Thorne v Kennedy

High Court of Australia · 2017

ContractVitiating Factors

Thorne v Kennedy (2017) 263 CLR 85; [2017] HCA 49

Four days before her wedding, a fiancée who had left her life overseas signed a pre-nuptial agreement her own solicitor had emphatically advised her not to sign. Could the law release her from it?

Clarified by Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd (2022) 276 CLR 1

In Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ cited Thorne at [38] alongside Kakavas when approving Mason J’s emphasis in Amadio that the other party “knows or ought to know” of the disabling condition and its effect (at [45] and footnote 74). Their Honours accepted that the primary judge’s findings that the lender’s agent “should have known” the borrower was bound to lose his equity did “not rise to an unequivocal finding of actual knowledge” on the agent’s part that the borrower would inevitably lose it, but held that “a finding in such terms was not essential to the appellant’s case for relief”: the question was whether the agent’s appreciation of the borrower’s special disadvantage amounted to an exploitation of it ([44]). The same three Justices said that the Amadio considerations are not to be addressed separately as if they were separate elements of a cause of action in tort ([39]). Steward J set out the Thorne summary of the test as the governing test, which was not in dispute ([155]). A student who states the knowledge limb from Thorne should present it as part of one assessment of the particular facts.

Clarified by Nitopi v Nitopi [2022] NSWCA 162

In Nitopi v Nitopi, an intermediate court whose reasoning does not bind the High Court, Bell CJ said that Thorne at [38] and Stubbings at [44] appear to represent “something of a retreat” from Kakavas’s apparent insistence on actual knowledge or wilful ignorance ([7]), and Ward P said there appears to have been a move away from the actual-knowledge requirement and an acceptance that constructive knowledge may suffice ([118]-[120]). Bell CJ reasoned that the only way to reconcile Kakavas and Thorne on knowledge is to read Kakavas as authority only for the proposition that constructive notice is insufficient, not for the further proposition that constructive knowledge is insufficient ([9]), and did not need to reach a concluded view on that question, because there was no finding of actual knowledge of the particular special disadvantage and, in his Honour’s view, no proper basis for concluding that the appellant ought to have been aware of it; the primary judge’s conclusion was at best one of constructive notice, which is insufficient. A student who relies on “ought to have known” from Thorne should distinguish constructive notice from constructive knowledge.

Clarified by Gunn v Meiners [2022] WASCA 95

In Gunn v Meiners the Western Australian Court of Appeal (Mitchell, Beech and Vaughan JJA), a court below the High Court, explained how it reads Thorne on two points. First, it did not understand the Thorne plurality to have departed from Kakavas, and held that “ought to have known” in Thorne at [38] “should be understood as picking up what was said by Mason J in Amadio as more recently restated and explained by a unanimous High Court in Kakavas”, so that in their Honours’ view knowledge found on a purely objective basis cannot suffice and wilful ignorance marks the limit, and they upheld the ground that the primary judge had approached knowledge on a wholly objective basis; Nitopi reads the same High Court decisions the other way. Second, they said the “markedly sub-standard” formulation in Thorne is concerned with actual undue influence, not with the presumption, which depends on the history of the relationship involving ascendancy or influence on one side and dependency or trust on the other. A student should state the knowledge limb of Thorne with this reading and the contrary reading in Nitopi both in view, and should not use the judgmental-capacity test to decide whether the presumption arises.

What happened?

Ms Thorne was a 36-year-old Eastern European woman living in the Middle East, with no substantial assets. Mr Kennedy was a 67-year-old Greek Australian property developer with assets of between $18 million and $24 million, divorced with three adult children. They met over the internet in 2006 ([4]). Very shortly after meeting her online he travelled overseas to meet her and told her that if he liked her he would marry her but that “you will have to sign paper. My money is for my children” ([5]). In February 2007 they moved to Australia to live in his penthouse, intending to marry ([6]), and the wedding was set for 30 September 2007 ([7]).

Around 19 September 2007 Mr Kennedy told Ms Thorne they were going to see solicitors about the signing of an agreement; when she asked whether he required her to sign, he replied that if she did not sign it the wedding would not go ahead ([7]). On 20 September he took her and her sister to an independent solicitor, Ms Harrison, an accredited family law specialist, and it was during that appointment that Ms Thorne first became aware of the agreement’s contents. By then her parents and sister had been flown to Australia and accommodated by Mr Kennedy, guests had been invited, her dress had been made and the reception had been booked ([7]).

Ms Harrison’s written advice recorded that if the couple separated within the first three years Ms Thorne would get nothing, and that after three years without children she would receive a single lump sum of $50,000, which Ms Harrison described as “piteously small” ([8]). It concluded that the agreement was drawn to protect Mr Kennedy’s interests “solely and in no way considers your interests” ([9]). Ms Harrison’s evidence was that the agreement was entirely inappropriate and that she told Ms Thorne she should not sign it ([12]). Relatively minor amendments were made at her suggestion ([11]). Ms Thorne signed the first agreement on 26 September 2007, four days before the wedding ([13]). A substantially identical agreement was signed on 5 November 2007, after Ms Harrison again urged her not to sign ([14]).

The couple separated, without children, in August 2011. Ms Thorne began proceedings in April 2012, seeking among other orders the setting aside of both agreements; Mr Kennedy died in May 2014, during the trial, and two of his adult children, as executors and trustees of his estate, were substituted as a party ([15]). The primary judge, Judge Demack, set both agreements aside for duress, a label she used interchangeably with undue influence ([2]). The Full Court of the Family Court (Strickland, Aldridge and Cronin JJ) allowed an appeal, holding that her reasons were inadequate ([50]) and that duress required unlawful conduct ([51]), and dismissed Ms Thorne’s notice of contention, which had sought to uphold the result on the basis of undue influence or unconscionable conduct ([52]-[53]). Ms Thorne appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Family Court made on 26 September 2016, ordered in their place that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs, and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to the High Court ([67]). The primary judge’s orders setting aside the two agreements therefore stood. The orders did not affect Ms Thorne’s application for a property adjustment order and a lump sum maintenance order, which remained to be determined by the Federal Circuit Court ([68]).

Seven Justices sat and delivered three sets of reasons, each agreeing in the orders ([69], [79], [124]). The Proposition sets out whose reasons are whose.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Undue influence: the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ (five of the seven Justices). The question whether a person’s act is “free” “requires consideration of the extent to which the person was constrained in assessing alternatives and deciding between them”, and pressure can deprive a person of free choice where it causes the person substantially to subordinate his or her will to that of the other party ([32]). The person need not have been reduced to an automaton, questions of degree are involved, and the judgmental capacity of the party seeking relief must at the very least be “markedly sub-standard” as a result of the effect on the person’s mind of the will of another ([32]).

Because pressure is only one of many sources of influence, the pressure need not be characterised as illegitimate or improper ([30]). Undue influence may be proved by direct evidence of the circumstances of the particular transaction, which was the primary judge’s approach, or by presumption ([34]). Ms Thorne’s alternative submission that the relationship of fiancé and fiancée should be recognised as one to which the presumption attaches was rejected: common experience today of the wide variety of circumstances in which two people can become engaged “negates any conclusion” that the relationship gives rise to a presumption that either person substantially subordinates his or her free will to the other ([35]-[36]).

The plurality emphasised the primary judge’s advantages and the evaluative nature of the question ([41]-[43]). It held that the primary judge’s finding was in effect that Ms Thorne was deprived of the ability to bring a free choice to the decision whether to sign, her choices having been subordinated to Mr Kennedy’s will, and that the conclusion was more aptly described as undue influence than duress ([57]). It said that the unfair and unreasonable terms were relevant, and that a pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement signed despite being known to be grossly unreasonable even for agreements of that nature can be an indicium of undue influence ([56]).

Factors that may have prominence for such agreements include whether the agreement was offered on a basis that it was not subject to negotiation, the emotional circumstances including any explicit or implicit threat to end a marriage or engagement, whether there was time for careful reflection, the nature of the relationship, the relative financial positions, and the independent advice received and whether there was time to reflect on it ([60]). The primary judge’s reasons were not inadequate: an assessment of undue influence does not require a trial judge to assign weight to each factor relied on ([62]).

Undue influence: Gordon J. Her Honour agreed with the orders but held that the agreements were procured by unconscionable conduct and not undue influence ([79]). The critical element for undue influence is the impairment of the will of the weaker party ([86], [103]); a belief that she had no choice but to sign if she wanted the relationship to continue did not show a lack of capacity to exercise independent judgment ([106]), and the narrowness of her options goes to special disadvantage and says nothing about her will ([107]). Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent, informed and voluntary judgment was in her Honour’s view unaffected ([80], [108]).

Undue influence: Nettle J. His Honour’s reasons rest the result on special disadvantage and unconscientious advantage-taking ([74]-[78]) and make no finding on whether undue influence was established.

Unconscionable conduct: all seven Justices. The plurality took the principles from Kakavas, which no party contested, and held that unconscionable conduct requires the innocent party to be subject to a special disadvantage “which seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to [the innocent party’s] own best interests” and the other party unconscientiously to take advantage of it ([37]-[38]). It said that the same circumstances can establish both undue influence and special disadvantage, but the doctrines have distinct spheres of operation, because special disadvantage can arise from many circumstances that would not establish undue influence ([39]-[40]).

The parties accepted that the principles were not altered by Pt VIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), though the particular circumstances of the marital context would be taken into account, and no submission was made on how s 90K(1)(e) might differ from the equitable doctrine ([23]). On the primary judge’s findings Ms Thorne was under a special disadvantage; it was known to Mr Kennedy and had been in part created by him, through the urgency with which he required the first agreement to be signed, the haste surrounding the second, and an ultimatum made after Ms Thorne and her family had been brought to Australia for the wedding; and he took advantage of it ([64]-[65]).

Nettle J held that equity may intervene against unconscientious advantage-taking of a position of special disadvantage “regardless of whether the conduct is otherwise lawful”, and found a special disadvantage that Mr Kennedy created, of which he was aware or which a reasonable person in his position would have conceived as a real possibility ([74]); both agreements should be set aside ([77]-[78]). Gordon J found a special disadvantage arising from the circumstances in which Mr Kennedy brought Ms Thorne to Australia, the proximity of the wedding and the circumstances in which the agreement was first provided ([116]-[118]), and an unconscientious taking of advantage, the agreements being grossly improvident and the circumstances of their making supporting that conclusion ([120]-[122]).

Her Honour said that receipt of independent legal advice, which Ms Thorne chose to reject, was not a sufficient response, and that her willingness to sign despite being advised the agreements were “terrible” underscored the extent of the special disadvantage ([123]).

Duress: the plurality and Nettle J. The plurality described duress as focusing on the effect of a particular type of pressure on the person seeking to set aside the transaction, not requiring that the person’s will be overborne ([26]), and recorded that the abandonment of the early common law restriction raised the question whether duress rests on any unlawful threat or conduct or also on other illegitimate or improper but lawful threats or conduct ([27]). It held that it was not necessary to address Karam’s view that duress at common law requires threatened or actual unlawful conduct, or whether lawful act duress adds anything to unconscionable conduct ([29]), and that it was not necessary to consider duress at all, there being no detailed argument on illegitimacy or impropriety and no findings on those matters ([63]).

Nettle J said that but for Karam he would be disposed to decide on the basis of illegitimate pressure, and that Karam’s restriction was not necessarily doctrinally valid ([70]-[72]); departing from Karam would need detailed argument and deep consideration, and in oral argument it was accepted that the point was subsumed in unconscionable conduct ([73]).

Limits. The case concerned a vitiating factor between the parties to an agreement and not a person taking the benefit of a transaction procured by a third party ([25]). Causation was not in issue, though the plurality observed that an inference of causation or contribution is readily drawn where the transaction cannot reasonably be accounted for by “ordinary motives” ([24]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [30]–[32] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [57]–[59] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

These principles explain the plurality’s stated ground for restoring the orders on undue influence: the findings showed substantial subordination of Ms Thorne’s free choice. Improper pressure was unnecessary to that ground. This was a ground of decision alongside unconscionable conduct; the plurality did not require a presumption.

Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [35]–[36] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

The plurality expressly rejected the proposed presumption arising merely from engagement. That considered rejection addressed Ms Thorne’s alternative submission, but was unnecessary to the successful ground of actual undue influence established from the particular circumstances.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [80] (PDF p 38) (opens in a new tab), [103]–[108] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in the orders but rejected undue influence. She distinguished limited practical options from impaired independent judgment and considered Ms Thorne’s will unaffected. Her route to relief was unconscionable conduct, so her analysis must be distinguished from the plurality’s undue influence ground.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [38]–[40] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [64]–[65] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

The plurality applied the equitable principles restated from Kakavas to establish an additional ground for setting aside both agreements: special disadvantage, Mr Kennedy’s knowledge and his exploitation of it. The overlap with undue influence explains the inference of disadvantage here. Actual knowledge was found; the result did not require deciding whether purely constructive knowledge would suffice.

Separate reasoning · Nettle J

Read judgment: [74]–[78] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab)

Nettle J concurred in the orders on unconscionable conduct: Mr Kennedy created and took advantage of a special disadvantage that prevented Ms Thorne from judging her own best interests. This was his operative route to setting aside both agreements, without deciding undue influence or departing from Karam.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [116]–[123] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in the orders on unconscionable conduct despite finding no impairment of independent will. Her findings of special disadvantage and knowing exploitation supplied her ground for relief. Her treatment of independent legal advice answers why that advice did not defeat relief on these facts.

Proposition 3

Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [26] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

The explanation that duress concerns pressure rather than an overborne will distinguishes the doctrines. It was not a ground for the orders: the plurality resolved the appeal through undue influence and unconscionable conduct without deciding whether duress was established.

Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [29] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [63] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

The plurality expressly declined to decide whether lawful pressure could constitute common law duress or whether recognising it adds to unconscionable conduct. The lack of substantial argument and relevant findings, together with the successful equitable grounds, explains the reservation. These passages neither adopt nor overrule Karam.

Obiter · Nettle J

Read judgment: [70]–[73] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab)

Nettle J concurred in the orders but his doubts about Karam and inclination to recognise illegitimate lawful pressure were not his ground of decision. He expressly required detailed argument before departing from Karam and resolved the appeal on unconscionable conduct. These observations do not establish a holding that lawful act duress is available.

Why does this case matter?

A problem about a signed pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement invites two shortcuts: arguing that a lopsided deal is enough to set it aside, or treating a signature given after independent legal advice as the end of the matter. This is the High Court decision examiners expect in that setting, and it shows the three doctrines being sorted by what the facts show about the signer, not by a general sense of unfairness. Because the Justices reached the same orders by different reasoning, an answer that cites the case has to say whose reasoning it is using.

Exam and application relevance

Distinguish the judges’ routes to relief. Compare the plurality’s analysis of undue influence with Gordon J’s, and identify the ground on which Nettle J reasoned.

For an agreement signed under time pressure or a threat to end an engagement or marriage, build a chronology of the negotiations, advice and signing. Use it to examine the factors discussed at [60].

Examine Mr Kennedy’s knowledge of Ms Thorne’s circumstances. Identify the plurality’s formulation at [38], its application to these facts, and the later treatment recorded in the reveal.

Address independent legal advice under each doctrine separately ([56], [123]).

Identify which question about duress remained open and explain the place of Karam in the reasons ([29], [70]-[73]).

If the benefit of the transaction went to someone other than the person who applied the pressure, check the scope of the dispute described at [25] before relying on Thorne.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices held that Ms Thorne was subject to undue influence, and what did the plurality say the primary judge’s findings amounted to in effect ([57])?

2. How did Gordon J assess Ms Thorne’s capacity to make an independent judgment, and how did that assessment affect her Honour’s route to the orders ([80], [81])?

3. How did the plurality explain the relationship between undue influence and special disadvantage ([39]-[40])?

4. Mr Kennedy’s executors argued that duress at common law requires unlawful conduct. What did the plurality decide about that argument, and what did Nettle J say about the decision in Karam ([29], [70]-[73])?

5. Ms Thorne was advised by an independent solicitor not to sign and signed anyway. What did Gordon J say about that fact in relation to unconscionable conduct ([123])?