduct and the loss (Gleeson CJ in Henville), and in a qualifying claim s 137B can reduce the amount recovered.
  6. Check the six-year limit, taking Wardley (actual loss sustained, decided on the old s 82) as the starting point for when the cause of action accrued and saying that it is applied to s 236(2) by analogy.
  7. Consider s 137B for a careless claimant and Part VIA for other wrongdoers, and say plainly where you are unsure how they combine.

Self-check

  • Have I said whether the claim is for damages under s 236 or for orders under s 237?
  • Have I shown actual or likely loss, not just a gap between the representation and the contract?
  • Have I stated that Wardley, Marks and Henville were decided under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and that Tambree was decided under the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW)?
  • Have I started the six-year period at the loss, not the statement, and said that this applies Wardley by analogy?
  • Have I dealt with causation from the statutory words, and with carelessness through both Henville and s 137B?
  • Have I checked that a financial service is not being analysed under the Commonwealth s 18?

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