Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree

High Court of Australia · 2005

ContractVitiating Factors

Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627; [2005] HCA 69

An accountant and an auditor negligently signed off a travel agent’s false accounts. After she lost her licence she traded on illegally until officials closed her down. Did that illegality end their liability to the fund that paid out?

Qualified by legislation: Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), from 1 January 2011

The Court applied ss 42 and 68 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) as they stood in 2005. The Fair Trading Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 2010 (NSW), which commenced on 1 January 2011, amended Division 8 of Part 2 and Parts 3 to 7 of that Act. The Act as now in force applies the Australian Consumer Law (NSW) as a law of New South Wales through Part 3, and s 68 is now headed “Proceedings for offences”. The reasoning in Tambree about the word “by” in the former s 68 therefore concerns a provision that is no longer in that form, and its application to the causation words of the Australian Consumer Law has to be argued from those words.

What happened?

The Travel Compensation Fund was set up under a Deed of Trust dated 12 December 1986 as part of a national scheme for the regulation of travel agents. It paid compensation to people who had entrusted money to a travel agent and suffered loss because the agent failed to account for it ([3]-[6]). A travel agent had to be a participant in the Fund to hold a licence, and the Fund decided each year whether to renew participation by reference to audited financial statements ([4]).

Ms Renee Fry ran a travel agency in Parramatta. Her financial statements for the years ended 30 June 1997 and 30 June 1998 were prepared by the first respondent and audited by the second, and were submitted to the Fund to support her continued participation; both respondents knew that the Fund would rely on them ([11]). The statements showed no current liabilities, although the business owed a wholesaler, Metro Travel, $65,684 at the end of the first year and $152,615 at the end of the second ([12]). Austin J found the statements false and misleading, found the respondents negligent, and found that they had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ([13], [20]).

On 18 February 1999 Ms Fry wrote to the Fund saying she wished to cease participation, and on 23 February 1999 the Fund terminated it ([15]). She and her father went on running the business from the same premises, without a licence, until the Department of Fair Trading closed it in April 1999 ([16]). The Fund paid claims totalling $143,050; $13,320 related to money paid before 23 February 1999 and most of the rest to money paid between that date and 20 April 1999 ([19]). Austin J concluded that the respondents’ conduct caused the Fund a loss of $143,050, and the Fund succeeded in its claim for damages ([1], [20]). Section 68 of the Act allowed a person who suffers loss or damage “by” conduct in contravention of s 42 to recover it ([20]).

The Court of Appeal of New South Wales accepted Austin J’s reasoning on every point but one ([23]). It held that Ms Fry’s illegal trading after 23 February 1999 “severed the chain of causation” and reduced the damages to $13,320 ([23]-[24]). The Fund appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders of the Court of Appeal were set aside and in their place the appeal to that Court was dismissed with costs (Orders; [38]). Four sets of reasons were given: Gleeson CJ ([1]-[38]); Gummow and Hayne JJ jointly ([39]-[50]); Kirby J ([51]-[77]); and Callinan J ([78]-[86]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Fund’s loss and the illegality of the trading ([28]-[36], [40]-[44], [49]-[50], [73]-[74], [84]). The five Justices agreed in allowing the appeal and in holding that the Fund’s loss from the claims it paid for dealings after 23 February 1999 was not cut off by the illegality of Ms Fry’s trading, although the reasons differ. Gleeson CJ: in deciding a causation issue under the Fair Trading Act the statutory purpose is the primary source of the relevant legal norms ([28]); s 68, applied to a contravention of s 42, gives rise to the same questions as s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) applied to a contravention of s 52, and the answer to whether loss is “by” misleading conduct is found in the purpose of the statute as related to the circumstances of the particular case ([30]).

This was a case of known reliance: the Fund needed financial information about participating agents to protect itself against claims, including claims by people who dealt with an agent who was no longer a participant, and it acted in reliance on that information ([31]). Where reliance involves undertaking a risk, the information is provided to induce that reliance, the misleading conduct is participation in providing false information, and the very risk against which protection is sought materialises, it is consistent with the purpose of the statute to treat the loss as resulting from the misleading conduct ([32]).

Clause 15.2 shows that the scheme was not limited to failures to account by agents licensed at the time ([33]), and the illegality of Ms Fry’s conduct did not take it outside the scope of the risk, as cl 15.1 also shows ([34]). The answer is to be found “not in a value judgment, but in an accurate identification of the nature of the risk against which the appellant sought protection and of the loss it suffered, considered in the light of the kind of wrongful conduct in which the first and second respondents engaged” ([35]); the same considerations apply to the negligence claim ([36]).

Gummow and Hayne JJ (jointly): what happened was the occurrence of the very risk against which the Fund sought to protect itself ([40]); that describes events from the Fund’s point of view, which is far from irrelevant, but the respondents contended that it obscured whether the circumstances in which the risk eventuated bore on liability ([41]). Their Honours held that the characterisation of the trading after 23 February 1999 as illegal, though correct, was irrelevant to whether the Fund suffered loss “by” the contraventions of s 42, because it did not bear on whether the respondents’ conduct was a cause of the loss, and the continued trading was trading which, had the respondents acted properly, would have been prevented ([44]); the question under s 68 was whether the conduct of each respondent that contravened the Act was a cause of the loss, and the unlawfulness of Ms Fry’s conduct was not relevant to that inquiry ([49]).

They added that, on the negligence claim, her continued trading was not an intervening event that broke the chain of causation ([50]). Kirby J agreed in the orders but not in the way the error of the Court of Appeal was expressed ([51]); his reasons for the result were that the loss was of the kind for which the Fund could be held liable to consumers and against which it was entitled to expect the accountant and auditor to protect it, so that the unlicensed trading did not sever the causal link ([73]-[74]).

Callinan J agreed with the reasons and conclusion of Gleeson CJ ([78]) and added that the illegality of the trading after the licence ended was incidental only: underlying the facts about the licence and its use, and directly and naturally contributing to them, including the subsequent, incidentally illegal trading, were the negligent accounting and auditing and the misrepresentations consequent upon them ([84]).

The Justices’ accounts of common sense and value judgments ([28]-[29], [45]-[49], [55]-[57], [61], [70], [79]-[85]). The Justices did not give the same account of “common sense”, value judgments and the Court of Appeal’s two-stage approach to causation. Gummow and Hayne JJ (jointly) said that the answer to a question of causation can differ with the purpose for which it is asked, and that, as emphasised in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd, it is doubtful whether there is any “common sense” notion of causation that can provide a useful, still less universal, legal norm, so that some cases require examination of the purpose of the particular cause of action or the nature and scope of the defendant’s obligation ([45]).

Accepting that considerations of legal policy may enter into the selection of causative factors does not adopt the proposition that the ultimate issue is whether “the defendant ought to be held liable to pay damages for [the] harm [suffered]”, the approach of Ipp JA in Ruddock v Taylor which the Court of Appeal adopted ([46]); the reasons given in Sullivan v Moody against a “fair, just and reasonable” criterion apply to that approach ([47]-[48]); and for a statutory claim “notions of ‘cause’ as involved in [that] statutory regime are to be understood by reference to the statutory subject, scope and purpose” ([49]).

Gleeson CJ accepted that issues of causation commonly involve normative considerations, but said that the object is to formulate principles from policy and apply them, that the relevant norms must be derived from legal principle, and that acknowledging a role for normative considerations does not invite judges to engage in value judgments at large ([28]-[29]). Kirby J agreed that the test for resolving contested causation questions in claims based on legislation such as the Fair Trading Act remains that stated in March v Stramare (E & M H) Pty Ltd, in the passage from Mason CJ extracted by Callinan J ([55]), but disagreed with what he took to be an attempt to exclude from that approach the “second question” Mason CJ identified, which he described as a policy question where value judgments have to be resolved ([57]); he considered the criticism of the Court of Appeal’s references to “value judgments” unwarranted ([61]) and the question the Court of Appeal asked in no way unreasonable ([70]), and he said that the Court of Appeal erred in deleting the sums from the judgment ([74]) while saying that Sheller JA had expressed the principles accurately and that the result did not follow from any misunderstanding of them ([75]).

Callinan J said that March v Stramare continues to state the relevant common law on the topic ([79]); agreed with Mason CJ that a disputed causation question cannot be resolved by an invariable scientific formula and that candour demands acknowledging the use of common sense, while value judgments may sometimes be inescapably involved ([81]); considered that the Court of Appeal had adopted a two-stage approach of the kind rejected in March ([82]), which probably led it into treating the illegality of the trading as a decisive disqualifying factor ([85]); and said that, were the case not governed by legislation and the loss to stem only or substantially from conduct illegal as such, he might well have decided it as the Court of Appeal did ([84]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ

Read judgment: [28]–[35] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs identify the statutory purpose as the source of the relevant norms and the risk the Fund sought protection against, and conclude that the illegality did not take the loss outside that risk; they are the Chief Justice’s route to the conclusion at [37] that Austin J was correct.

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [40]–[44] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [49]–[50] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs hold that the illegality of the trading was irrelevant to whether the respondents’ contraventions were a cause of the loss under s 68, and that on the negligence claim it was not an intervening event; they agree with Gleeson CJ that the appeal should be allowed ([39]).

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders)

Read judgment: [73]–[75] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J reached the same result by holding that the loss was within what the Fund could be held liable for and that the Court of Appeal erred in deleting the sums ([73]-[74]), while saying that it had not misunderstood the principles of causation ([75]); he agrees in the orders, not in the way the error is expressed by the other Justices ([51]).

Separate reasoning · Callinan J (agreeing with Gleeson CJ and adding reasons)

Read judgment: [84]–[85] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J agrees with the reasons and conclusion of the Chief Justice ([78]) and adds that the illegality was incidental and that the Court of Appeal’s two-stage approach led it into treating illegality as decisive.

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [45]–[49] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the doubt about a “common sense” notion of causation ([45]) and reject the Court of Appeal’s two-stage approach ([46]-[48]); [49] then applies the statutory-purpose point to s 68, and the joint reasons treat their conclusions about the Fair Trading Act as sufficient to require the appeal to be allowed ([50]). The doubt about “common sense” and the rejection of the two-stage approach are the reasoning of two Justices, and Gleeson CJ ([28]-[29]), Kirby J and Callinan J say different things on the same subject.

Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ

Read judgment: [28]–[29] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

The Chief Justice accepts a role for normative considerations in causation but says they must be derived from legal principle; his own reasons for the result rest on the statutory purpose and the risk ([35]).

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders)

Read judgment: [55]–[57] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [61]–[66] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J would keep the March v Stramare approach, including its policy question, and says the criticism of the Court of Appeal’s use of value judgments is unwarranted; he joins the orders only.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J (agreeing with Gleeson CJ and adding reasons)

Read judgment: [79]–[82] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J restates March v Stramare as the common law, endorses common sense with candour, and says the Court of Appeal adopted the two-stage approach that March rejected; these are his additional observations beside his agreement with the Chief Justice.

Why does this case matter?

Problem questions about misleading conduct often add a third person whose wrongdoing comes between the contravention and the loss, and many answers settle the matter with a slogan or with the label “illegal”. This decision gives a student the facts of such a problem and four sets of reasons to read against each other, which is the material an examiner expects an answer to engage with.

Exam and application relevance

Name the Act and the date. The Court decided the case under ss 42 and 68 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) as they stood in 2005; it was not asked about the Australian Consumer Law, which was not then in force, and the change from 1 January 2011 is set out in the treatment above.

Attribute each step to the Justice or Justices whose reasons it is, using the pinpoints in the Proposition, and describe the result separately from the route to it.

Check your understanding

1. What were the Court of Appeal’s reasons for reducing the Fund’s damages from $143,050 to $13,320, and which paragraphs of Gleeson CJ’s reasons set them out ([23]-[24])?

2. How did Gleeson CJ describe the risk against which the Fund sought protection, and what did he say about the illegality of Ms Fry’s conduct in relation to it ([31]-[35])?

3. How did Gummow and Hayne JJ analyse the significance of Ms Fry’s unlicensed trading to statutory causation, and at which paragraphs ([44], [49])?

4. What did Callinan J say about March v Stramare, and how does that compare with what Gummow and Hayne JJ said about “common sense” ([45], [79]-[82])?

5. What did Kirby J agree with, and what did he disagree with, in the reasons of the other members of the Court ([51], [55], [57], [61])?