Remedies, loss and causation for misleading or deceptive conduct

Where the remedies come from

Section 18(1) bans misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce. This sits in Chapter 2. Remedies in Chapter 5 apply when Chapter 2 is breached.

There are four main remedy routes under ss 236 to 239. They differ in who can use them and what each requires. (Section 232, which covers injunctions, is a separate route not covered here.)

Section 236 lets a person who has actually suffered loss claim damages. They can sue the wrongdoer or anyone involved in the contravention.

Section 237 lets a court make orders for a person who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss. The regulator can apply on the injured person’s behalf, but only with their written consent.

Section 238 applies once a case has already started under Chapter 4 or Chapter 5. If the court finds a party has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss from a Chapter 2, 3 or 4 contravention, it can make orders against the wrongdoer or an involved person.

Section 239 lets only the regulator apply, on behalf of a wider class of people, including non-parties. These orders cannot include damages.

Students often confuse ss 236 and 237. Section 236 requires loss that has already happened. Section 237 only requires likely future loss, and the order must compensate the person or prevent/reduce that loss.

Orders that act on the contract

Section 243 lists extra orders a court may make about a contract. These orders do not limit the court’s powers under ss 237(1), 238(1) and 239(1).

The court may void the contract, in whole or part, from the start or from a later date it sets. It may instead vary the contract, or refuse to enforce some or all of its terms.

Other orders include refunding money, returning property, or paying the injured person for their loss (except under s 239(1)). The court can also order repairs, services, or signing a document affecting land.

These orders do not depend on a right to rescind under general law. The real question is statutory: has the applicant suffered or likely suffered loss from the contravention, and will the order fix, prevent or reduce it?

A contract that is simply a bad bargain is not enough on its own.

What counts as loss or damage

Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd was decided under the former ss 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which gave damages for misleading conduct. Borrowers were told interest would be a base rate plus a fixed margin; the lender later raised the margin.

The court’s reasoning held that a contract differing from what was represented does not, by itself, prove loss or damage. A misled party only suffers loss if it shows it could have acted differently and been better off.

Here, the borrowers conceded no cheaper loan was available. So on these facts there was no loss, and no order could be made. This does not mean other kinds of loss, such as consequential loss, are excluded.

Lesson: the gap between what was represented and reality is only the start of the loss inquiry. Ask what the claimant could have done instead, and whether that would have left them better off.

Causation

Section 236(1) requires loss “because of” the conduct. In Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia, the court said this means ordinary common-sense causation, the kind used at common law. The statute only changes this concept where it expressly says so.

Henville v Walker shows this idea is generous. Gleeson CJ said a contravention need not be the only cause of loss. In that case, the claimants’ own careless feasibility study was one cause, and the other side’s misrepresentations were another cause. That was enough to satisfy causation.

Gleeson CJ also said the victim’s own negligence does not bar a claim. It only bars the claim if it breaks the causal link between the contravention and the loss. Note these are Gleeson CJ’s reasons alone, not the view of the whole court.

Gleeson CJ further said common law methods for assessing contract or tort damages “are not directly in point”. They may still offer useful guidance but do not control the outcome. So students should not assume contract or tort damages rules automatically apply.

Common-sense causation is not the final word, though. In Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree, a case about the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), Gummow and Hayne JJ doubted there is one “common sense” causation test useful across all statutes. Instead, causation depends on the specific statute’s subject, scope and purpose.

Tambree concerned the NSW Act, not the ACL. For problem questions, start with Wardley’s common-sense approach, but then examine what the specific provision is aimed at.

The six-year limit and when it starts

There is a six-year limit for these claims. A claim for damages under s 236 must start within six years of the cause of action accruing. An application under s 237 must also be made within six years of accrual.

This six-year period does not always start when the misleading statement was made. In Wardley, the court held that the cause of action does not accrue until the person actually suffers loss or damage.

Wardley dealt with an older three-year limit, not the current six-year one in s 236(2). But the same reasoning still applies, because s 236(2) uses the same idea of accrual. The claim is still defined by the loss caused by the conduct.

Reducing and sharing liability

Section 137B of the Competition and Consumer Act changes things since Henville. It applies when a claimant sues under s 236(1) for economic loss or property damage caused by conduct that breaches s 18. It only applies if the claimant’s own failure to take reasonable care partly caused the loss too.

Where s 137B applies, the court can reduce the recoverable amount. The reduction must be just and equitable, based on the claimant’s share of responsibility. But there is no reduction if the other person intended the loss, or caused it fraudulently.

Part VIA of the same Act covers a different problem: several people causing the one loss. It applies to damages claims under s 236 for economic loss or property damage from a s 18 contravention.

Under Part VIA, a “concurrent wrongdoer” (someone also responsible for the loss) is only liable for their fair share. The court decides this share based on their responsibility, and judgment cannot exceed that amount.

This protection does not apply to a concurrent wrongdoer who intended the loss or caused it fraudulently (s 87CC). Their liability is worked out under ordinary legal rules instead.

Some cases involve both a careless claimant and multiple wrongdoers, triggering both provisions. The passage notes that how these two provisions interact together is not settled by the sources referred to here.

Applying this in a problem question

First, check the conduct breaches s 18. This article only covers the Commonwealth law for corporations, not financial services.

Next, pick the remedy. Damages under s 236 need loss already suffered. An order under s 237 can cover loss likely to happen later.

If the claimant wants the contract avoided, varied, or unenforced, frame this under ss 237 and 243. Show the loss the order will compensate or prevent.

Compare what the claimant actually got with what else they could have done. Under Marks, simply getting a different bargain than promised does not, alone, prove loss.

For causation, start with Wardley’s common-sense idea, then ask what the provision targets (Tambree). The conduct need not be the sole cause. Carelessness by the claimant does not automatically break causation — but it will if it severs the link between conduct and loss (Gleeson CJ, Henville). Where s 137B applies, it can reduce the amount recovered.

Check the six-year time limit. Wardley (actual loss, decided under the old s 82) marks when the cause of action starts, applied to s 236(2) by analogy.

Finally, consider s 137B for a careless claimant and Part VIA for other wrongdoers. If unsure how these interact, say so clearly.

Self-check

Before finishing, check these points.

State whether you are claiming damages under s 236 or orders under s 237.

Show actual or likely loss. A mere gap between the representation and the contract is not enough.

Note that Wardley, Marks and Henville were decided under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Tambree, by contrast, was decided under the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW).

Start the six-year limitation period from the loss, not the statement. This approach applies Wardley by analogy, not as binding authority.

Address causation using the statutory wording itself. Deal with carelessness through both Henville and s 137B.

Finally, confirm that a financial service is not wrongly analysed under the Commonwealth’s s 18.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.

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